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

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

JOHN LOCKE

Frontispiece

The Growth of Modern Philosophy

By

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PREFACE

PHILOSOPHY may be at once, in the best sense of both words, popular and scientific. Plain speech does not make exact thinking impossible; and indeed there is authority enough, even in the work of recognised philosophers, for treating of the highest problems in the simplest language. Plato did not write textbooks, but dialogues which might be read outside the school; and Hume confessed to an attempt at being "ambassador from the realms of learning to those of conversation"—not, perhaps, without a smile at these divided kingdoms.

The distrust of philosophic terminology, so common in England, is a most valuable corrective for those uncouth obscurities with which philosophers sometimes mistakenly attempt to glorify their subject. Nevertheless a new thought often produces a strange

word, and philosophy no less than physical science must therefore master language. We form in language an instrument which is as dangerous as it is useful. The very words which may be an aid to clear thinking may be the destruction of real thought. For it has often happened that a trained mind can do nothing more valuable than juggle with terms. Such conjuring feats are not philosophy. Philosophy indeed becomes more real the more intelligible it is: but we need not suppose that to be popular a statement must be intelligible to fools. That would be to estimate too condescendingly the intelligence of "the people." The art of omission must be practised rather than diffuseness.

The central idea of this book is the intimate connection between real life and real thought. Philosophies are personal and national, and only thus can they be human. For that reason political history has been noticed. The world's life gives philosophies birth and death. We are now perhaps at the birth of a less provincial and less wordy philosophy than any which has been produced in the past.

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The Growth of Modern Philosophy

Chapter I

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHY

THE word "philosophy" has been used to cover many different meanings. In its earliest use, as the science of the lover of wisdom, it referred vaguely to the whole of the higher branches of education. That, however, was in the days when the various provinces of intellectual work were not clearly distinguished; when only the difference of brain from muscle, of thought from action, was seen. The first efforts of thought resulted in the specialisation of these various provinces; but "philosophy" still meant higher education, and included the first elements of such subjects

as we now call Astronomy, Literature, and Theology.

Further progress involved a still more restricted use, and at the present time philosophy properly means a severely specialised branch of intellectual work; but the past history of the word still causes many to suppose that any vague generalisation, any airy platitude, may be fairly called philosophical. It is useless to dispute about the proper meaning of words; but it is clearly necessary that one definite conception should always be referred to by the same term. For this reason it will be well to state the meaning of the word "philosophy" as used in the following pages.

Philosophy, then, may be described as an intellectual expression of the highest point of view obtainable, with regard to experience as a whole. That is to say, in the first place, philosophy is truly scientific. It is intellectual rather than emotional, and therefore more closely allied to what we in England know as Natural Science than to Art. Now, the real meaning of science, in its highest sense, is organised or systematic knowledge. Our

knowledge, therefore, in order to be scientific, must be such that every part is connected with every other part. There must be no closed compartments. It is for this reason that it has been truly said that "philosophy is not a fortuitous concussion of opinions." The collecting of opinions is useless for understanding philosophy.

But although philosophy's language, method, and result are purely logical or scientific, although it is concerned chiefly with the true, as contrasted with the good or the beautiful, yet the philosopher has a definite connection with the artist, with the poet, and with him whose life is given up to doing good; for the philosopher endeavours to attain to the highest point of view obtainable in his time, and the artist, the poet, the worker, have all of them something to give towards this end. Thus the philosopher is often more in sympathy with the poet than with the physical scientist. He loses touch with the scientist when the latter becomes a mere calculating machine. The true scientist is something more than that.

In the second place, philosophy expresses

the highest point of view obtainable. This does not mean that philosophy is in any way superior to the other branches of knowledge; for we may equally well say that philosophy is the logical ground of all knowledge. Sometimes, indeed, so deeply laid is the foundation of knowledge that the philosophy upon which it depends is beneath the surface; but that other metaphor involved in the use of the words "point of view" seems more illuminating. For thus it is imagined that we move, in the growth of our minds, up a mountain-side. When we are in the regions of "common sense" we are at the foot of the mountain. The hedges and the trees obscure our view, and, in order to understand the country in which we live, we need to mount higher. Thus we gain knowledge, by seeing in its setting what we had previously seen in a limited way. Thus also scientific knowledge is an explanation of what the senses show in detail. Now, the more we know the higher we move, and the more we can explain. At the highest point we may have a view of the whole land which we have seen in gradually decreasing detail during our climb. That

view will be our philosophical knowledge. We express it in our philosophy.

Before we leave this metaphor, however, it is well to consider what each one of us is likely to see. We shall see some fields which we know well, and roads, and perhaps houses, or perhaps some region unexplored; but for all of us there is an horizon. Beyond that we cannot see; nor can we hope, by any higher climbing the Mount of Metaphysic, to see beyond some horizon. Still farther away is the "untravelled land, whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move."

This sense of the horizon is present to every true philosopher. He does not forget the fields of common life, or the well-made roads and governed lands of partial sciences. Nor is he any the less a true and clear thinker because he is aware of the dim limits to present knowledge. Only let it not be imagined that beyond the horizon lie ghosts and mysteries, or that the great dragon, the Unknowable, dwells there. As we climb higher we may see that the unknown is not the unknowable.

It is now possible to consider the third phrase used in the description of philosophy.

The subject-matter of philosophy is "experience as a whole." This is the land over which we look from the highest point of our climb. There is no sacred strangeness in the words used. Experience means just what comes to us as we live and think and feel. All this the philosopher attempts to deal with, and to express in consistent language. Naturally, therefore, much of the detail will be obscured; for we cannot keep all our experience before us at one moment. The only possibility is that of so arranging our mind and our statements as to allow for all the various aspects of our experience, as they appear.

It is clearly involved in this conception of philosophy that, in a sense, every man is his own philosopher. If a man cannot think out, in some way, his own experience, it is useless for him to read Hume or Kant. He will not find much in what follows here; for philosophy, like charity, begins at home. It is necessary first to think clearly for oneself: it might almost be said to be the one thing necessary. Kant himself cannot do the thinking for another. In a more limited sense, however, it may be truly said that the founda-

tion of all philosophy is the experience of an individual. The man in the street or the average man has his philosophy. The crudest "opinion" and the finest knowledge arise from the same kind of root—experience. Thus it is at least barely possible for any man, even without scientific training, to attain to an adequate and not self-contradictory view of "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth."

Although this is possible, yet it is likely that the untrained mind will be led astray upon side-issues. Thus philosophy, strictly so-called, implies previous training in intellectual work. Again, the experience of an individual is fragmentary: it is like a piece of paper torn from a larger piece. The jagged edges, where personal experience ends, are fitted into and "explained" by all the work of science and of history. Hence a real philosophy needs to be drawn from an extended experience. The wider the preliminary knowledge, the more adequate the final explanation will be; and since the explanation thus attained will apply to more than the fragmentary experience of a single individual,

philosophy becomes as much a special province of thought as do the various branches of physical science.

In this stricter sense, the man in the street is not a philosopher. Nor have the homœopathic doses of quacks any claim to recognition. Knowledge, as in the special sciences, is the only justification for opinion; and philosophy is a special kind of knowledge. Thus every age has its philosophers; for it has men who can see more clearly than others over all the fields at the moment extended before the mountain, up which both the race and the individual are climbing. In every age, again, the philosophers are in the minority; and in this subject, as in any other branch of study, the majority have absolutely no right to an opinion. Traditional charms for the difficulties raised by thinking are of no value, however often they may be repeated. As well may physical science be judged by comparison with the mythology of a child or a savage, as may philosophy be refuted by an appeal to what is called common sense.

The philosopher gathers up the results of sciences, whether they deal with event or

with fact—whether, that is to say, they are historical or physical. From these results he derives a system of knowledge. Or, to put it in another way, the philosopher thinks out what is implied in the results of the various sciences, and from this derives a knowledge of the world in which we live. Thus a true physical science or scientific history involves a philosophy, and a true philosophy implies a physical science and a history.

To return, however, to the central point of all that has preceded, the vital core of true philosophy is experience. Now, experience is always changing. The experience of a man to-day is different from what was the experience of those who now are dead; and from this follows the use of history, for as the point of view changes in an individual life, so it does in the life of the race. What was the highest point reached by ancient Britons may seem very low to us now. We may even suppose that we can see farther and more clearly than many a Greek philosopher.

The history of philosophy is a history of those who have seen farthest and clearest; and it is only by seeing as far and as clearly

as they that we may hope to make one step towards a point of view which is higher. We are related to the great philosophers neither as followers nor as critics; but we learn through them to see more clearly the world in which we live, for a great thinker concentrates in his writing the highest expression of the thought of his time. Moreover, because the world is in a great measure the same to-day as it was to Aristotle or to Kant, we may suppose that the great thinker sees more deeply into the make of our world than many who come after him. Thus it is true, in one sense, to say that a great philosophy is never out of date, and, in another sense, to say that the philosophy of yesterday cannot explain the experience of to-day.

The interest of this history of modern philosophy will therefore lie in the tracing of a gradual movement towards the position now held by thinkers. The successive views are but aspects in a steady development; the disagreement among philosophers is but a sign of life in their knowledge. For knowledge is like a tree with many branches, which part as the tree grows.

The purpose of this history is not the mere recording of events. It is intended that, by understanding the insight of past philosophers, our own philosophic insight may be improved. Least of all should a study of history produce the shallow scepticism that is based upon the disagreement of authorities. The fact that philosophers have disagreed is not a proof that no truth is to be attained. It is the complexity of the problem and not the lack of evidence which causes disagreement in the authorities. Too much has been made of the uncertain nature of some of the conclusions of philosophy: it is supposed that a sceptical attitude is the only possible one after we have put reason to its highest use. This, however, is false, though it may be persuasive. It is not the office of philosophy to destroy. For it is by the careful use of logical thought that truth—and in truth the foundation of goodness and beauty—is to be found. It may be that much of popular belief must be destroyed; but the result is not a blind scepticism. Although philosophy may cause revolution, that is not its end. For it does not declare all beliefs equally untrue; and if certain statements are

discovered to be false, it can only be because we have some positive truth with which to compare them.

The history of philosophy is the chronicle of a gradual explaining of a growing experience. The Reality, which is still as unplumbed by us as it was by the earliest thinkers, is yet more and more understood. The journey may be into the darkness, but we carry with us a light; and scepticism as to the progress of thought is more often the result of an inability to think than of the despair of a thinker. Men often mistake the narrowness of their own intellects for the limitations of knowledge.

It is always possible that a history of change in philosophic thought may leave the philosophic interest in the subject-matter external to the reader. The number of names and terms often confuses the issue; for the only view to which this history will appear as a unity is that taken "from the inside." Unless the problems are real to the reader, and he understands the meaning of the solutions from the point of view of Hume or Kant, the history of philosophy will fail of

its chief interest and of all its importance. That is to say, it is necessary for the individual himself to go through the intellectual stages of the race.

If the thinker can take any view of the subject-matter that does not leave the interest quite external to himself, then the history of philosophy becomes of great use in the formation of a real philosophy. For what we may call the philosophical perspective is gained more easily from history than from the separate study of any one system, however perfect it may be. The true philosopher is a "spectator of all time, and all existence"; and to him comes, what the Greeks counted as the great reward of philosophy—untroubled calm. For he who watches with steady eyes the growth of the tree of life and knowledge is not likely to be disturbed if the wind sometimes shakes the dead leaves to the ground.

Chapter II

THE RENAISSANCE

IN the Renaissance the modern world began. The ghosts which had haunted the Middle Ages were gradually laid. The Holy Roman Empire disappeared like a dream: the centralised and political religion of Rome faded into nothing. The barren way of ascetic holiness was deserted, and the world breathed again.

The old tradition used to say that Scholasticism, the philosophy of the Middle Ages, was refuted by the thinkers of the Renaissance; that men learned then to forsake authorities in order to think for themselves. This, however, is not altogether true. Scholasticism was never refuted: it died in a good old age, full of works and days. Indeed, the thinkers of the Renaissance were themselves scholastic. Bacon, the supposed

founder of a new philosophy, used the syllogism to prove that the syllogism was useless. It was not abstract thought, but actual life which killed Scholasticism. The experience of men changed utterly, and a philosophy which had arisen in cloisters was too narrow to explain the open world. Bacon was closer to the truth in what he implied than in what he said. But he expressed the real issue when he asserted that scholastic philosophy was "quite inadequate to explain the subtlety of nature." Again, the revelation which the Middle Ages had found in their Arabian Aristotle did not cease when the Renaissance learnt Greek. As soon as the new literary knowledge showed men the meaning of Greek thought, the day of an authoritative philosophy was over; and, as the scholastics had learnt from Greece, so now did the humanists. It is true indeed that the Renaissance scholars protested against the barren logic-chopping that, at the close of Scholasticism, sheltered itself under the great name of Aristotle. Nevertheless, it is evident that the meaning of the protest lay in the fact that over-subtle commentary had obscured that freshness of

inspiration which the northern mind has always been able to find in Greek thought. Thus it is rather the truth that the scholastics of the decadence had separated, in spirit if not in words, from their great predecessors, than that the Renaissance was a period of revolt against the spirit and method of the thirteenth century.

In the Renaissance there were two intellectual movements, one literary, the other scientific—both, however, based on the new experience. The value of the literary or humanist Renaissance was not so great as that of the scientific movement, with regard at least to positive and obvious effects; but as a movement towards a general spread of education and an increase of the class to whom philosophic thought could appeal, its value is incalculable. Add to this that, by the very force of its name, the humanist movement caused the development of the study of man in all his various relations, in State and Church. Nothing is stranger in the scholastic philosophy than the complete lack of interest in the romantic lore, the chivalry and the art of the Middle Ages. Philosophy

among the Schoolmen was far removed from the life of the world in which it arose; but it was entirely different with the humanist, and in directing thought towards all living experience, he began the restoration of a real philosophy.

The spread of knowledge and general education is usually connected with the scattering of Greek manuscripts and the wandering of the Greek scholars which followed the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire; but, as a matter of fact, the fields lay ready long before all this seed was sown. With the dissolution of mediæval ideals, the nations found their true interest to lie in independent self-development, and not in eternal conflicts for barren territory or delusive privileges. Common interests united men in the demand for non-interference. Hitherto, war had been the central idea of politics; now commerce took its place.

Thus it came about that, as in Athens during the period of the Sophists, it was possible for a larger class of men than those within the cloister to find the leisure and knowledge which are necessary for higher thought.

The effects of humanism were at first confined to the artistic or emotional sphere; but the mind could not fail to pass beyond the form to the inspiring thoughts of the ancient philosophy. The humanists were therefore soon divided into Platonists and Aristotelians. The general attitude of humanism has been well expressed as "the belief that nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality —no language they have ever spoken, nor oracle beside which they have hushed their voices; no dream which has once been entertained by actual human minds; nothing about which they have ever been passionate or expended time and zeal."

The most striking note in all the writers of this new age, whether philosophical or purely literary, is that of individuality. It was the development of all the powers of oneself that was the ideal of humanism; and this shows itself in the philosophic literature through a fearless criticism by individuals of much that had formerly been reserved to authorities, and in an eager search for all kinds of knowledge. The independence, which

seemed now to be gained for the individual, is expressed both in the sceptical tendency of some writers and in the admiration of others for all forms of strength in character.

Humanism was chiefly an Italian movement, and the scientific learning which followed belonged chiefly to the North. Bruno and Campanella represent the effort of the Italian mind to attune itself to the new science. Both acknowledge their indebtedness to Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, and both are in sympathy with the new view of the phenomenal universe introduced by astronomers. Bruno is enthusiastic over the destruction of those ghostly crystal spheres which had confined the thoughts of the Middle Ages to dull earth; and Campanella is inspired by the thought of a universe which was no longer supposed to be centred round man and his petty comic tragedies. Half mystic as they were, it is not possible to extract a logical system from their writings; but for philosophy it is interesting to note that Bruno grasped the relativity of scientific thought, and that Campanella hoped for a philosophy of experience. The latter was author of an

ideal dream, an earthly paradise, "The City of the Sun," built upon the model of Plato's Republic. It is well to note in the history of these two men the difficulties with which original thought had to deal in southern countries. Bruno suffered much imprisonment and was eventually burnt at the stake by the Roman authorities. Campanella was imprisoned by the Inquisition for twenty-seven years.

While humanism in Italy tended to pass into purely formal interest and the thrashing of literary straw, the new science had already arisen in the North. Not that Renaissance science was wholly non-Italian—such names as those of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei should remind us of the contrary; but Italy, in the later Renaissance, tended more and more to lose the possibility of thought. She was oppressed with the decadence which followed the brilliant development of her city-states, and for years she was merely a battleground.

In the North, however, scientific thought had a swift development. This had followed upon a period devoted to the acquisition of

new facts. Invention and discovery changed the aspect of the world at the Renaissance before men began to speculate on the meaning of the new life they had found. It is sufficient to remember that the conception of the earth was changed by the discovery of America, and still more by the new astronomy. "The floor of heaven inlaid with stars had sunk back into an infinite abyss of immeasurable space; and the firm earth itself, unfixed from its foundations, was seen to be but a small atom in the awful vastness of the universe." Yet men looked forward with the more hope, at the very moment when they seemed to have sunk into insignificance; for reason, which had revealed the universe, also gave the inventions which enabled man to assert his place in it. The compass and the telescope, and the thousand mechanical devices of which printing was the most important, could not fail to arouse enthusiasm. Of this enthusiasm the philosophy of the Renaissance is the result.

It was Bacon who first introduced the ideas of the new science into the development of philosophy. Though not himself a specialist in either philosophy or science, he saw and

stated clearly the attitude of a thoughtful man towards the new experience. It was indeed obvious that the professional learning and official methods of the day had done nothing towards all those acquisitions which now impressed the world. Bacon therefore set about to discover the methods which seemed to have been involved, and to develop the theory by the aid of which the world hoped that progress might be made. He was not a deep thinker, but a keen and practical observer. His aim was generally to acquire such knowledge as might make life more easy. We are prevented from direct knowledge by prejudices ("idols" of race, of our own, of common speech, or of tradition); and when these are cleared away, we may begin the examination of experienced facts. Our method, says Bacon, should be "true and exclusive induction"; which is merely a modified form of the old Aristotelian accumulation of instances. He looked forward to a steady accumulation of "facts" by many observers; and in the end we are to have a New Atlantis, where government will be according to knowledge. Thus far Bacon

expresses the ideals of his day; but in actual knowledge he was considerably wanting. He appears to have been ignorant of the possibilities that lay in the mechanical conception of nature; and his theory of method has not proved valuable—except, of course, in so far as he pointed out the obvious fact that actual experience is the most fruitful source of real knowledge.

A much greater place in the history of philosophy is deserved by Thomas Hobbes. With him philosophic thought was the central interest, and he it was who developed a consistent system out of the naturalistic hypotheses of Renaissance science. In method and in the results of his work he marks the connection between Bacon and Descartes, both of whose systems he knew. Hobbes was a clear thinker, who began with the data of sense-perception as his most tangible starting-point, and would not move forward beyond the test of immediate experience. Such words as "infinite" and "eternal" and "incorporeal," only too common in the metaphysics of his day, were for him only the shelters of ignorance and excuses for absurdity. He is practi-

cally the founder of modern psychological investigation, which deals with states, and not with faculties and essences. His whole philosophy was a definite system of empiricism, and he, not Bacon, is the true founder of this English type of thought.

In the theory of social life he attempted an historical explanation of the existing political forms. Previously, thinkers had written as though each form of government had been suddenly inspired. He, however, says that the needs and dangers of isolated individuals led them to make a contract between themselves, abdicating all power and giving it into the hands of one central government—the great Leviathan. As against absolutism, therefore, we may say that the sovereign power is dependent ultimately upon the will of the people; and, as against individualism, that the State once formed must be obeyed.

The course of political events in England, the war between King and Parliament, had attracted the attention of Hobbes; and, crude as his theory was, it was immensely important for the future of philosophy. But nothing further was accomplished in England, in the

THOMAS HOBBES

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problems of pure thought, until after the Revolution of 1688.

In France, however, the Renaissance had reached a system of philosophy from which all modern thought can trace a direct descent. The way by which modern thinkers have reached knowledge undreamt of by the Greeks or the Scholastics was first shown by René Descartes; but although his attitude of mind and his method are those of the new thought, much of the system which he imagined himself to have discovered was a survival of effete ideas. There are indeed two distinct movements in the thought of Descartes: one analytic or critical—in this his work is of permanent value; and the other synthetic or constructive—and this gave results beyond which we have long passed.

The early training of Descartes was mathematical. It was by contrasting the acknowledged certainty and precision of mathematics with the uncriticised traditions and vague platitudes of Scholastic metaphysics that Descartes conceived the idea of a philosophic knowledge of the world which would be of mathematical type. He had therefore

to begin with a thorough examination of experience and of all that was supposed to be knowledge, in order to establish some position upon which he could safely construct a real philosophy. His critical attitude is expressed in the formula, "One must doubt everything." This, however, must not be understood as mere scepticism; for the doubt is a transitory position, adopted for an end which would destroy doubt. Cartesian doubt precedes, it does not follow knowledge.

The method thus adopted is clearly based upon the conception that real knowledge is a systematic construction or growth in the mind of an individual. The system of knowledge, our philosophy, can only arise by connection with some definite basis—with what is fundamental in the mind of the knower: and this presupposition of all knowledge Descartes expressed in the statement, "Cogito ergo sum"—"I am conscious, that is to say I exist," or "I exist in so far as I am thinking." The awareness of one's own existence is the basis for all reasoning. Beyond this we cannot go: the individual thinker exists.

Now, although it was susceptible of many

meanings, this phrase has founded the modern conception that real knowledge begins at home. Descartes himself did not make clear all its implications. Indeed, he was but making more explicit the concept of individuality with which the best Scholasticism ended. The Terminists, or Occamites, had attempted to express it in an obsolete terminology; the Mystics had attempted the same thing in their return to the Augustinian idea of self; but of all this Descartes does not seem to have been aware. A man is not less great if he takes the elements of his thought from the achieved results of his predecessors or contemporaries; but, in the spirit of the Renaissance, Descartes develops this thought of the individual as though it had no human parentage. He actually speaks of himself as having learnt nothing from Aristotle and the philosophers.

The result was only too apparent when Descartes went on to elaborate his own philosophy. He began at once to reintroduce the old concepts of metaphysics. He states that the postulate of individual existence is like a mathematical hypothesis, and is

therefore a statement from which argument may proceed. Our awareness or certainty of this postulate is described as "intuitive." Hence we may say that intuition gives us certain clear or distinct ideas as principles from which to start: in view of their immediate connection with self-consciousness, these are called "innate ideas." On this kind of basis every kind of uncriticised thought may be introduced. For, if a man declares this or the other idea to be innate in him, there is no evidence upon which anyone else can convince him of his error. Among the clear ideas Descartes found the most prominent to be that of an infinite and perfect Being; but since, he argued, I am neither, this clear idea must be caused from outside me. Therefore God exists. Thus the old concept of efficient cause is smuggled in. The next step in his philosophy was for Descartes to introduce as intuitively certain the distinctions used in every-day language. He finds that experience gives him two kinds of "substance"—namely, "things" and human "selves" ("res extensæ" and "res cogitantes").

With the "selves" or "thinking substances" Descartes was not much concerned. They are said to be independent beings, or souls, connected at one point (the pineal gland) with certain portions of extended substance, called bodies. The old mediæval "soul" is thus gradually changing into the modern "self," and is therefore gradually disappearing. Descartes, however, is far from clear on the point. It remains only to observe that we have in his philosophy, as regards "souls," what is nowadays ordinarily called the common-sense view.

It is interesting to note that common sense means out-of-date metaphysics. The ordinary talk of soul and body, as though the human self were composed of parts, is not by any means based upon evidence; it is as much a theory as the extremest idealism, and it is a theory which is useless in accounting for the facts.

On the other hand, in his conception of "extended things" Descartes laid the foundation of the modern view of Nature as a machine. Yet this is just the point in which he thought himself least original. Indeed, he

owed much to the mathematics of his day, and to the work of Kepler; but Descartes applied these to the treatment of "matter" as nothing else but "extension," and by means of this conception the phenomenal world has gradually been explained with mathematical exactness. Thus the various "things" of experience already tend, in Descartes' language, to be regarded as fundamentally one "thing-substance." This is no other than the "matter" of physical science. Homogeneity of nature and uniformity of action are thus postulated for the whole phenomenal world; and the fundamental idea of this world is that of spatial extension. Here, it is interesting to observe, we have the statement which still satisfies many who are called scientists: the world of extended matter is a theory—in philosophy, an out-of-date theory.

Whatever the value of the conception of the world thus gained, it is not adequate as an explanation of the ordinary world of experience. The resulting difficulties in explaining "thought" or "emotion," or other realities of that nature, are not difficulties which arise out of the mysterious nature of "thought."

RENÉ DESCARTES

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There is nothing mysterious about that; but, because the original theory of a world-machine is wrong, a difficulty arises—thought cannot be explained. As Berkeley put it, "we raise the dust, and then complain that we cannot see."

Descartes himself was puzzled to explain the occasional connection of an alien substance, a thinking thing, with this phenomenal world of invariable law. The world of thought is no less real than the world of colour and size; but the dualism, which Descartes treated as intuitively certain, and with which many to-day are satisfied, made it impossible to solve the problem. Hence arises the long list of "difficulties"—the "freedom-and-law" difficulty, and the rest. It may be well to observe that difficulty in explanation is due more often to the falsity of some hypothesis from which we have started than to the intrinsic nature of "the world"; indeed, we are often led to suppose that the world is a puzzle through turning ourselves round and round so rapidly that we cannot see it clearly.

CHAPTER III

SPINOZA AND LEIBNITZ

DESCARTES had left the world a bluntly stated dualism; but, since the one word "thing" was used to describe the substantial existence of thinking things and extended things, there was a ground for monism. The two kinds of "thing," matter and mind, had something in common by force of which each could be called a "thing" or a reality. This is only to say that reality is essentially one; and this at least is what is meant by all systems of monism. Spinoza it was who created the first systematic monism of modern times. The ideal of method, the mathematical or geometrical form of argument, was accepted by Spinoza from Descartes, and the half-expressed principles of Cartesianism were carried to their legitimate conclusions.

To appreciate Spinoza's philosophy, some

knowledge of his life is necessary. Indeed, the life of a philosopher is never unimportant to the consideration of his philosophy; for, as it has been said, every real philosophy begins from the experience of the individual thinker. Moreover, in the history of philosophy there are the names of many whose character was as immortal as their thought. Spinoza was one of these.

He was born of Jewish parents at Amsterdam (1632). The Jews with whom he was connected had taken refuge in the Netherlands when the persecutions of the Inquisition under Philip III. had driven them from the Spanish peninsula. Thus Spinoza was of the same race of Jews whose writings educated the Scholastics during the Middle Ages; for it was to the Spanish Jews as well as to the Spanish Arabs that the Schoolmen owed their most brilliant theories.

Spinoza received his education at the schools of the Synagogue at Amsterdam, where the teaching was strictly orthodox. "Though I was nurtured," he writes, "in the current views of the Scriptures, and my mind filled with their teaching, I was compelled to break

with my early beliefs." His very silence in regard to orthodox opinions aroused suspicion, and at last, partly because of his non-attendance at the Synagogue, his reserve became a ground for accusation. He was badgered by two of his former school-fellows, whose zeal for orthodoxy led them to care for the consciences of others. He was then delated to the Synagogue. There statements were made as to what he really believed, and he was called upon to retract. Spinoza found it impossible to retract what he had never uttered; yet, seeing that he would not state what he did believe, he was anathematised and excommunicated. This meant expulsion from his home, and Spinoza continued barely to live by employment as an usher in a small school. Afterwards he found a more congenial way of living by working as an optician. During the years which followed he made himself thoroughly acquainted with the Cartesian philosophy. Men were dogmatic and difficult to live with even at Amsterdam and at Rhynsberg, so he eventually found a home at the Hague. His writings had made his name known, and he was offered a post at

the University of Heidelberg; but Spinoza felt that in such an official position his "liberty of philosophising" would be curtailed, so he continued to grind lenses. He died at the Hague (1677), leaving the greatest of his works, "The Ethics," still unpublished.

The central idea of Spinoza's philosophy is that of substance. He found the word loosely used, sometimes for that unknown bond in the ceaseless change of experience which makes us say a thing is the same; sometimes for that which beyond all appearances could alone be called truly real. In its more definite meaning, as the permanent and the real, substance had been used to explain the world of phenomena; but it is obvious that the "things" of our every-day speech are by no means permanent. Besides the change which takes place in the size, for example, of a tree, there is that other change which takes place on the total destruction or disappearance of the tree. Substance, therefore, if it means the permanent, must lie beyond the existence of any individual things, and so ultimately we may speak of change and contrast as really occurring in one medium. Already Descartes

had seen that the whole phenomenal world was of one essential type, in that it was extended. Here, therefore, the old Scholastic things, the separate and independent substances, had disappeared for ever from the language of philosophy. Further, exactly the same method of argument will show that the other type of Cartesian substances, conscious selves ("res cogitantes"), are ultimately reducible to modifications of one absolute reality; for, in so far as substantial existence is the basis and presupposition of all change, the thinking selves, which are in continual change, which themselves come and go, cannot be conceived as independently real and substantial; so we may be but waves upon the ocean which is God. This God is no theological one, but merely "natura naturans"—the cause, the ultimate reality, of the phenomenal world.

Thus the double world of things and selves can be reduced by the same forcible logic to an ultimate unity; and here alone will thought rest, for this is the ultimate explanation of the world in which we live. Opposition demands a ground beyond itself in which the

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opposition may occur; and, if the world be conceived as consisting of modifications in two kinds of substance, it follows that because these two kinds can be contrasted they must be in some way alike. They are alike, says Spinoza, because ultimately they are seen to be the same. "All bodies, however various, are full of soul." This same thing of which all are made is the eternal and immutable, undistinguished and absolute substance, "God or Nature." Of this supreme Reality nothing can be known intellectually, for it is above all attributes, and no qualities can be predicated of it.

We have here an argued system of mystical philosophy, in which all the detail and opposition of immediate experience has disappeared. Its wording is almost that of the old negative theology, which rises by negation of this and that to a concept of the ultimate ground of all experience; but so far the result is barren of explanation in regard to the finite and immediate world of every-day experience. Indeed, the idea of Substance, with which Spinoza's "Ethics" begins, is not really the starting-place for his thought. We

know that it is a habit of philosophers to take that idea from which they begin their reconstruction as if it were the idea from which their whole system arose; but in fact, before the philosopher reaches the first page of his writing, he has been through a long process of thinking. Thus it seems often that the greatest difficulty in understanding a philosopher is that which occurs at the very beginning; and the philosopher himself tends to forget that the logical order in which he sets out his thought is not the order in which he himself developed it. So Spinoza begins his explanation of the ordinary world from the idea of substance; but we may well suppose that it was the ordinary world which gave rise to that idea. Spinoza's philosophy is a finished lens, through which he saw more clearly the same world which he had dimly seen before.

This, then, is the explanation of the world of ordinary life: Of substance there are two great modifications—the Cartesian extended matter and a world of thought or spirit. The whole of the finite world is therefore dual; each part is a perfect whole within God or

Nature, and within each part subdivision is determined by subdivision. That is to say, the divisions of the apparent world are real divisions only if looked at from within; or again, we see the world divided because we are ourselves each a division. We may thus conceive that separation as such is unreal, and that ultimately the whole, from a point of view which is higher, may be regarded as two sides of one thing. The world of science is nature that has been produced, and the force which produces lies within that world.

But is the world of human individuality also appearance? Spinoza says it is; yet he does not mean that it is all an illusion. He never denies that for the man a separate and independent individuality is true as a practical postulate; but for him who has risen to some vision of the whole it is also true to say that reality is one unbroken system, all self-determined. The practical postulate of life, the idea of an independent individual, gives rise to the basis of all good life—the force of self-assertion ("conatus sui conservandi"). It is therefore true morality to develop the self to the uttermost, and all

limitation is to be regarded as a means to this end. Now, the greater the knowledge of the whole, the greater the development of the individual is likely to be: for this reason it is said that virtue is knowledge. The attitude of the will is absolutely determined by what is thought to be good, and so in fact intellect absorbs all the supposed functions of a freely choosing will. Hence also it is the positive side of life that we must commend, in the faith that evil and all negatives do not ultimately exist. Grief and abjectness are to be done away with, and we are to go forward with the assurance that God or Nature does not mislead us. We are not to suppose, however, that we can cast ourselves free from the circumstances of our nature. True freedom is not a right with which we are born, but a prize which we must win.

With such resolute logic as his, it is hardly to be wondered at if Spinoza was isolated from the thought of his day. A thousand interests other than those of pure truth were in conflict with what seemed to be a violation of all the established conceptions of life. Thus it was that Spinoza's conception of his

own meaning, and the judgment passed on him by contemporaries, were absolutely opposed. He whom a future age recognised as "drunk with godhead" was regarded by men of his own time as an atheist.

But, quite apart from popular misunderstanding, there are obvious limitations in Spinoza's philosophy. His thought did not express a complete insight into the world of his day. And in fact we find that the deficiencies of the grinder of lenses were supplied by a courtier-philosopher. Leibnitz was not so great a man as Spinoza; but his position in the development of philosophy is important as supplementing that of his opponent. For whereas Spinoza saw the unity of the world, Leibnitz saw its infinite variety.

No more startling contrast could be desired than is to be found in the lives of these two. This fact will prepare us for a contrast of view, if once it is granted that the philosopher's own experience is the ground for all his speculation. Leibnitz was no recluse. He not only stands in definite relation to all parties of his own day, but is himself a link between the periods of history. He is

an example of the polymath of the Renaissance, knowing classic and scholastic literature as well as the empirical science and mathematics of his own age; and he is also one of the first exponents of the ideal of personal culture peculiar to the Aufklärung—the German Enlightenment.

Leibnitz (1646–1716) was the son of a professor of moral philosophy at Leipsic. His education was varied, and his later life was filled with different employments. Travel and the meeting with great men of his day—Arnauld, Boyle, and Spinoza—further widened his views. In the theory of language he was far in advance of his time; and he published an improved version of the differential calculus, which had just been discovered. He was energetic in supporting the foundation of Scientific Academies and in attempting to reunite Christendom.

A system of philosophy was but slowly established in the mind of Leibnitz. This had its effect in the comprehensiveness of the result. Feeling as he did the gain to thought which had been due to the mechanical conception of nature, he was aware, never-

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ

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theless, that the formation of a philosophy upon that model had been too hurried. Important elements of experience had been omitted. Thus Leibnitz first appears as a critic of the Cartesian philosophy of nature, in behalf of the æsthetic and moral elements in human life. In spite of opposition, however, Leibnitz was at one with the new philosophy in so far as it denied the "forms" and "occult powers" of Scholasticism. His language as to clear ideas and the opposition of soul and body remains Cartesian; though doubtless the meaning is transformed when these terms have been placed within his new system.

The problem which first attracted Leibnitz was that of the opposition between the mechanical or determinist philosophy and the teleology or purposes upon which all the value of life seemed to depend. Here we have the clear opposition of determined Nature and free-willed Man. So certain and logical is the determinist conception of the world that no reasonable man could deny it all value. Are we then to think of the waves of law rising to cover the last vestige

of personality? Is individuality to disappear into a scientific formula? Or are we to say, "Thus far and no farther"? Leibnitz faced the spectre of mechanism, and, by discovering the limitations of the new philosophy, he reached a point of view from which he could explain both the truth which it contained and the interests it opposed. Of course the same battle had to be fought again in different lands, because the vision of Leibnitz was partial and inadequate. Nevertheless, it was he who made the first step. For the mathematical and stable relations to which Cartesianism had reduced the world, Leibnitz substituted active centres of individual force which he called Monads. The connection of these monads, and the establishment of that ultimate unity which is a necessity for metaphysics, he sought in an idea of Pre-established Harmony. The most striking elements of his thought may be explained under these two terms.

First, with regard to Monads, the mathematical knowledge of Leibnitz led him to doubt the hypothesis of infinitely divisible extension as the ultimate nature of bodies.

It is obvious that such an hypothesis is insufficient to account for motion and change. The concept of force must be introduced before it can be even a scientific theory; but the idea of force, if regarded as fundamental, will explain both change and the dependent extension. Activity will explain passivity; but passivity can never explain activity. Thus, as with Spinoza, the demand is made for the reduction of hypothesis to a simple form; not two substantial existences are to be admitted, but the world is to be conceived as consisting of one substance which is *force* ("vis viva," force primitive). Substance may be defined as "a being capable of action." This does not mean that force is so much "material"; but it means that force is what is ultimately real, the independent upon which all determination depends. Thus in itself force is merely "that which brings about change."

We are here not far from the nature as producing ("natura naturans") of Spinoza. Leibnitz, however, proceeds to show that there are many substances, and not one only. The correction of Spinoza rests upon the nature

of self-consciousness, for the world of experience can clearly be divided into self and not-self. It is not clear, it must be confessed, why Leibnitz should think himself justified in supposing that experience gives innumerable such divisions; but, having fixed upon the conception of self and many selves, he finds the self to be a type of force. The centre of force is called a monad, or individual, because it is independent. Now, the force of which we are aware in ourselves is immanent, for, having separated the self from the not-self, we cannot reunite them. Thus the monad is described as having no windows, nor any means of influencing what is outside. Within the self we find a succession of states passing upwards from the subconscious "petites perceptions" to perception or sensory life, and thence to apperception, or the conscious appropriation of sensory data by the self.

The whole world is a world of individuals. No amount of metaphysical thinking can justify us in denying that fundamental division upon which all such thinking is based—the division of the self from what is not the

self. Nothing is but monads. These monads are of all kinds, united only in so far as they are all the expressions of force. Some are "sleeping monads," such as what we call dead matter; some are half-awakened, such as trees or animals.

Of the poetic beauty of such a conception there can be no doubt; but a cruel logic must ask for reasons. What ground is there for supposing that the whole of this world of monads is not merely a subjective dream—and this more especially since we have asserted that no influence can pass from one monad to another? Leibnitz replies with the theory of a pre-established harmony. In each monad the internal activities are harmonious with the changes in every other monad, so that each is a unique synthesis of the various states in all the others; and, because of this content in each, the monads are all bound together in harmony. At first the harmony was spoken of by Leibnitz as an external connecting-link between all monads; but later it becomes itself a force, and therefore the Monad of monads—God. Then we may say the harmony regarded as

the link between finite monads is "caused by" God. Because the harmony is a logical presupposition of a world of monads it is called pre-established. The relation of the finite monads to the infinite Monad is spoken of, neo-platonically, as "continual fulguration."

With the theological learning of Leibnitz we are not concerned. He wrote a justification of "God" in a very different and more orthodox meaning of that term. He also discovered that pleasant fable, based upon a mistake of formal logic, that this is the best of all possible worlds.

Leibnitz thought he could maintain the orthodox view of the world; but, like other and better men, he imagined he had found a new meaning in orthodoxy, when he had only found a new name for it. The violence of his opposition to Spinoza, if honest, was due to his zeal for orthodoxy. Spinoza, however, was already beyond the reach of a courtier's zeal against the heresy of a recluse.

In their thinking, these two men express a very old contrast. It is nothing less than the relation of the individual to the absolute

which was in question. Approached from one side all the world seems one reality, and from the other side plurality is obvious and omnipresent. Spinoza, perhaps, with Eastern leanings, loses the individual in the absolute: Leibnitz, with his Western mind, could never forget that the living individual is the basis of all thought and life.

CHAPTER IV

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

WHILE the great thinkers of the Continent were employed in the making of comprehensive systems, Philosophy was being developed in England with a different purpose. A precision of knowledge rather than an all-embracing system seemed most valuable. The field viewed was confined within the limits of almost personal observation, and hence it has been sometimes doubted whether we can even speak of an English Philosophy of that period. For philosophy must at any rate attempt a comprehensive view of experience. It is, however, true to say that a comprehensive view must involve exact observation of detail, and in this the great system-makers have often been at fault. Hence we may count as within the main stream of development those thinkers

whose office it has been to test, by continual reference to immediate experience, the comprehensive thought reached by their predecessors. In fact, the course of thought which we have now to trace in England and in France makes the necessary antithesis to the dogmatic systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz. Out of the opposition between these two types of thought, the unifying and the analysing, arose the philosophy of Kant.

Although Locke and his followers were inspired by Cartesianism, their continual reference to ordinary experience for the data of their philosophy serves to connect them with the English philosophy attempted by Bacon and Hobbes. Since the days in which direct thinking had been practised by Hobbes in England, political revolutions had been accomplished. The whole scheme of mediæval life was gone. The passions of opposing parties, from which Hobbes had suffered, were almost cooled, and the time seemed ripe for constructive thought. In the intellectual world an obsolete Scholasticism held the Universities, and Cartesianism was still unorthodox. Oxford was consistently

Aristotelian. At Cambridge, where the Renaissance had produced such criticism as that of Bacon, a kind of anti-Cartesianism was attempted. The Cambridge Platonists, as the new thinkers were called, are connected with the literary rather than with the scientific Renaissance. They are of interest chiefly as indicating the tendencies which were opposed to the efforts of Locke and Hume. Of far greater importance for the future of philosophy was the work of Isaac Newton, who, though no philosopher, carried to its legitimate consequences the mechanical view of nature.

The purely philosophical movement which we have now to discuss may be conveniently regarded as a single whole. It begins in Empiricism, it changes with Berkeley into an Idealism only half-developed, and it ends in the Scepticism of Hume. In many ways Berkeley stands apart from those who precede and follow him. He is, perhaps, too important to be regarded as a step between Locke and Hume; but, viewed historically, his work must be valued differently from the way in which we should judge it if he stood alone.

The fact is that his own generation seems to have understood only his subsidiary ideas and orthodox language; and the great influence of Hume over the later Continental philosophy obscured the importance of Berkeley.

Three great names, therefore, are united in the historic development of English philosophy—those of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Their lives are of the greatest importance for the understanding of their philosophy.

John Locke (1632–1704) was born at Wrington, near Bristol. He was educated at Westminster and Christ Church. To the Scholasticism of the University he added private reading in the Cartesian philosophy. After some secretarial employment he became physician and personal friend of Lord Shaftesbury, whose fortunes in politics affected Locke's movements. He lived in exile in France for a time (1675–1679), returned, and departed again with Shaftesbury to Holland when James II. showed himself hostile. Thus it was that Locke entered England eventually attached to the party of William

of Orange. For a time he was a Commissioner, and afterwards lived at Oates in Essex, at Sir Thomas Masham's—whose wife, it is interesting to note, was a daughter of Ralf Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist. The work of Locke that is most important for philosophy is the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," written about 1687 and published about 1689. There were many editions of this book, introducing revisions and additions; and apparently, in the sixth edition, the chapter on the Association of Ideas was introduced in this way. The letters on "Toleration," and on "Civil Government," and the work called "The Reasonableness of Christianity," express Locke's views on religion and politics. In religion he thought he was conservative; in politics he was a Whig.

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was born in Co. Kilkenny, in Ireland, of an English family. He studied at Trinity College, Dublin. After the first development of his philosophical ideas, his position as a clergyman led him first to attempt the correction of free-thinkers. Then, with his enthusiasm for simplicity in



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life and thought, he went out as a missionary, accompanying the colonists of Rhode Island. He returned disappointed, and adopted the quiet ideals of a scholar; he never, however, lost his love for a life untrammelled by the fashions of the eighteenth century. He became Bishop of Cloyne in 1734, and afterwards retired to Oxford, where he died. His philosophy was almost fully developed in his first efforts: his earliest and most important works are the "New Theory of Vision" (1709) and the "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" (1710). The other works of interest are more popular—"Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" and "Alciphron; or, the Minute Philosopher" (1732).

David Hume, the son of a Scottish advocate, was born at Edinburgh in 1711. He lived for some years in France (1734–1737), during which time he composed the "Treatise on Human Nature" (published in London, 1739). He was inspired with literary and philosophic ideals, and is almost a Renaissance Humanist in the manner in which he speaks of fame. After some time spent as secretary to the embassies

in Vienna and Turin, Hume was able to settle down to literary pursuits, as librarian in Edinburgh. During this time he published his "History of England" (1754–1762), and showed his religious position in "The Natural History of Religion" (1755). He had now attained the position of fame for which he had hoped, and, on accompanying a political mission to France in 1763, found himself a person of consequence in the intellectual world. Hume was Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office for about two years, and retired to Edinburgh on a pension in 1769. There he lived in philosophic calm, which the disease that came to him in 1775 could not destroy, until his death in 1776. His character was generous; he could meet with equal pleasure the philosophical coterie and the men and women of the world. He thought himself happy in the kind attitude of all men towards him, even of those who, as he says, had most reason to attack him. His chief works are the "Treatise of Human Nature," which marked a stage in the history of thought, and a smaller rendering of the same theories, the "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding"

(1749), which he published owing to the failure of his great work to attract attention. There are also " An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals " (1751), " The Natural History of Religion " (1755), and " Essays " (1748). The " Dialogue concerning Natural Religion " was published after his death by his friend Adam Smith. Of Hume as a philosopher it might be said that he " pricked many bubbles and blew none."

The whole movement represented by these men began with a demand for reference to observed facts, as a protest against the antiquated jargon of the Universities and the ready-made systems of the Cartesians. The problem of philosophic thought was necessarily stated in Cartesian language, and Locke at many points uncritically accepted Cartesian conceptions; but in the main he used a sane criticism of experience. His purpose he confesses to be a very limited one. He will not construct a metaphysical system, but will attempt only to think out the meaning of the most obvious facts. Now, those " facts " which appear to him most prominent are " ideas " or thoughts. One class of thoughts

is supposed to lie beyond criticism—the so-called innate ideas, whether logical or moral. Locke denies the existence of any such class. His disproof of its existence is unreal to us now. "A child," he says, "knows not that three and four are equal to seven till he comes to be able to count seven"—such ideas depend upon experience. Therefore we cannot be said to be born with them. The valuable part of Locke's argument is the implication that criticism must cover the whole of thought, and thought itself is at no point independent of experience.

If, then, we wish to explain experience we must begin with its simplest elements. The data of experience are first of all sensations, which are run together to make complex ideas, such as that of substance. With this crude description is connected the first reasoned account of the association of ideas ("Human Understanding," ii. 32). It is here also that Locke makes the famous distinction between primary qualities, or those which are perceived by more than one sense (*e.g.* extension), and secondary qualities, such as colour. Primary qualities are said to belong to objects, and

secondary qualities are caused by the action of the percipient.

The thought has so far proceeded upon the supposition that the idea is a veil rather than a revelation of the "thing." The idea intervenes between the subject and the object. In a brilliant treatment of the value of words Locke now hints at the nominalism which tends to relegate the "thing" to the region of the unknowable. The contrast follows between the intuitive knowledge of ideas and the unknown connection between the ideas and the "things." The secret is out, and the way is prepared for Berkeley and Hume. We are supposed to know ideas and not things. Locke himself was not clear as to what had happened. He continued to have the most pathetic faith in his reasoning; and, more strangely still, he seems to have thought that he had reached by his own unaided criticism these relics of a dead metaphysic—the "idea" and the unknown "thing."

Logic, however, will not always stop where its servants expect. Berkeley, as a Cartesian, accepts self-consciousness for the basis of his philosophy, and, as a learner from Locke, he

accepts the certain knowledge of our own states (ideas); but, as to the mysterious substratum of which sensory ideas are supposed to be the outcome, he boldly says that it is a superfluous hypothesis. All qualities depend upon the subject perceiving, and to speak of "matter" which supports them is mere absurdity. For then *the* reality is said to be that which never enters into experience, and our knowledge of this reality is dependent upon the qualities which in no way present it to us. Such an abstraction as "matter," therefore, must be put aside, in the interests of common sense and philosophy. It is plain that an object is merely what is opposed to the subject; its reality is its being perceived ("esse" is "percipi"). In fact "there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives" (§ 7). From this critical reasoning, but without any reference to the real movement of Berkeley's thought, arose a metaphysical "freak" of the eighteenth century, called at that date Egoism and now known as Solipsism. It was argued that one's self and its modifications were all that could be known. The ordered world of things was a

subjective dream. Of course such a belief is not Idealism, nor has it any claim to be called philosophical; it may, however, usurp the language of philosophy. A fatal objection to it is that it gives one no means of distinguishing illusion from appearance; and Berkeley himself had to attempt further explanation of his view. What is the meaning of the common experience of being "affected with ideas" (§ 18)? To this Berkeley replies, with less cogency and less originality than one might have expected, by postulating a universal cause, an infinite Spirit—God. The realities, of which the ideas of body and such things as body are the result, are the ideas of God, imprinted by Him upon us. Things therefore "are external with regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them" (§ 90). With such a reduction of the whole problem to infinities and eternities, the current conceptions of religion and morals find a place and a justification. After all, Berkeley, although a philosopher, was a bishop. His religious meditation in what follows, and

his philosophy, are not unlike those of Malebranche, the Cartesian of the Paris Oratory.

Once again, however, the thought which a great man begins goes farther than he can imagine. Berkeley had destroyed the hypothesis of "extended things"; and Hume proceeded farther along the way that now was open. "That all the arguments," he says, "of that ingenious author [Berkeley], though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction."[1] The premise had been that all knowledge, whether of ideas or of things, came from different sensations or impressions, and Berkeley had said that the connection between the idea and the thing was arbitrary. Hume now saw that the position was exactly the same with regard to intuitive ideas. The idea of self, for example, is arbitrary in exactly the same way as the idea of a table. For indeed it is obvious that all ideas are the ideas of a perceiving subject: the result depends upon the process—"this is the universe of Imagina-

[1] "Enquiry," § 12, pt. 1, note.

tion."[1] If it is false to say that an unknown thing, "matter," is the postulate of what is given to us in externally caused impressions, it is no less false to say that an unknown thing, "spirit," is the postulate of what is given to us as a succession of states. If "matter" is misleading, "spirit" is as bad; for, in fact, the very idea of substance is misleading: it is nothing but an unwarrantable hypothesis acting as a ghostly substratum or support for what is, in experience, a mere succession of states. The conclusion that would follow in regard to the substance which was regarded as the ground or explanation for the whole of experience is not stated by Hume. The motto chosen by him for his great work indicated "the fewness of those periods in which one can think what one likes and say what one thinks." In Hume's day it was not prudent to speak too plainly on religious and theological subjects; but as to immediate experience, it is plainly stated that there is no ground for the common assumption of "independent" realities.[2] It is pure fiction to

[1] "Treatise," i. 315.

[2] "Treatise," i. 504.

suppose that these exist; just as it is fiction to suppose that an object is still coloured when it is in the dark, because we see that it is coloured when it is in the light.[1] Hume's reasoning went still farther; having explained the current conceptions of metaphysics as delusions, he proceeds to show how such delusions arise.

Berkeley had introduced a "Deus ex machina," as Hume calls it, to account for the delusion about "matter"; but Hume had not even this resource, for even substance-self and spirit had disappeared. He looked therefore to immediate experience once again, to find by closer inspection some kind of explanation. In the world of ideas he finds association. There are some ideas that have affinity to others, and, by continual repetition of a certain concomitance, a feeling of necessary connection between associated ideas arises within us. This causes a customary or habitual attitude, and serves to explain the past and foretell the future. Hume, of course, does not deny the fact of the continuity of conscious life: he states that experience gives

[1] "Treatise," i. 406.

us a bond between ideas, and of the nature of this bond he knows nothing.[1] The self as the unifying bond is never given to thought.[2]

With regard to the external world, the necessary connection which is supposed to be the postulate for our unifying of perception is that of cause and effect. This is the object of Hume's further criticism.[3] We must be aware that at one time the word "cause" seems to have meant "active agent." The present scientific use of the word, as meaning the sum of the pre-conditions, is partly due to the influence of Hume. It was he who corrected the popular idea of activity in "things." "As all philosophers since Hume have recognised, the 'activity' of the cause results from an ascription to it of the characteristic feeling of self-assertion and self-expansion which accompany our own voluntary interference in the course of events."[4]

In the first place, it is clear that the connection of cause and effect is not the same as

1 "Treatise," § 2, p. 4.
2 "Treatise," i. p. 463.
3 "Treatise," bk. i. pt. 3.
4 Taylor, "Metaphysics," p. 109.

however, were we to omit the work they did in the theory of morals. Before further discussing the growth of purely philosophical thought, we must therefore deal with that department of it which treats of the basis for morals. Hobbes had long ago begun the English tradition of criticism with regard to moral sentiments. The later philosophers followed him in searching rather for psychological connections than for metaphysical grounds for the moral ideas. Now, in the world of moral judgments the most obvious criterion of good and bad is that of consequences. What was conceived to be "good" was explained as so judged because it had advantageous consequences. This was the beginning of the Utilitarian theory. At first the advantage or utility to which reference was made was individual or "selfish"; but it soon became evident that a large section of moral judgments involved the recognition of common interests. Hume made these vague ideas into a keen psychological anatomy of morals.[1] He dissects the feelings to find in

[1] In the "Treatise," pt. iii., and the "Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals."

them the ground for the moral judgments. Whatever the origin of the moral sentiments, Hume is as clear as Spinoza in his acceptance of their validity. A non-rational origin did not seem to involve any deficiency in the product. Hume's position, then, if not deeply introspective, is cogent. His treatment of sympathy as the appreciation of another's experience served as a basis for the social morals of his friend, Adam Smith (1732–1790). From this came, as a consequence of the theory of the mechanical relation of the individual and the social organism, the new theory of Political Economy. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) forms the link between these thinkers and the later Utilitarians.

An opposition to the method and results of Hume was formed almost immediately. Even before his day Shaftesbury had attempted to express a different view of morals. His manner was violent and often unphilosophical; but his attitude had much influence in his day, for it was that of the "gentleman of the period." The reaction in pure philosophy was attempted by Thomas Reid (1710–1796),

who, in the name of Common Sense, appealed against Hume's destroying logic.

Protests, however, were insufficient to stem the current of criticism. Men passed from the discussion of Morals to the discussion of Religion. In Hume's "Dialogues on Natural Religion" we are already in the world of the Deists and the Encyclopædists. The conclusion of criticisms seemed to be this: There might be some principle of unity, a "Supreme Being" which might be called God; but as to the nature of this Being—the sum of it all was, we cannot know. The sense of all-pervading law, gained during the Renaissance, led thinkers to reject apologies for religion which were based upon the supposed value of exceptions (miracles). Revelation was explained away, and "natural" religion was advocated. "Free-thinker" and "pantheism" are terms invented during this period, to express an attitude and a philosophy. At this time, however, the real force of the critical movement rapidly passed from England to France, and we must therefore examine the development of thought in that country.

CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

A MOVEMENT closely related to the English Empiricism was taking place at the same time in France. It is known as the Enlightenment (*l'Illumination*); and although the name can be applied to the movement of English and of German thought during the eighteenth century, there is a tone in the French thought of the period which seems to make this word " enlightenment " specially applicable to it. It must be recognised, however, that in essentials the movement is one which began as the empiricism of individual experience in England, was continued in the scepticism as to authority in France, and became in Germany a gospel of intellectual culture. The three countries formed three distinct backgrounds for the same movement of thought.

At first the French Illumination was represented by the spread of a scientific attitude towards experience. The attempts of the old Cartesianism to establish a metaphysics of all reality were rejected as preposterous, and the more moderate and more cogent, if less exalted, efforts of empiricism were accepted.[1] But, once again in the history of thought, external interests were soon involved; for the Illumination was taking place in an environment by no means suited to philosophic reflection. Political and religious corruption were too obvious and too omnipresent to be excluded from the philosopher's study. Therefore the scientific movement became definitely opposed to the accepted forms of the religious consciousness. In this the French Illumination was closely

[1] Cf. Condillac, "Essai sur l'Origine des Conn.," Introd.: "Il faut distinguer deux sortes de métaphysique. L'une, ambitieuse, veut percer tous les mystères, . . . l'autre, plus retenue, proportionne ses recherches à la faiblesse de l'esprit humain. . . . La première fait de toute la nature une espèce d'enchantement qui se dissipe comme elle: la seconde, ne cherchant à voir les choses que comme elles sont en effet, est aussi simple que la vérité même. . . . Les philosophes se sont particulièrement exercés sur la première. . . . Locke est le seul que je crois devoir excepter."

connected with the Sceptical and Deist movement in England; but in its last stages it had a character all its own, for it was also definitely in opposition to the accepted political theory. Whereas English Empiricism had found a political revolution already accomplished, and Locke merely gave reasons for a "res judicata," in France the old order and the ghosts of feudalism still remained in possession when philosophers turned their attention to the theory of government. In order, therefore, to understand the movement of French thought, it is necessary to refer to circumstances lying outside the scope of philosophy.

In the political world the most prominent feature was the severance of social strata. This survived even in the attitude of thinkers. They regarded themselves as an élite, in comparison to the "vile canaille," who could not be called "rational animals." The divisions of society were not less marked when a new element, the wealthy bourgeoisie, rose to importance. To the aristocracy of brains and cash rather than to that of family the philosophers of the Enlightenment were

related. There was thus a gradual loosening of the ties that once had bound educated men to the established social order. The language of Voltaire on this point is in striking contrast with that of the thinkers of the next generation.

Sceptical conservatism, that will destroy everything but its own comfort, found a means of bowing to the established order, while King Louis wandered over Europe with his mistresses, and a tinsel aristocracy supported cruelty and famine. Closely connected with all this, however, was an established order of ecclesiastical custom: to this and to the privileges it involved for its exponents, not even the aristocracy were reverent. The very foundations of religion had been sapped by controversy. Molinists and Jansenists and Gallicans, and the thousand types of opposition to these, had made theological subtlety a ready mark for the sceptical sarcasms of the cultured, whether philosophic or otherwise. That theological scepticism does not always involve intellectual pre-eminence was known to philosophers. As Vauvenargues says: "Not all who mock at auguries have more intellect than those who

believe in them." There was, however, a tendency, which became supreme when philosophy had become more popular, for the established political forms to be closely connected with the forms of religious observance. It could not be readily forgotten that the greatest figures in the French Church were connected with an anti-popular Government. To the preachers of the Revolution both religion and politics seemed artificial. It was in this world of old privilege, of feudal and ecclesiastical absurdities, and of a new bourgeoisie that the Enlightenment of France occurred. The work was done by a succession of men less great as individual thinkers than the philosophers of England and Germany; but although less great in abstract thought, they had perhaps a more real connection with life. The results of their thinking showed this. They produced no great philosophic conceptions, but they changed the attitude of men towards the world in which they lived.

The intellectual movement[1] may be said to have begun with Bayle, although the

[1] Cf. Lange: "Hist. of Materialism" (Eng. trans.), Vol. II. i., ii., iii.

writings of Montaigne (1533–1593) had had a great influence already in giving a sceptical tone to French thought. With Bayle, however, the attitude towards reality becomes more positive: the very fact of definite knowledge in regard to immediate data is his ground for an all-destroying scepticism as to what are known as religious truths. Now, this attitude harmonised well with the positive results, if not with the stated conclusions, of English Empiricism; and the movement was carried further in the writings of Voltaire. With him thought made no new efforts; but his clear, if limited, insight was of immense service in spreading the knowledge that had been already acquired. His pitiless dissection of established creeds, whether philosophic or religious, gave men a confidence in the power of individual thinking that no authority could destroy. If his outlook was narrow and his prejudices irrational, this did not lessen his influence. He is the Sophist of the Illumination, and he became the central figure of intellectual Europe in the eighteenth century. In political theory he is preceded by Montesquieu (1685–

1775), whose "L'Esprit des Lois" and admiration for the English Constitution, once paradoxes, have now become platitudes. In such positive philosophic knowledge as Voltaire acquired, he was preceded by Condillac, who carried to its extremest consequences the Lockian doctrine of sensation. Closely connected with Voltaire, but chiefly following him in date, are the names of the Encyclopædists. Diderot and d'Alembert, the editors of the Encyclopédie, represent the central force of the movement it embodied. La Mettrie (1709–1751), with his book "L'Homme Machine," and Helvetius, with his sensualisms, marked the intellectual and positivist elements of thought, which were in some way concentrated in the "Système de la Nature" of Dietrich von Holbach. In the meantime an opposing force, that of sentiment, was developed in the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. To him we may perhaps trace the Romanticism which in the early nineteenth century was to reverse the positivism of the eighteenth. His supposed influence on the Revolution is perhaps due to the force of sentimentality, which takes the place of thought

during periods of transition. In theory directly based upon the practical, Turgot and Condorcet deserve mention : the former as an economist, the latter a keen observer and the thinker who alone saw the first "bitter in-gatherings of the harvest" in the Revolution.[1]

In the development of thought on the lines of empiricism, the French Illumination does not materially improve upon Locke and Hume. The premises are perhaps more clearly conceived, there are more brilliant flashes of insight, and the conclusions are more fearlessly stated—as, for instance, by Holbach; but, for philosophy, there was perhaps too much quasi-scientific precision and too uncritical a method: the scepticism of the French illuminati did not extend to their own knowledge. Again, for pure thought, there was too extreme an opposition to what was popular and accepted.[2]

In the sphere of theory as to the nature

[1] For these see "Critical Miscell.," by J. Morley, vol. ii.

[2] This was of course necessary. "Philosophical thought was turned into a weapon of warfare. The peaceful soul of thought was interrupted by the sound of the signal to turn out and do spiritual battle with the traditions and institutions of former times, which the impatient spirit of man was now calling into question."—Höffding, vol. i. p. 455.

of reality as a whole, French thinkers found the lumber of a mediæval metaphysics. Their sense of the difficulty of gaining and stating scientific knowledge made them the more ready to suppose that a knowledge of reality as a whole was not likely to be so easily acquired, or so correctly stated, as was popularly supposed. The Cartesian reconstruction seemed merely to have put together the old lumber on a new plan. To many, therefore, metaphysical theory seemed negligible folly, and they turned their attention to scientific detail; but to less closeted thinkers metaphysical lumber seemed obstructive, and they turned to move it.[1] In this they are at one with the Deist movement in England; and at first the general position as to Natural Religion repeats itself in France. The positive forms of religious theory then in vogue were tried and found wanting in logic and in morality. In regard to logic, the supposed "argument from design" is pitilessly dissected; for this was the special

[1] Cf. the quotation adopted by Carlyle for his "French Revolution": *χωρὶς δὲ δογμάτων μεταβολῆς, τί ἄλλο ἢ δουλεία στενόντων καὶ πείθεσθαι προσποιουμένων;*

argument developed during the Renaissance, when physical knowledge had driven the old "primum movens" from the empyrean. In Leibnitz it is stated that this is the best of all possible worlds. "What must the others be like?" asks Candide, especially considering the earthquake at Lisbon.[1] Wolff had even been at pains to show that this world is a convenient place for man; therefore, to this illogical logic, it seemed that the universe was provided for the entertainment of "l'animal rationnel." Voltaire could see that this was absurd: the cause of the fallacy he could not see. He admits that the postulate of moral order involved in this argument was necessary for life: "Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer."

When, however, the mind turned to the categories of morality in which the established form of religion seemed to find its chief support, these also were found opposed to established theories. Shaftesbury had already shown, with all his contempt for "enthusiasm," that it was possible to criticise the average

[1] This took place in 1755, and did more than many arguments to shake the popular belief in the "argument from design."

religious theory from the point of view of morality. Ideals of true goodness, even in their most inconsistent form, seemed able to dispense with the doubtful support of a vindictive tyrant for the maintenance of moral discipline. In this Voltaire and Diderot follow Shaftesbury. And at this stage we find the attempted establishment of a Natural Religion, as a safer and truer " sanction " for morality. It is perhaps at this point that Rousseau becomes separated from the main body of thinkers, for he is the preacher of sentimentalism in religion as elsewhere. His " Savoyard Vicar " attempts to preach a mild form of the " cosmic emotion." " Morality touched by emotion " is perhaps not an unfair definition for the religion of these " intellectuels " ; but logic will not stop for good intentions. The sentimentalist view of religion is historically false, and an undogmatic religion is a fiction of deficient thought. Yet the insight of the Enlightenment found nothing to take the place of the old metaphysical systems. Therefore, at the end of the movement it was forcibly stated that the old view of the world was untrue, that sentiment

was no criterion of truth, and that no reasonable world-view existed. It was then seen that the falsehood of the argument from design lay in the arbitrary assumption that our own logical schemata are the premises according to which reality is constructed.

The mind therefore turned from the celestial dreamlands of an obsolete metaphysics to seek for the shape and form of an earthly paradise; but the world upon which thinkers looked, when they left the sceptical salons and found themselves in the brutish streets, was by no means the best possible. They trusted that the force which they had learnt to revere in logic was sufficient for life: and they set out to right the world by thinking. The moral and political scheme of life demanded reconstruction.

Lastly, therefore, the eighteenth century in France is marked by a logical deduction from the Renaissance concept of the Law of Nature as the foundation of morality. In nothing more than in this are we separated from the Enlightenment; for to the philosophers of that time the moral standard appeared absolute, but for us history has

made even this relative. That the practice was variable they knew; but they seem to have explained this by the prevailing ignorance of the ideal code. To them the ideal of morality appeared fixed and immutable, and —never doubting their own enlightenment —readily discoverable. To this philosophical ideal they referred when criticising the morality and the laws of their country and their time. The comparison was the more easy because the morality was corrupted and the laws obsolete: the ideal seemed plain. With such a contrast before them, it is hardly strange that the language of philosophers should have seemed revolutionary. Yet in such men as Turgot and Condorcet a critical attitude seldom involved extreme violence of opposition: to them, as philosophers, reform did not mean revolution. The pressure of social circumstances would not, however, allow of slow movement; and the deluge of the French Revolution swept away all barriers of law and morality and thought—the good with the evil. The philosophic movement is not immediately concerned with the events of 1789 and 1792;

but it is doubtless true that the critical thought of the eighteenth century is connected with the ultimate attempt at social reconstruction. For the Revolution does not seem to have been to its own eyes a period of mere destruction: an ideal vision—it may have been illusion—moved the heart and stirred the passions even of Septembriseurs. This vision was an inheritance from the abstract thinkers of the preceding generation; and what was in essence an economic upheaval took upon itself the vesture and used the thoughts of a philosophic movement.

But philosophy had already passed beyond this stage: the "Critique of Pure Reason" had been written. The dogmatic world of the Scholastics and of Leibnitz and the Cartesians, as well as the sceptical thought of Hume, had passed into a new form. No step in the development of modern philosophy is more important than that which was made in Germany at the time of the Revolution. For Germany had inherited both the dogmatism of the French and the scepticism of the English schools, and it was there that the new philosophy of Criticism first arose.

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG AND KANT

IN Germany the Aufklärung had already been partially expressed by Leibnitz; yet it is not clear whether that great man more truly represents the polymath of the Renaissance or the scholar of the scientific Enlightenment. The more humanist elements in his thought were, in any case, lost by his immediate successors, and the extreme of rationalist dogmatism was reached by the scholars of Wolff. Thus during the period of Deist controversy in England and revolutionary empiricism in France, the purely philosophical thought of the day was represented in Germany by a systematic but unpersuasive metaphysics. This metaphysics was at first opposed in the interests of the fuller rendering given to life by the old

forms of religious theory; but Pietism soon found it necessary to form some kind of alliance with the metaphysics of Wolff; and this metaphysics, on its side, adopted a more conciliatory and even apologetic tone in regard to the interests of the orthodox theology. Thus it came about that a kind of inward and ethical emotionalism was in the end adopted as the logical attitude towards which philosophy pointed: this was called Religion, and is obviously related to the natural religion of England and France in the eighteenth century. But in Germany this attitude did not seem opposed to the accepted forms of the religious consciousness.

The strength of this ethical and emotional movement was made still greater by the adoption of that side of the French Enlightenment which was expressed by Rousseau. To this is due the interest in æsthetics and the sentimentalism of the current literature. Thus, an artificial culture, largely adopted from France, became the ideal of education, and the influence of Frederick the Great was directed along these lines; but there was, perhaps, also a stirring of the depths that

were to bring forth more forcible thought and more genuine emotion.[1]

The unholy alliance of an arbitrary rationalism with an artificial æsthetic and ethical culture could not long survive. Even before logical thought had freed itself, the force of a new movement, which yet had in it the truth of the past, was expressed by Lessing (1729–1781). His life had in it the promise of the future: a stern critic and a fearless destroyer, he was also a strenuous and hopeful creator. In philosophical thought he was a mystic, and expressed reverence for the much-decried Spinoza; but it is perhaps as a living character that he has influenced thought, through and beyond Kant. Fate was not gentle with him, yet his head was never bowed.

In the sphere of pure thought meanwhile another movement was preparing, and in the year of Lessing's death the "Critique of Pure Reason" was published by Immanuel Kant. Kant (1724–1804) was a Scot by descent: he was born at Königsberg, in

1 Cf. the half-prophetic words of Frederick himself: "Nous avons nos auteurs classiques; . . . nos voisins apprendront l'allemand."

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East Prussia, where his father had established himself as a strap-maker. He grew up under the influence of a kindly pietism. His parents died while he was still young; his sisters went out as servants, and he, with his younger brother, for many years earned a bare livelihood as a private tutor. He had, indeed, kept himself during the years of his own education by coaching some of his fellow students. In 1755 he returned to Königsberg and became a Privatdozent at the University there. His publications of this period are chiefly of interest by contrast to those of his later life. It is recorded that he was much influenced by Rousseau, and he made himself thoroughly acquainted with English thought. He had been educated in philosophic thought by a disciple of Wolff, and during the fifteen years of waiting for an official position he had gained an extensive knowledge of the best mathematics and science of the day. In fact, his lectures and his publications of this period relate more to these subjects than to pure metaphysics. His interest in extra-rational experiences led him to study Swedenborg also; and the result of these

various influences was expressed by him in the "Dreams of a Visionary, Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics" (1766). The year 1769 is said by Kant to have marked his real turning from empiricism and scepticism, as well as from the established metaphysics; and in 1770 he was made Professor of Philosophy in Königsberg. The strenuous severity of his life and thought after this is reflected in the elaborate arguments and the inartistic form of his later writings. Such was the regularity of his life that, as Heine says, the inhabitants of Königsberg "set their watches by him," and such the precision of his thought that all modern philosophy has been guided by reference to it. The "Domesday-book" of philosophy, the "Critique of Pure Reason" ("Kritik der reinen Vernunft"), was published in 1781, and was followed by the "Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics" ("Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können," 1783), which is a more popular rendering of the same thoughts. The remainder of Kant's life was devoted to working out the implications of the Critical Philosophy.

In 1788 the practical results of the new philosophy as a doctrine of ethics appeared in the "Critique of Practical Reason" ("Kritik der praktischen Vernunft"), and two years afterwards Kant made the attempt to systematise the dualism with which he seemed to be left in the "Critique of the Judgment" ("Kritik der Urteilskraft," 1790).

In addition to controversial writings in defence of his ideas and further elaboration of them, Kant published (after being granted the imprimatur of the Königsberg theologians) the conclusions he had reached on the subject of religion in the "Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason" ("Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft," 1793). Frederick the Great and his ministers, with the rationalism of the Enlightenment, had passed away, and given place to a pious obscurantism in high quarters at Berlin. Kant's book was condemned by the theological politicians, and a Cabinet order threatened the philosopher with dire consequences if he presumed to say what he thought about religion. Kant consented to be silent during the lifetime of the king then reigning.

A few essays more were, however, all that Kant was able to manage; and in 1797 he gave up lecturing. Old age was already upon him. His mind was no longer capable of its former grasp, and the history of his closing years is one of slow and painful decay.

In Kant's thought the many influences of the Enlightenment were drawn together; and in his works the swelling of the stream can be noticed; for if Kant may be said to have assimilated all the knowledge of his day, he did not do so with that kind of acquisition which leaves the acquired knowledge unchanged and the learner a mere sciolist. It was because the mind of Kant lived through the different attitudes prevalent among the learned of his day that he was able to move forward towards a new stage of thought. The greatness of Kant lies chiefly in this, that he embodied his own principle of rising above controversy: he was able, by appreciating opposite points of view, to rise above the opposition. Or it may be stated in this way: much that had appeared absolute to his predecessors, Kant saw was relative; and he said that what had been

supposed to be absolutely true was true only from the human point of view. For this reason he called himself a Copernicus of philosophy.

This position was reached gradually. Kant was educated in the metaphysics of Wolff, and his scientific thought was for many years developed on the lines of that system. Looking back even, through Wolff and Leibnitz, we may find in Kant traces of that earlier philosophy of Nominalism with which Scholasticism had ended; for when Kant had freed himself from what he called dogmatism in metaphysics he still kept the old prejudices in favour of the precision of formal logic; and, as may be seen even in the "Critique of Pure Reason," the forms of syllogistic reasoning are uncritically forced upon the experience of reality.

The most important years of the development of Kant's mind were marked by a close attention to mathematics and physics. Newton's teaching exercised a great influence upon him; and he was gradually led to an appreciation of the value of scientific knowledge in comparison with the useless vagaries of the current metaphysics. In conjunction with this was the influence of an empiricism

in psychology which had been adopted from Locke even by the followers of Wolff—so obvious was the value of a method of observation in regard to the facts of consciousness, as opposed to the airy theorising as to spiritual powers. Now, this psychological empiricism had ended in an analysis of the subject-matter of the theory of consciousness into knowing, willing, and feeling. This division Kant appears to have adopted even in his later thought from Tetens (1736–1805), and it is the basis for the divisions of the critical philosophy, as rendered in the Critique of Reason, of Practice, and of the Judgment. More important, however, than the question of a suitable method was the influence of the theory which this empiricism involved. This had been bluntly stated by Hume, and this statement wakened Kant from his "dogmatic slumber."[1] The contrast which Kant

[1] "I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing which, many years ago, first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigation in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction."—"Prolegomena," Introd. Kant appears to have been unacquainted with Hume's "Treatise," and therefore depended on the smaller works.

felt to exist between the vague teachings of metaphysics and the definiteness of mathematical and scientific knowledge seemed to be due to the neglect of the principle expressed by Hume, that the experience embodied in sense-perception was the true and only sphere of certainty. Now, Kant's interest remained philosophical, in spite of the deficiencies of the philosophy of his day: it was through him that the contempt for metaphysics became a popular attitude; and through the usual popular misunderstanding of philosophic thought, the deficiencies of pre-Kantian metaphysics were supposed to prove the vanity of all philosophical knowledge. On the other hand, the object of Kant's speculation was to restore metaphysics to the "secure path of science," that is to say, to replace the old theorising by a scientific metaphysics depending upon experience. For this reason, although admitting the cogency of Hume's arguments, he did not wholly agree with the conclusions[1]—not indeed as though these were false, but on the ground that they were inadequate.

[1] Cf. "Prolegomena," *loc. cit.*

Yet another influence directed the thought of Kant. His early pietistic training, his strenuous life, and his interest in all that claimed to be great and noble led him to feel the antithesis between the scientific and the religious view of the world. He examined the claims of the new mysticism of Swedenborg, and doubtless felt the deficiencies of a cold and abstract rationalism from the point of view of Romanticists like Rousseau. Of the conception of religion gained by the Enlightenment Kant was not ignorant. Therefore, although, with the ambition of a true philosopher, he directed his attention to truth only, yet he never lost sight of the other interests of life. The true reading of Kant's thought seems to be that which looks upon the "Critique of Pure Reason" as intentionally a stage in the development which later is marked by the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Critique of the Judgment." If he is opposed to a dogmatic metaphysics, he is no less opposed to the "counter-dogmatism of unbelief that comes into conflict with morality."

Kant gathered up the influences of his day;

nevertheless it may be admitted that his attitude towards thinkers of the past is somewhat deficient.[1] His absorption in the meaning of his own thought prevented him from seeing his own position historically: he therefore, through the illusion of greatness in what is near, conceived himself to be more isolated from the course of thought than we can consider him. He was not even aware that in the study of philosophic questions as much is gained by scientific historical as by scientific mathematical methods; and again, he did not recognise how much he himself owed to the past; hence he seems to have thought that he had reached by abstract and introspective argument the principles of the judgment and the syllogism which he really adopted from outside.[2] To these deficiencies are due the changes he makes in philosophic terminology; and the fashion he set in the coining of words or the recasting of meaning in old words

[1] For a forcible, if perhaps exaggerated, statement of this, cf. Lovejoy in *Mind*, N.S. 15, p. 171.

[2] Hence it could be said by Schelling: "His philosophy is a building which at the best rests upon the empirical earth, but in part also on the rubbish-heaps of forgotten systems."

(sometimes in defiance of history[1]) has had unfortunate consequences—for it forms an unnecessary barrier to the popular appreciation of philosophic truth.

In the working out of his own thought Kant's development continued; the problem changed as he attempted to solve it.[2] As often happens in the history of thought, Kant found that the usual statement of the problem made any solution impossible. Beginning therefore from acknowledged premises, the Kantian philosophy by imperceptible steps reconstitutes the premises in the course of its development. Hence at the end of the Kantian regress in the examination of knowledge itself, we find ourselves in a new world of thought.

The task that Kant set himself proved ultimately too great for his powers. In the "Critique of Pure Reason," and in the "Critique of Practical Reason," a careful analysis had given the basis and indicated

[1] Cf. transcendental, æsthetics, category, matter and form. The fashion thus set has been only too well followed by the majority of German philosophers.

[2] Cf. Caird, "Critical Philosophy of Kant," vol. i. ch. ii.

the nature of a systematic metaphysics. There remained, according to the psychological division adopted, that part of experience which is referred to as emotion. This part is analysed, and the beginnings of a synthetic view of the whole of experience are to be found, in the "Critique of the Judgment." In this work, therefore, and in his labours in the theory of religion, are to be found his attempts at an ideal and scientific metaphysics. From the very beginning indeed he had recognised the danger of a premature synthesis in philosophy;[1] but that such a synthetic view of experience as a whole can be had is the implied postulate of all his thought.

Hence it is that the thought of Kant not only marks a departure from the philosophy that preceded him, but also had in it the germs of the philosophy that followed. If therefore we end, in tracing the Critical Philosophy,

[1] Of past metaphysicians he says: "They are anxious to have a grand philosophy; but the desirable thing is, that it should be a sound one." Cf. Mr. Moore, in his "Principia Ethica," p. 222: "To search for 'unity' and 'system' at the expense of truth is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers."

with no definite and conclusive view of experience as a whole, it is only in so far as the great founder of that philosophy himself thus ended; but if the position of his philosophy is to be adequately judged, its history must be traced through the Idealism that it originated. Kant himself as a thinker is not to be conceived as the sculptor of some finished and perfect form, but as the man who kindled a destroying and re-creating flame. Within the space of about thirty years from the completion of Kant's labours, there appeared in Germany alone a series of the most magnificent productions of philosophic thought.[1]

[1] 1795, Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre"; 1801, Schelling's "System der Philosophie"; 1817, Hegel's "Encyclopädie"; 1819, Schopenhauer's "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung."

CHAPTER VII

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

IN treating of the Critical Philosophy as it appears in the work of Kant himself we may adopt the main divisions of the problem given in his works. Some also of his terminology is so characteristic that its use is unavoidable; but it is not essential to follow the subdivisions which Kant makes, nor to adopt the whole of his philosophical language. Historical accuracy and philosophical depth may on this account be lost, but it will be more than sufficient recompense to the memory of the great thinker if his conquests in "the secure path of science" be made to seem more real. Too often the value of a philosopher's work is made unintelligible by close adherence to the language in which his work had to be done.

We shall treat, in order, of the theory of

knowing in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the "Prolegomena," of the theory of willing in the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Metaphysic of Ethics," and of the theory of emotion and synthetic stages of philosophy in the "Critique of the Judgment" and the works on Religion. The subdivisions of these works will, as we have said, be disregarded, except in so far as they are logically valid; and the treatment of the problems will be directed towards an appreciation of their real value in the historical sequence of thought.

I. Reason

First therefore we shall deal with the problem of knowledge.[1] This, regarded as part of a greater whole, is preparatory for a metaphysics of experience. Regarded as an independent problem it is a question as to the constitution of real knowledge; but it is not the psychological fact to which we now refer, it is the validity of what is ordinarily supposed to be implied in knowledge that we must discuss. Not "ideas" or "thoughts" as

[1] "Critique of Pure Reason," and "Prolegomena."

objects, but their peculiar nature (that is to say, their supposed reference to a reality beyond themselves) is now in question. Thus the first step of Kant is epistemology.

Now, there are examples of knowledge that every one will admit to be such: for if there is any real knowledge at all, that which concerns immediately given objects is the most obvious. That is to say, the awareness of an object in perception (called by Kant "Anschauung," intuition) seems fundamental. If consciousness therefore may be divided into perception and thought, it is the first of these which we must now consider. What is the nature of this kind of consciousness? As regards its contrast with thought we may say that in perception the objects are given, whereas in thought the objects seem in some way to be made; but this does not tell us the nature of perception in itself. Looking therefore at the knowledge we suppose ourselves to have in perception, we find that two elements are involved, a universal element and a particular; for there are peculiarities in each perception, yet all perception is bound together. The element of knowledge which thus stands apart or is the

postulate of all particular examples of knowledge is called by Kant the *a priori*, and the contingent or particular (the given, as merely given) is by contrast called the *a posteriori*. The contrast is of course logical and not temporal. There are no such things as innate ideas on the one hand, nor, on the other, atomic and independent perceptions; for the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* exist only together. The implications of this will be seen when we treat of thought; but now our concern is only with perception. Obviously the nature and validity of perception will depend upon the universal element in it. What therefore is the *a priori* in perception? It has two forms, space and time. All external objects are determinations of space, and as given they always imply space. All objects of immediate perception not conceived as external are determinations of time, and always imply time (*e.g.* thoughts, etc.). Of these two *a priori* forms of perception we may say that they are not conceptions because they refer only to objects as given (they are themselves unique but not universal), and they are not themselves objects of perception,

for they are implied in all perception. They are modes of receptivity; and since all knowledge begins with perception, and indeed with sense-perception, no part of knowledge is quite absolved from the influence of, and the modification due to, the nature of the receiving medium.

The *a priori* conditions of perception, or features in perception, are the subject-matter for mathematics. Its precision and certainty as knowledge are due to the *a priori* nature of this subject-matter: that is to say, the basis for mathematics does not lie in the independent world, but only in the world of perception. Yet its reality as knowledge depends upon the fact that its subject-matter is only given in the experience which we have called perception.

In his earlier discussions Kant does not go on to show the method by which perception becomes knowledge, or the way in which it may be regarded as knowledge; but later it was seen that the method is one of synthesis even here. Hence it became necessary to say that mathematics as real knowledge was possible only because "synthetic judgments

a priori" were possible in respect to its subject-matter. Even from the beginning of his Criticism it was clear to Kant that real propositions, of however seemingly abstract a type, are all synthetic. In other words, every real judgment marks a growth in knowledge by the fact that in it something is gathered in and systematised with the preceding knowledge;[1] but we may leave this for the present, and continue the examination of perception.

Further, there are characteristics of perception which are universal, besides the all-embracing forms of space and time. General principles are conceived to hold true with regard to perception, and they are, for the nature of physical science, just what space and time are for the quantitative world of

[1] "Critique of Pure Reason," Transcend. Anal. § 2: "The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is a subject of which general logic knows nothing, not even its name, while in a transcendental logic it is the most important task of all, nay even the only one, when we have to consider the possibility of synthetical judgments *a priori*, their conditions and the extent of their validity. For when that task is accomplished, the object of transcendental logic—namely, to determine the extent and limits of the pure understanding—will have been fully attained."

mathematics. That aspect of reasoning which relates to the world of nature is called by Kant the understanding. It is the work of the understanding to attend to the world of colour and sound, and all the other sensations; and here we begin to feel the connection as well as the contrast between perception and thought. For in real knowledge separate and independent perceptions cannot exist. If they did, then knowledge itself would be a mere collection in which each exhibit was kept in a totally different compartment. Obviously what we find in knowledge is a connection of every part with every other part; but if sensation be that which gives us the parts as separate, then thought must be that which welds the parts together. Hence the activity of thought (understanding) is synthetic. This is the argument of what Kant calls transcendental as opposed to formal logic. Nevertheless, since thought as such (*i.e.* in itself, and not in its immediate connection with the data of sense) is active on already acquired data, the method of its dealing with experience can be conceived as analytic. Hence Kant adapts from the analytic and formal logic the

various modes in which thought is conceived to be active. The judgment is, as we have seen, the type of that activity which we call knowing; and there are, or were, four kinds of judgment—those of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. These are the forms of synthesis, as Kant believes, and under each of these are three modifications, each based upon the idea that thought-process involves first the acceptance of the unanalysed, then analysis, and then interrelation or synthesis. Hence there are twelve "categories."[1] The arbitrariness of this classification did not obstruct the progress of Kant's thought, nor are its details necessary to his argument.

Returning to the actual world of synthetic thought-process, we find that in our knowledge of the world of nature there are the same

[1]

Quantity.	*Quality.*
1. Unity.	1. Reality.
2. Plurality.	2. Negation.
3. Totality.	3. Limitation.
Relation.	*Modality.*
1. Substance and Accident.	1. Possibility.
2. Cause and Effect.	2. Existence.
3. Action and Reaction.	3. Necessity.

elements as in our knowledge of the world of perception in general—that is to say, an *a priori* and an *a posteriori*. Here most obviously is it true that "conceptions without perceptions are empty, and perceptions without conceptions are meaningless or blind." The bare world of atomic sensations is not the "nature" of science; but if this "nature" be an "ordered system" "bound by laws," this system and these laws (the *a priori* in understanding) cannot be found otherwise than in the one common ground which sensations have—their reception in a percipient subject. The law does not itself occur as an object of perception; for if it did, then knowledge would depend upon a chance experience; but, in fact, if we look at what we suppose ourselves to have in the knowledge of nature, the law is seen to be a common and necessary truth, one universal to all men who understand, however varying the particular experiences of each of these individuals may have been. This universality and necessity, therefore, are due to nothing but the *a priori* forms of the understanding; the laws are of our making, the system is the expression of

our point of view; and the other side of the relation observed in knowledge (the particular, the "examples" of the law) is nothing but "what appears"—phenomenon. For the understanding makes nature, though it does not create it. Thus we have reached a new conception of knowledge. The problem of knowing may be supposed to have started with the question as to how it is possible for us to be certain of the application of what we say to the world conceived as wholly independent of our saying: that is, the difficulty arose from the gap supposed to exist between the thought and the thing (of which the thought was supposed to be the copy or reflection). In attempting to answer this question and solve this difficulty by looking at the evidence we possess, we find that the question is meaningless and the difficulty non-existent; for there is no "independent" object to be found in real knowledge, and there is no conceivable thing which is not what it is precisely because of the mode of its conception. All knowledge is relative—and that is no objection to it.

Thus Kant reaches the thought which was to develop later into systems of philosophy

absolutely different from all preceding; for now it seemed that independent reals, things out of all relation to experience, could not be subject-matter for scientific knowledge. Kant had transcended, at least in part, the dualism of common sense with its absolute separation of the thinker from the thing; for hitherto subject was conceived to "enter into" relation with object in the process of knowledge; but now, at least dimly, it is seen that only in that relation are the terms themselves constituted. Before the process of thought there is neither thinker nor thing: in the process of thought both are simultaneously created.

There yet remained a dualism in Kant, that of sense and intellect, which originated anew the old difficulty; but first we must trace the course of Kant's thought when he turned his attention to the supposed facts of psychological distinction. He supposed Leibnitz and his followers to be entirely mistaken in treating perception and conception as essentially the same process, though in different stages; and with his usual analytical method, he proceeded to treat these two as essentially different in kind. When he looked back,

however (in the "Critique of Pure Reason," div. i. bk. i. ch. ii.), along the way he had come to the transcending of an old opposition, when he found that each step had been but a repetition of the same thought, that real knowledge contained elements and not kinds, then he saw that he must bind together all the stages of the process of knowledge. Confused with this is the difficulty of treating those forms of understanding, which we have said are the *a priori* conditions of experience, as what common sense would call "objectively valid."[1] If knowledge is relative it seems to be no better than a dream; if all our conceptions of the world are coloured by the nature of our own thought, how can we attempt to say anything of the "real" world? Kant was afraid of the power he was using. He feared to be called an "idealist" because of the popular conception of reality; and though he talked of his method as transcendental idealism, he never quite drew his own premises to their conclusion.

[1] The confusion is marked by the changes made in the second edition of the "Critique," in the matter of the "Deduction of the Categories."

We are compelled by the "realist" difficulty to discuss the nature of thought-process or consciousness as a whole; and in its first stages, in sensation or perception, we observe that activity or spontaneity appears. For no consciousness is conceivable in which the recipient can be regarded as purely passive: and further, his activity takes the form of synthesis, or a grasping into unity of what is "given" as a manifold. The unification which has thus taken place in the earliest or simplest stage of consciousness is carried through in all its stages: for the manifold of perception is synthesised in thought.

Not indeed as though the rough matter of sensuous experience were the only medium of thought-synthesis; for thought also may grasp the *a priori* conditions of experience. The synthesis that arises then is called the synthesis of (pure) imagination: this is the ground for mathematics, and hence it is that, as we said above, the essential note of all systematic knowledge is in the synthetic "functionising." The synthesis of perceptions, however, is useless, and the synthesis of

imagination is a delusion, if both be not bound together in an experience which is essentially one. This last binding is nothing less than the interrelation of every stage of conscious life; but this takes place only by reference to one essential principle, which is "the transcendental unity of apperception." Thus the analytical sundering of the various modes or stages of conscious life is concluded, and the parts are gathered together. Experience is thus a coherent and systematic whole, and the objective phenomenal world is unified by reference to what we call the single point of view.

Now, within the whole of conscious life are the various modes of the reception of phenomena which we have named categories. Here, then, arises the old difficulty. What validity have these modes in their application to phenomena?

Such application of the categories to the data of experience (phenomena) is called by Kant schematisation. It is by this process that the synthesis takes place between the lower and higher stages of conscious life (sense and intellect). The categories, which in them-

selves are dead, correct but empty forms, are now called the principles of understanding, and the problem before us is that of the validity of abstract thought. It is indeed but a new form of the old problem of universals and of reality, but Kant has examined the data upon which the answer must rest, and therefore we are nearer a solution. For now it becomes increasingly clear that the only "objects" of knowledge are such as are found within the subjective forms of knowledge. In the first place, the categories of Quantity and Quality give respectively the Axiom of perception and the Anticipation of empirical perception: that is to say, by these categories we are led to find all objects of knowledge as determinations of time, and as appearing in various degrees. This means that the data of thought (phenomena), when found in thought, are *continuous* in extension and in "intension" ("Trans. Analytic," ii. p. 147. Eng. trans.). Connected always with the all-embracing form of time, there now appears the use of the third group of categories—that of Relation. Under these we find the metaphysics of nature, and the old concepts of

substance, cause, and reciprocity appear now with a new meaning; for it is true that the "given world," all phenomena, can only enter into thought on the postulate that there is a permanence in reality, and yet again this permanence is merely the ground for change. Once more, change must take place according to rule—the world for thought appears as a connected system, a continuous succession that cannot be reversed.

Finally, there is a community between the phenomena of experience such that co-existence is postulated in the thought of them. Reciprocal influence is necessary for our concept of nature. Thus we have the three great "analogies of experience," as Kant calls them; and it is seen that this is the result of an examination into the scope of pure thought—viz., that knowledge constitutes its objects in the very process of knowing, that the "nature" and the "world" of all knowledge is a world of phenomena.[1]

[1] Of the "Postulates of Empirical Thought" arising from the categories of Modality, with which Kant next deals, nothing need be said here, as they refer to the difficult contrast between the possible and the actual and necessary.

The word "phenomena" may serve as a connecting link between the Analytic and the Dialectic; for after a long discussion of the contrast between phenomena and noumena, or things in themselves, Kant proceeds, in the Dialectic,[1] to show how vain are the efforts of pure thinking where it has none of the hard facts of experience to discuss. We have seen that all knowledge is of phenomena. But what is "the thing" which common sense speaks of as "appearing" in this way and that? Obviously it can only be a vague problematic entity for our thought. Kant's followers simply denied its existence, but he himself, feeling the limitations of individual knowledge, imagined behind the veil of appearance a reality which might be an object to a mind quite different from his. Such a mind would be "pure" of the dross of sensation, and its object would be "thought-object" or noumenon. Suggestions of such objects appear in our thought as

[1] The third part of the problem in the "Critique of Pure Reason," forming the greater portion of that work. Here first appears the *pure* Reason of Kant's terminology, that delusive function which attempts to construct without data, to think without experience.

insoluble problems: these are the Ideas of pure Reason.

Now, as a matter of fact, precisely such objects had been dealt with as objects of knowledge by the pre-Kantian, or Dogmatic Metaphysics. There are three of these "Ideas"—the Soul, the World, and God; and we have only to refer back to the earlier part of the "Critique" to find that nowhere in the sphere of real knowledge and real experience are such ideas to be found: for these are *ex hypothesi* not phenomena, and all knowledge is of phenomena. The object therefore of the transcendental Dialectic is not to refute these delusions, but merely to show how they have arisen. Speaking generally of all three, the most striking characteristic is that these ideas give the unconditioned, the infinite, the eternal permanent, and in this they are quite opposite to anything to be found in actual knowledge. It is this characteristic which condemns them, for real knowledge can never hold anything which *ex hypothesi* denies any dependence on or relation to the forms of thought. In fact, the illusion by which we suppose ourselves to know anything when we

use in the sense of dogmatic metaphysics such words as "soul," "world," "God," is due to our readily supposing a problem solved which we desire to be solved. The wish is father to the thought, and we attain dogmatism.

In detail, with regard to the soul: we hear of it as a simple and immortal substance; but this is due to the paralogisms of pure reason, for we merely confuse ourselves by supposing that because the "ego" is a logical postulate for the unity of experience, therefore it is given as an object. The subject can never become an object: in the very effort to make it an object the "me" is substituted for the "I"; and yet only of objects in the world of phenomena can we use the concept of simple substance. Again we confuse ourselves when we say that because the thinker and the thing can be distinguished, therefore I, the thinker, exist, independent of all things such as are ordinarily necessary for human thought. The whole of what was called "rational psychology" is thus a pseudo-science: we as philosophers can say nothing either for or against the

ultimate meanings of the propositions it advances, for its subject-matter is not data for knowledge.[1]

Next, with regard to the world as a whole,[2] there arise the antinomies of pure reason. The usual statements of dogmatic cosmology are stated and proved, and then statements the direct contradictories of these are likewise proved. Thus we have four antinomies, of which the first two are:

Thesis	*Antithesis*
1. The world has a beginning (a limit) in time and space.	1. The world has no limit in time or space.
2. Everything is simple ultimately (cf. monads, atoms).	2. Nothing is simple (*i.e.* all is infinitely divisible).

These are the mathematical concepts of the world as given in space and time. Kant's proofs are strict and cogent, and the result

[1] This old psychology dealt with eternal and intangible "souls." No reference of course is made to modern psychology.

[2] Treated as the whole of the data of external perception. It is to be noted that Kant's criticism is as opposed to the shallow dogmatism which sometimes poses as natural science as to that of theology. The universe as such is just as much an "idea" (and *not* an object of knowledge) as the soul or God.

is a plain contradiction. Yet this does not give a sceptical conclusion, for Kant shows why the contradiction arises. The reason is this: both theses and antitheses have treated as an object what is never an object—*i.e.* the world as a whole.

Besides these we have:

Thesis	*Antithesis*
1. There are in the world free causes.	1. There is no freedom (but everything takes place by laws of nature).
2. There is a necessary Being, either as part or cause of the world.	2. There nowhere exists a necessary Being as cause of the world.

There are dynamical concepts of the world, as a world of change and perhaps interaction. The proofs on either side are again given; but this time the contradiction reached in the conclusions is of a different nature. For instead of both propositions being false, both may be true. The seeming contradiction arises therefore because they do not refer to the same objects; but whereas the theses attempt to deal with man and the world as possibly things-in-themselves (postulates or problems, not data of scientific knowledge), the antitheses continue the arguments from a

scientific view of the world as phenomenal. It results, however, from all these arguments that dogmatic cosmology is, like the old rational psychology, a pseudo-science. Strict thinking can never deal with the universe as such.

Finally, dogmatic philosophy had arrived at an ideal of pure reason, called God, by which was meant the absolutely unconditioned ground of all reality. This concept bound together the concept of the soul and that of the world; and, like these two, it is an illusion. Whatever the means by which historically the idea of God has reached its present popular form, three philosophical processes are supposed to express the real way towards that idea. These are the three "proofs of the existence of God"—the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological. These are roughly to be conceived as the arguments, (1) from the idea of a necessary Being, (2) from the idea of cause and necessity, (3) from the "design" or "order" in the world. As to the ontological proof, it cannot follow that, because we have an idea of a perfect Being, such a Being exists.[1]

[1] The ontological proof may indeed be differently rendered; but then it is not the proof to which Kant is referring. To

In the cosmological proof it is argued that because the concept of cause and dependence breaks down, therefore there is an uncaused Cause; but this only proves that we cannot by the concepts which have meaning only within experience validly transcend that experience. The argument from design seemed cogent to Kant, if the world can be regarded as in the main good and beautiful; but even so it is no absolute wisdom that is proved, but only a very limited mechanical agent, and that is not the ideal of pure reason. It is not to be considered, however, that Kant's position is purely negative with regard to these so-called "proofs": his argument is rather that on this subject scientific and logical reasoning can have nothing to say. From the point of view of reason, therefore, it is equally possible to seem to prove or to disprove the existence of God. That the effort was made to "prove" God's existence is a sign of a power which lies beyond reason, with which we deal later. Meantime it is clear that the natural theology of dogmatic metaphysics is a pseudo-science.

him it appeared in the form given by Anselm and Descartes and Leibnitz.

II. Will

Following the psychological division already named, we have now to discuss that part of experience which is connected with the will; and by the will Kant understood a functionising in the sphere of means and ends. This is plainly the division under which we shall find the concepts of what ought to be, or of the ideal: it is therefore contrasted with the function of thought, which deals only with what is. Here, then, we enter upon Ethics—not as an afterthought, but as a necessary part of the philosophy of experience which Kant from the beginning had proposed. Although his theory of ethics forms thus the second part of his philosophy, yet in fact the influences which went to make the result were originally independent of such thought as we find in the "Critique of Pure Reason." The early training in Pietism and the influence of such thinkers as Shaftesbury left in Kant a rigorist view of life. In theory he began with the view of the origin of morals in mere feeling, but later he conceived even will as implying logical grounds. Again, his study of history gave Kant an early appreciation of

the development of the whole race towards some vague goal.[1] The pessimistic view of the results of all action seemed to him to involve the false hope of individualistic, even egoistic, happiness; and such hope was false, because history showed that sensuous satisfaction, "a paradise life," is not an end, but an historical origin, from which the farther we moved the better. The stress and strain of moral endeavour pointed to a higher solution; and this solution, as an anticipation, was present to the individual in his sense of the moral law. The end of the race as one was present as an ideal to the individual. Hence arose the form in which the principle of morality was afterwards stated by Kant—"so act that the rule followed in your action may be the expression of a universal law"; and against egoistic or selfish happiness as an end—"regard every human being as an end and not a means."

When Kant's studies of the theory of knowledge and the concept of reality were finished, a new attitude resulted in regard to

[1] Cf. "Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784).

ethical questions. They are discussed in a more definite form; and since the form is largely that used in purely logical questions, it tends to make Kantian ethics seem pedantic. The dichotomy of moral life, the antithesis between what is and what ought to be, is treated as parallel to the division of the empirical and the universal in knowledge. Hence in examining the data of moral philosophy Kant distinguishes two elements—an *a priori* universal element, which is the binding force of the whole subject-matter, and a secondary *a posteriori* element, which as it were consists of various and disconnected actions. The possibility of a moral philosophy rests upon the nature of the universal element. This, Kant says, is a categorical imperative, an unconditional command. It is a command because we are dealing with the region of will, and in this sphere command is parallel with universal statement in the intellectual sphere. It is unconditional—that is to say, it does not assert any consequences or give any choice: for morality is not a means to any other end, but is an end in itself. Thus the voice of conscience does not say—"if

you want this, you must do that," but simply and plainly, "you must do that." When we judge a moral action we refer not to success, but to intention. Duty for duty's sake is the only principle of morality; and in the categorical "ought to be" is the contrast with inclination which makes duty seem disagreeable. It remains to be seen how this *a priori* element of morality is related to the details of actual life, and first we find that it has no meaning except in definite combination with individual life. For the law of duty is not an external principle, but an internal force; an externally imposed code may give legality but not morality to actions. Morality therefore consists in an attitude of actual life towards an internal law: hence Kant says "nothing is good but the good will." The perfectly moral man fights his own battles upon his own battlefields, and does not attempt to avoid responsibility by invoking authority. Hence it is that the Kantian ethics is conceived to be individualistic; but in the description of the content of the moral law, Kant adopts a universalism that is so wide as to seem unreal. The law is said

to command that in every action, not an individual desire, but a "universal law of nature" may be expressed. The impulses and inclinations are to be resisted as being determinations or influences from the outside, from the phenomenal, and the rational will alone is to be followed as embodying the moral principle of autonomy and self-determination. The freedom which is conceived as the basis for morality is nothing less than self-determination—although Kant himself sometimes falls back into the old concept of the freedom of indeterminism, according to which morality involves the possibility of a choice between opposites at any moment. This latter concept, however, in so far as it neglects the fact that character determines choice, has almost disappeared from ethics since the days of Kant.

When at length he discussed the metaphysical basis of ethics, Kant found that the very possibility of the contrast between external determination and self-determination involved as a postulate that the self of experience must be regarded as "free." Further, the concept of the moral law involved the

postulate that what was good was also ultimately real as contrasted with mere phenomena; but since the self of ordinary experience always held the contrast between what is and what ought to be, we might reach a second postulate—immortality—in which this contrast might be solved. Finally, the opposition between the desire for happiness of the sensuous will and the desire for virtue in the rational will might imply a third postulate—the existence of God. God, freedom, and immortality, though not to be known, may yet be hoped for.

From these postulates of the practical reason religion arises: it is in truth nothing but a morality in which the moral law is conceived as a divine command. The moral man will therefore, generally speaking,[1] be religious in so far as he lives in the faith of optimism that good is triumphant. All the detail of the metaphysics ordinarily connected with religion is therefore conceived to be symbolism, and thus to subserve an ideal morality. Original sin, atonement, and the rest are

[1] This, Kant says, is not necessary; cf. "Criticism of Judgment," § 87.

inadequate and almost picture-renderings of deep moral truths.

III. Feeling

We are left at the end of the Kantian Ethics with a conviction of a conflict between the practical and theoretical interests of life. In fact, for long it was said that Kant had put back under the name of practical postulates all the concepts he had before rejected as misleading in theory. The ground for such a statement is to be found in the fact that Kant held the subject-matter discussed from the point of view of pure reason absolutely apart from the subject-matter of practical life. A synthesis was found for reasoning, and a synthesis for will; but now the same principle of critical thought demanded that these two aspects should be themselves synthesised. Psychologically the sphere remaining to be discussed was that of feeling; under this, value or approval might be conceived to be found; and in a logical system the function exercised in feelings might be called the judgment, both because the judg-

ment intervenes between the reason and the understanding and because in the "reflecting" judgment the particulars are subsumed under a universal purpose. Hence we have a Critique of Judgment.

The vague judgment of approval may be subdivided into the æsthetic and teleological, in so far as one is the judgment of an object as gratifying, the other of an object as fitting (purposive); and with regard to the æsthetic judgment we have first to ask whether there is any *a priori* or universal element in judgments of taste. Is there, as we loosely put it, any real beauty? Or is every man's taste as good as his neighbour's? Kant was without special training in æsthetic questions, and examples of his taste which have come down to us are often more than suspicious. Nevertheless his keen logical insight served him well even in this subject. He begins with an analysis of subjective artistic appreciation, and concedes to popular conception the truth that logical dispute as to the beautiful leads nowhere; but this does not mean that there is no *a priori* universal "standard" of beauty, for there are such things as universally valid

feelings or emotions. To these the beautiful is given. It is not the significance or the worth of its object which constitutes its beauty, but only its fitness to cause a harmony between the perceptive and the reasoning functions. Thus in the beautiful the immediate and the ideal are synthesised. And since this sense of beauty in the individual percipient is, as it were, merely a sign of a purposiveness in the object in reference to a system far greater than the individual can grasp, the *a priori* in æsthetic judgments is based upon this higher world. The sublime, on the contrary, gains its effect through almost crushing the percipient, and creates an æsthetic effect when the sensuous side of our activity (which is felt to be so inadequate) is contrasted with the rational side, in which we stand above nature.

Next, in regard to the teleological judgment, we have to synthesise the abstract and mechanical concepts of nature with the ideas of purpose, means, and end with which we explain part of our experience. Kant says that there are limits to the mechanical and scientific concepts, for "life" of which we

have experience cannot be explained by the mechanical theories of determination from the outside. This is not due to a mere present lack of data, for the very nature of the subject-matter demands another principle of explanation. This new principle may be called that of organism. In view of this we can regard from a teleological point of view all that part of experience in which "life" is given, and talk of the means and ends of an organism. Kant also says that, regarded as a whole, nature may be explained teleologically. The mechanical explanations of science are then the description of aspects in the carrying out of a great rational and moral purpose in all nature. With this thought Kant gave impetus to the various phases of romantic idealism that followed him.

In spite of the obvious limitations of his philosophy, we cannot fail to see how important a position in the history of thought is occupied by this Germanised Scotsman. His limitations were perhaps conditions for the exactness of his thinking. What he lost in comprehensiveness he gained in

intensity. Therefore his work may still be regarded as one of the turning-points in the history of thought.

But the individualism and abstractness of Kant's thought should not blind us to the fact that all real philosophy grows out of the experience of a certain man in a certain time and place. The influence of Pietism in the Ethics we have already remarked. But we can also see in all his thought the untiring argument of the Scottish and the German theologian. Kant, more international than those who precede or follow him, was nevertheless an outcome of a particular type of national experience. In reference to him it is most true that German philosophy is the granddaughter of Protestant theology.

CHAPTER VIII

THE KANTIANS, FICHTE, AND ROMANTICISM

THE movement of thought in the immediate successors of Kant is largely dependent upon his statements of the problems and his conclusions; and the concept of the "thing-in-itself" was naturally that which first attracted attention. In Kant's statement this concept had been rather a problem for knowledge than a definite starting-point, but the other-worldliness with which the thing-in-itself seemed to be surrounded was attractive to many minds at this time. Even during the lifetime of Kant there appeared signs of the coming Romanticism. The reaction from the intellectualism of the eighteenth century was finding voice in the literature of Germany, and soon attempted to confuse philosophy. Some protest was in-

deed necessary against what is to be found even in Kant, the dividing of human nature according to the abstract rules of the intellect; but the exaggeration of those other elements in life, beauty and goodness, to the detriment of truth, was harmful. The revival of interest in Spinoza expresses in philosophers of this date a straining after mysticism.

The Kantians who attempted the development and correction of Kant in this mood were chiefly Jacobi and Maimon. Taking Kant at his word, Jacobi pointed out that there was no method of escaping in thought the charmed circle of mere appearances. Reality, which is distinguished from these appearances, must therefore always lie beyond thought—that is, beyond knowledge; but it is not therefore unconnected with us, for we have immediate (*i.e.* unmediated) knowledge in feeling: the act of connection is called "faith." The way is therefore open to anything and everything, for we are thus placed beyond the realm of logical process.

With Maimon, however, the object is more purely rational. He, discussing the value of the thing-in-itself, observes that, although

inconceivable, it was introduced as a kind of formula for the insoluble difficulty as to the nature of "the given" in consciousness. It is an irrational quantity which yet can be used philosophically; it is comparable to such a mathematical symbol as $\sqrt{2}$.

While the earliest developments of the Critical Philosophy were in progress, events in the political world were influencing the course of thought. We have already seen that when the Revolution culminated in France, philosophy there was dead, and in Germany the "Critique of Pure Reason" had been written. The chaos which followed the Revolution then gradually became settled, and one great figure appears upon the ruins of the old régime. Napoleon was the life-spirit of France in the years that followed; and Europe, at first interested only theoretically in the course of French events, was soon wakened by him into a practical appreciation of the changed order. Through Napoleon changes came over the whole scheme of political life in the West, comparable only to the changes of the Renaissance. Whether or not Revolution and Renaissance are to be regarded

as essentially the same movement, it is certain that the one accomplished what the other began; for not only was the political system changed, but the whole attitude expressed in real life became different, and the difference is apparent in the philosophies which arose from this changed experience. So complex, indeed, is the web of history that it is almost impossible to follow a single line of cause and effect. Just as Kant's criticism arose not only out of abstract philosophy, but also from a fuller view of life, so now the greatest of Kant's successors were influenced not less by the new values and problems of experience than by the Critiques.

Germany, where philosophy was now to make progress, was at this time a collection of small States. Prussia was indeed the most powerful, but had not yet risen to the consciousness of power, and the smaller States were united politically in a loose confederation of Central Europe, of which Austria was the chief member.

France, meanwhile, tired of internal struggles, had been roused by her soldiers to ambitions of conquest abroad. Carrying with

them and sowing in their path a new political and national enthusiasm, the French armies had acquired an influence over half Europe. The new-born national spirit swept everything before it in the brilliant successes at Marengo (1800), Austerlitz (1805), and lesser battles on the continent; and it was not yet perceived that its defeats at sea—Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805)—at the hands of an older national spirit, had already decided that its dreams were not destined to be realised.

Prussia, seeming to gain for herself, had remained neutral while Napoleon consolidated his power and secured his hold on the surrounding countries; but at last popular feeling forced the authorities to declare war. The result was the total collapse of Prussia at Jena and Auerstädt (1806); and Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph. Worse than defeat was the apathy with which, on the whole, subjection was received by Germany. During the few years following, Napoleon was the supreme force of all Europe; and yet the gospel of national ideals, which was to be his ultimate overthrow, was being preached even during these years by enthusiasts like Fichte; and

the reconstruction of Germany by education and public spirit was steadily progressing.

A similar process, fostered and furthered by English aid, had resulted in Napoleon's withdrawal from Spain; and when the Russian campaign ended in the hopeless retreat from Moscow (1812), Europe rose from its ashes. The General of revolutionary France was forced to abdicate the Empire he had won, and the political world was able to attempt reconstruction.

Such was the turmoil in the midst of which the great systems of German philosophy arose. The very spirit of these systems was the same which in the political world produced through infinite travail the single German nation. In place of the critical insight of Kant we find an effort to establish complete and unified systems; so that in this change from Kantian to purely German philosophy, we have once again the proof that all real philosophy arises from a new experience. Life always goes before logic. However absolute the claims of any system of thought, its validity depends upon its expression of a real individual and national life. In the work

of Fichte the Critical Philosophy underwent a development of the greatest importance for the future. Fichte's primary object was to systematise the results attained by Kant, but in attempting this he was led to develop a fundamental thought to its ultimate consequences. That thought was contained in what Kant had called the synthetic unity of apperception: it indicated, in a more precise way than the vague Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum," that the individual thinker was the universal element or the unifying point in all real experience. Hence Fichte, developing this, is the philosopher of the Ego.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was born in Lusatia. His precocious genius and exact memory attracted the attention of a rich man, at whose expense his education was begun; but on the death of his patron, Fichte had to struggle on at school as best he might. After schooling, he contrived to continue his studies at Leipzig, with a view to becoming a pastor. From the beginning, however, the clerical profession was distasteful to him, and he soon became a literary

essayist. At Zürich he met Johanna Rahn, whose love influenced the remainder of his life. After some years of wandering as tutor at various places, he was almost accidentally attracted by the "Critique of Pure Reason." Therein, as he said, his scheming spirit found rest, and he consciously became a philosopher. His poverty forced him still to live by tutoring; but, after a disagreeable experience at Warsaw, he journeyed to Königsberg (1790) to see Kant. The old philosopher was brusquely kind to him, but poverty again forced him to the distasteful tutoring. In the meantime an essay by Fichte was anonymously published, which attempted to draw conclusions as to religion from the Critical Philosophy (An Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation, 1792). This was mistaken by readers and reviewers for a work of Kant's own hand; and when the real authorship was revealed, Fichte's position as a philosopher was secured. He was then able to marry, and was soon after called to be Professor at Jena (1793). There he stayed, attempting reform in the University, and stating views by no means palatable to the

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authorities, in consequence of which he was expelled from his position in 1799; but he had already conceived the splendid system of his "Wissenschaftslehre." He found a home in Berlin, where he developed his thoughts, in lectures, in the direction of absolute Idealism. At this time political events changed his ideals of reform into ideals of patriotism. He fled before the victorious advance of Napoleon, but after a short stay at Königsberg, where he lectured, he returned to Berlin in 1807. Then he delivered his famous "Addresses to the German Nation," inciting Prussia to renewed efforts. He was made first Rector of the new Berlin University. His greatest enthusiasm was excited by the struggles of 1812 and 1813 against Napoleon. His wife, nursing the wounded, was attacked by fever, and Fichte caught the disease from her, and died of it. In character he was a passionate idealist, impatient of a world by no means ideal. Indeed, even in his strictest processes of reasoning, he is something of a preacher and a poet; in his later works[1] the language is almost that of an inspired visionary.

[1] Of these the three most striking—"The Nature of the

The system of Fichte's results is often artificial, and the process of his reasoning often arbitrary, but the essentials of his philosophy are immortal. The grandeur of Spinoza's thought led him through the precise analytics of Kant to an intuition almost Platonic. In the development of the Critical Philosophy Fichte gradually felt his own power; and by the force of his own thought he moved forward through what may be regarded as two definite stages. At first, like his master, he is absorbed by the problems of knowledge and reality as given; then he is attracted by the fuller reality which seemed to be given in active life. He leaves the barren controversies as to the thing-in-itself, and in the end explains away altogether this bugbear of reasoning.

Philosophy is called by Fichte "Wissenschaftslehre"; thus he conceives it as a systematic thinking out of conscious knowledge. Later it changes into what he has called "a pragmatic history of consciousness." For a

Scholar," "The Vocation of Man," "The Doctrines of Religion"—were translated into English by Dr. Smith (Trübner & Co., 1873).

systematic philosophy it is necessary to commence from the *ultimate datum* of all experience, which is, as Kant had shown in "synthetic apperception," the *universal element* in all experience. Now, in its first stage, experience involves merely a unity of opposites, which may be called the self and the not-self. In the act of awareness (Anschauung) the connection or unifying contrast is directly given, and the opposites are not clearly conceived; but if this awareness be an *act*, in so far as it is a basis of knowledge it is directed towards the ultimate necessity of all real knowing—a full self-knowledge. That we do not observe the part our self plays in our experience is due to the familiarity which breeds contempt, for the self alone is omnipresent in all experience. But the first act aiming at self (or ego) finds it only by opposition to not-self (non-ego); this not-self therefore is merely an intermediate postulate or limitation by which to reach the self, in and for which the original opposition arose. Now, this beginning of philosophy with act and not fact is at variance with the popular conception of experience. It is therefore

wrong to suppose that Fichte is talking of the "things" and "selves" of common sense as the members of his opposition.

When we come to think out the meaning of real experience, it is possible to speak of this opposition either in terms of causation (to say that the non-self determines or modifies a passive ego) or in terms of substance—to say that the self (ego) is active in producing its own states and in positing itself. If we say the former, we are realists; if the latter, we are subjective idealists. Both statements are false; for it is only as mutually determined that these opposites have any reality at all.

Starting, therefore, from the beginning of all consciousness, we find that the first act, sensation, gives no determination at all. Its results are thus conceived as "given," because not consciously made.[1] The "productive imagination" beyond and above this gives (out of the opposition) definite opposites, which are now subject and object. This, therefore, is the first and fundamental act of real knowledge; but productive imagination

[1] The self is "felt" as passive because this is the first act of self-limitation.

is merely a new stage in what is essentially the free activity of experience, and the next stage is that by which the products of the primary intuitions are fixed in classes. Thus the world of understanding arises in and for an activity which is itself productive of both elements in knowledge, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. If the whole of this abstract world of our construction be now made an object, we have the ultimate act of conscious life. Here will be found the purest Ego of philosophic thought by opposition to the purest form of non-Ego; but we have not even here reached any such mysterious substratum as ordinary thought thinks the "I" to be.[1] Does all our dialectical movement

[1] So long as the Fichtean "ego" is regarded as the individual and personal unit (which is ordinarily spoken of as a substance), no understanding of Fichte is possible. Still less is it possible to follow him if some mysterious "soul" be postulated, for "soul" and "body" are constructions of activity, the one as the active, the other as the passive connection with the not-self. The ordinary soul-and-body hypothesis is in truth nothing but a residue of early metaphysics. So Fichte says: "The existence of a soul is absolutely denied, and the whole concept rejected as a bad invention. And this is not an indifferent matter, but an essential criterion of our system. With the belief in such a soul a man cannot abide in our system, nor even enter it."

(by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) lead to any definite end? Certainly not, if the end be conceived as a substance or a cause, for both these have appeared only *in* the activity, and must be transcended when we deal with that activity as such.

Turning back to our original experience, we find that throughout the world of our theoretical construction there has been no explanation given of the meaning of the original limitation or opposition; indeed, no theoretical explanation is possible, for the original activity is the ground of all theory, and that original activity is of the type not of thinking, but of willing. In fact, all our thinking is purposive; the very meaning of our thoughts depends upon our purpose in constructing them. "Will is in a special sense the essence of reason." "The whole system of our ideas depends upon our impulses (Trieb) and our will." Thus we take up again Lessing's concept of "eternal striving"; and here Fichte passes from the "Critique of Pure Reason" to the "Critique of Practical Reason." The real itself is merely a postulate in a process whose whole meaning is

movement towards the ideal. The realisation of the ideal self is the end, and the concept of this is the summit of philosophy; but such realisation takes place in an infinite series of activities.

The later form of the "Wissenschaftslehre" and the popular works mark the progress from these concepts to a transcendental system which is an attempt to read the real world in its relation to the ideal; for the force that expresses the individual's first (unconscious) activity is not his own, and the end he moves towards is not merely personal. Also the limiting world is not, as limit, the construction of that which exists only by being limited (finite activity). On every side the finite self goes out into infinity; and the infinity, as to meaning, is the Divine Idea: the Absolute is God. Here, then, Fichte, the ideal moralist, becomes a mystic—not a dreamy despiser of thought, but rather one who has thought life out to the end. "There is no other Being than life. The only life that exists entirely in itself, from itself and by itself, is the life of God, or of the Absolute; . . . the truth is, the Absolute is Life and Life is the

Absolute."[1] But this again is a philosophic truth, not mere mystic assertion. "To me it is—not so certain as the sun in heaven or as the feeling of my own body—but infinitely more certain, that there is Truth, that it is attainable by man, and clearly conceived by him."[2] The metaphysic of the whole of experience involves a synthesis of all the forms of knowledge and the series of practical life; and this synthesis is in itself an active unity upon which the system of finite selves and the nature which arises out of their finiteness is dependent. This one activity in and for itself ("hidden," as Fichte called it) may be conceived as stable and unchanging; but for us it is manifested as the eternal striving of the ideal in the real; this is the "Universal Ego" ("allgemeinen Ich").

From such a height did Fichte speak to the world of ordinary experience, and in his practical ethics he attempted to show how the limitations of social life and civil law are themselves directed towards the true development of the free and ideal self of the individuals.

1 "Nature of the Scholar," Eng. trans., p. 148.

2 "The Doctrine of Religion," Eng. trans., p. 552.

All communities, even the highest, Church and State, arise out of the nature of the finite self, which by limitation realises the infinite in the empirical world. The free fulfilment of a duty whose command is from within and not from without (authority) is the sole object of laws and limits. Thus Fichte could be at once the first socialist of "the complete industrial State," and the patriot who felt the divine idea to be realised in the natural community of which he was a member. He died with the gospel of strenuous idealism upon his lips. Above his grave is written—"The teachers shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars that shine for ever."

Even during Fichte's development of philosophic thought, an alien principle had begun to influence reasoning. It is indeed false to life to regard intellectual exactness as the only criterion of progress, and the only thing valuable. In protest against this Rousseau had written, and later literature had taken up the cry of return to the roughness and the strength of full life—"the native hue of resolution." The arbitrary standards of

eighteenth-century intellectualism were rejected, and " naturalism " was adopted. The real world had been and was then obviously fuller than science found it. Now this movement was at last reduced to systematic coherence in "Romanticism." The principles of this, indeed, are hard to define, especially as its latest exponents appear to be weak-minded enthusiasts. But in its first stages Romanticism may be conceived as an expression of the æsthetic appreciation of real life, and it is therefore intimately connected with naturalism. In Germany at first it expressed the new-found strength of the German nation rising against alien ideals and foreign power. Thus it was connected with an interest in the Middle Ages, which in thought and art had been so prominently Teutonic. Soon, however, Schiller and Goethe give place to Schlegel and Novalis, and Romanticism becomes a barren protest against scientific thinking. At this stage, too, it becomes connected with religious enthusiasm and political reaction. Thus a thousand currents swell the stream whose whole force is directed along other channels than that of

pure thought. At first it seemed as if philosophy itself would be expressed in terms of Romanticism.

Fichte had been influenced by the enthusiasms of his contemporaries, though he never consciously allowed his logical thinking to suffer. With weaker men the result was different. We have already seen how the earliest commentators on Kant's Critiques, such as Jacobi, attempted to assert the security of immediate feeling in defiance of critical thought. Other thinkers had attained a kind of reasoned scepticism; but in Schelling the opposing interests meet in conflict; and as he ended in a negative attitude towards scientific thinking, he may be regarded as typical of the philosophy of Romanticism. Together with him may be mentioned that graceful but inadequate thinker, the poet Novalis, and the theorising æsthete Fr. Schlegel.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) was a native of Würtemberg, and was educated at Tübingen. He was a follower and afterwards an assistant of Fichte at Jena, and he was made Professor there in 1798.

There he was connected with the two Schlegels and Novalis, among others, and thus originated Romanticism. But the enthusiasm of Schelling at this time was anti-religious and purely naturalistic; his speculation also was wholly concerned with nature and art. When, however, external circumstances forced the more popular interests of life upon his view, his attitude was entirely changed, and he attempted religious mysticism ending in theosophy. For some years after 1841 he lectured in Berlin; but his active thinking ceased very soon after the change in his attitude. Hegel had in the interval attained success in philosophic circles; and when the Hegelians seemed to be unorthodox in speculation Schelling reappeared as the champion of orthodoxy, but to little effect.

Schelling's first object was purely philosophical. It was to obtain a conception of nature from the point of view of the idealism of Fichte; for not only did philosophy demand that science should be brought into harmony with her, but science itself seemed to confess the inadequacies of its own hypotheses.[1] The

[1] Apart from the difficulties of a mechanical explanation

method adopted was a reversal of the scientific point of view; and whereas all science had been, as it still is, based upon mathematical and mechanical rules, Schelling explains nature by teleological concepts, and conceives it to be a gradual development of a spiritual principle.[1] Nature, therefore, is the Odyssey of spirit; the aim and closing synthesis of its many dualisms (of force, negative and positive electricity, etc.) is consciousness. Poetically valid, this concept did not prove philosophically or scientifically valuable. There followed a strange attempt to substitute symbolism for science; rational meaning (why?) and not mere connection (how?) was demanded. With such a theory, beauty may easily be confused with truth; and, just as Kant had hinted that the last synthesis of his critical analysis would be emotional or æsthetic, so now artistic

of biological facts, the newly discovered phenomena of electricity were attracting attention. Hence the idea of "polarity" to be found in Schelling.

[1] The contrast may be found still within science: for whereas chemistry, for instance, reduces the qualitative differences of colour to a quantitative proportion of ether-waves, biological evolution, on the other hand, demands that organic changes should be regarded as purposive (*i.e.* teleological).

intuition was held to be the ultimate ground of philosophic knowledge.

When, however, we have reached an emotional attitude in regard to the whole of known reality as the conclusion of philosophy, we are already on the threshold of some form of religion. The artistic interest and religious enthusiasm of Romanticism now appear as real life in opposition to the abstract reasoning as to nature. Thus Schelling re-reads his system with a view perhaps of finding what is supposed to be necessary to the religious consciousness. The spiritual unity of nature now becomes a personal Spirit, and the actual world of finite existences is described, neoplatonically, as a falling away from this. In the interests also of religious ethics this personal world-ground is conceived as all good, in opposition apparently to the chaos of the irrational which is somehow within Him. So that the world is the development of God, the conquest of evil which yet only exists in good.[1] There is here the struggle to sever the concept of "God" in religion from that

[1] "The battle becomes a game, a divine joke."—Höffding, ii. p. 172.

of the Absolute in philosophy. But the method is arbitrary, and the results did not have any great influence. A somewhat similar attempt was made by Fr. Schleiermacher, an unorthodox Moravian (1768–1834). His purpose was to reach a consistent and rational mysticism, and his method depended upon a revival of the Kantian thing-in-itself. This was the last great attempt to use scientific thought as a basis for colourless orthodoxy. Afterwards it was seen by all thinkers that the popular creed could not be reinstated; even by mystical symbolism.

CHAPTER IX

HEGEL

THE positive side of the development of German philosophy culminated in Hegel. With him the Critical Philosophy is an "overcome standpoint," and Absolute Idealism takes its place. An all-embracing system is attempted by means of a method already implicit in the thought of Fichte and Schelling—the Dialectic.

George William Frederic Hegel (1770–1831) was a native of Stüttgart, and was educated at Tübingen. He seems to have been a quiet student, with none of the precocious genius of Schelling, who was his contemporary at Tübingen. His earliest enthusiasm was for the Greeks; but in connection with literary and romantic interests he was already studying

Kant. In 1793 he began his "Wanderjahre," and acted as tutor first at Berne and afterwards at Frankfort. His interests during these years of formation were concerned with religion: he had been intended for the Church while at Tübingen, and he seems never to have lost his interest in and appreciation of the ordinary religious consciousness. At this time he was attracted towards mysticism and the thought of the Middle Ages. His genial nature was gradually becoming overclouded while he struggled to arrive at a definite conclusion as to the problem now present to him. This was nothing less than the question as to the value of the principle of individuality as expressed in the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Thus Hegel seems to have lived through the various attitudes expressed in what later on he called the Dialectic. His attention to exact and philosophic thought had naturally left him with a conception of the human individual such as is expressed by Kant and Fichte. In this, independence and isolation seemed to be the prominent notes, and these notes appeared to Hegel embodied in the principle of Chris-

tianity;[1] but on the other hand Hegel's enthusiasm for the Greeks, and his appreciation of the truth embodied in the Romantic principle of the unity of human life, led him to see the falsehood of the abstract postulate of the Enlightenment. The Greeks seemed to him to show in their history how the true and fully developed human individual was only to be found when completely taken up in the community of which he was a member. It is in this sense that Hegel agreed with the principle of authority as expressed in Romanticism, and even with the philosophy of identity preached by Schelling. Further thought, however, led him to see that the harmony reached by the life of a Greek city-state was exceptional, and even that it was possible to exaggerate the principle of authority and the idea of the unity of human life to such a point as to destroy all individuality. Along with these pregnant thoughts, Hegel was developing the idea of a systematic use of the method exhibited by

[1] Thus it is clear that his concept of Christianity was predominantly Lutheran at this time. He treats Christianity as essentially Judaic in his early "Studies of Jewish and Christian Religion from a Greek Point of View." His later judgment corrected this.

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Kant and Fichte. They had shown that logical thinking on philosophic subjects must be carried out by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis —the new names of the old "methodus sic et non." With such preparation Hegel sketched in outline the system he was afterwards to develop. Philosophy was to be the systematic study of reality as given in experience, or simply a study of experience. Its first effort was to be an attempt to grasp the general structure of reality (Logic or Metaphysic); the next was to exhibit that part of reality which is seen by us "from the outside," as common language has it (Philosophy of Nature); and the third and last effort was to examine "from the inside" such reality as could be so studied (Philosophy of Mind), and by this means to gather together all the different elements into one concrete whole, which as a system would give a relative place to all aspects of reality. Thus the whole might be called, from its highest point, a Philosophy of Spirit.

In 1801 Hegel went to Jena and appeared as a champion of Schelling's philosophy. Together they attacked the analysis of Kant and

Fichte as too extreme; but gradually Hegel drew apart, for Schelling's protest appeared to him to be a kind of emotional mysticism, and as such to be anti-scientific. The philosophy of identity seemed no better than the philosophy of substance as expressed in Spinoza; the highest reality, the Absolute, was "a dark night in which all cows look black." And in consonance with this attitude some mysterious and sacred intuition was supposed to sever the philosopher, as an artist, from the common herd. Such poetic generalities did not appeal to Hegel: and in his "voyage of discovery," as he called the "Phenomenology of Spirit" (1807), he showed how philosophy was related as a scientific study to the other spheres of knowledge, and said that the true work of a philosopher was to plunge headlong ("hineinstürzen") into experience. Thus, in opposition to Schelling, the subject-matter of philosophy was said to be reality as given here and now, and the subject-matter in its highest aspect never passed beyond thought-experience; again, the method of philosophy was a continuation of the same logical process by which

physical science arose out of common sense.

While Hegel was thus thinking, political events had led up to the battle of Jena. Before the battle Hegel had watched Napoleon, "the world-mind on horseback, reaching over the world and remoulding it," as he says; and when war left no further opportunity for higher studies, Hegel became Rector of the Gymnasium at Nürnberg, where he remained for some years (1808–16). During this period he married (1811), and afterwards published his "Science of Logic" ("Wissenschaft der Logik," 1812–16, three volumes).[1] This work brought him fame. He was offered a position by three universities, and accepted the offer from Heidelberg. There he lectured on philosophy (1816–18). Naturally at that date he developed further the thought on the individual and authority, especially with regard to political life. His moderate views, tending, by contrast to the current "individualism," to seem conservative, attracted

[1] This is the "greater" Logic, translated in part (Quality and Quantity) by Stirling in his "Secret of Hegel." The smaller Logic, the first part of the Encyclopedia, is translated by Dr. Wallace.

attention in Berlin. He therefore was called to succeed Fichte there in 1818. From this time he was the greatest power in the philosophic world. He published his "Philosophy of Right," and attempted to solve the opposition of an exaggerated individualism—expressed in the "Aufklärung," and partly in the ethics of Kant and Fichte—and an exaggerated view of government as parental, the principle of authority—as expressed by the reaction against the Revolution. In spite of a philosophic intention of standing above controversy, as was natural to a philosopher who would not separate his theories from the real and immediate world, Hegel's views underwent a limitation. His ideals were inevitably coloured by the circumstances in which they were developed; and therefore the claim that he stood outside and beyond the process of development, if we can imagine it seriously urged, cannot be accepted. His idea of government is Prussian, and his idea of religion is Lutheran. Work of greater value was done by him in pure philosophy. His lectures had already been embodied in the "Encyclopedia," which expresses the system of which he had

drawn the scheme at Frankfort. Of this work, the first part (Logic) was influential in forming the systematic philosophy of Germany; and the third part (Philosophy of Spirit), full as it was of Hegel's deep historical learning, established scientific idealism; but the second part (Philosophy of Nature), perhaps owing to his lack of physical science, has not proved valuable. Of other works may be mentioned a "History of Philosophy" and a "Philosophy of History."

Hegel died of the epidemic of cholera, having lectured with his usual force up to within two days of his death.

If Kant showed that criticism must be the beginning of all philosophic thought, by which no *ipse dixit* of authority can be admitted as a barrier to individual thought, Hegel showed that dialectics must be the method of philosophy. No individual can take his first thoughts as an absolute beginning, for all is relative; and yet the relativity of all thought cannot invalidate its result. The precision of method gave a

systematic coherence to the results attained by Hegel, by which his development of philosophy is connected in its general tone with the great systems of the past—the Aristotelian and the Thomistic. For, like the earliest thinkers of the North, Hegel's method is by "sic et non," and his result is a justification of the postulate "omne ens est verum," "the real is the rational." There is no unknowable, however much may be unknown. In the width of his outlook Hegel is like an Aristotle—a successor to the Platonic Fichte. It will perhaps appear that his deficiencies also connect him with the great systematic thinkers. Hegel fails, perhaps like Aristotle, through not appreciating the value of the mechanical (atomistic) principle of physical science; and he fails, like Thomas Aquinas, because his precise abstract thinking seems, at any rate to many, to lack definite application to immediate reality.[1]

However distasteful the result may be, the first efforts of Hegel's thinking can hardly be

[1] Thus Aristotle appears to neglect Democritus, as Hegel did Kepler and his followers; and Thomas Aquinas was criticised as an abstract "panlogist" by Scotus, much in the same way as Hegel was by Schopenhauer.

called unreal, even by the man of "average intelligence." Those efforts were directed towards restoring philosophy to the sanity of a science of ordinary experience; for the last efforts of his predecessors seemed to Hegel to have removed philosophic study into the mists of special intuition and exceptional types of experience. Thus Hegel went through, in his own thought, the course of all preceding thought. The first essays in critical and reflective thought seemed to be embodied in Kant and Fichte. In them the prejudices of the Enlightenment in favour of analytic thinking seemed to have reached their logical results; and apart from the difficulty of treating the elements of experience in isolation, there was the more obtrusive difficulty of treating the human individual as, in essence, isolated. True it may be that without reference to the individual all experience and all thought is meaningless; and, from this premise, Kant and Fichte had seemed to exalt the ego so much as to leave the individual unrelated to his community and the general environment. Thus in ethics, where the results of an exag-

gerated metaphysical postulate are tested, the cold moralism of Kant was followed by the enthusiasm of the Idea-Ego in Fichte. Looking back, we can see with Hegel "the dead sea of moral platitudes" that was the ethics of the Enlightenment. And if Hegel is too severe upon a principle which in the main was true and valuable—that the individual conscience is fundamental in moral life—it may perhaps be due to the fact that he felt most keenly the popular exaggeration of this in a fatuous "individualism."

Upon cool inquiry it soon appears that the human individual is not in fact isolated, that man is a "social animal," and is to be understood only through the relation in which he, as particular, stands to the universal, his community. History indeed teaches that the individual attains his highest development when he lives not as a hermit, but as a citizen. Here Hegel was taught by the Greeks; for in that nation we find the most entire sinking of individuality in the State, and at the same time the development of the highest types of the individual. This loss of individuality in the community was practically the same as

that preached by Schelling. The other type of perfect community seemed to the philosophers of Romanticism to be found in the Middle Ages;[1] but to this Hegel does not refer, for it had not yet reached definite expression. In the Greeks, however, not only were the particular interests of the individual subordinated to the more universal, but the two were bound together. To the Greeks life was a rounded whole. To them the ideal was found in and through the real, as may be seen in their art. Now, from this last position Hegel never receded. Romanticism remained to him the name for the highest type of artistic intuition; and by it he meant that in art so conceived the ideal was realised, or found in the real world, in one inspired moment. In the wider interests of life, again, and particularly in religion, the Greeks were at one with actual experience; for, while

[1] The fact that the Middle Ages of artistic and religious thinkers never existed does not affect the argument. The meaning was that this was an ideal time, when authority did all the dirty work, and the individual was required only to give a graceful obedience. The Middle Ages of Romanticism are no more and no less historically untrue than the Greece of Winckelmann and Goethe—to which Hegel referred.

the Jewish religion was the religion of great men—the prophets—the Greeks had a greater religion, for theirs was a religion of the people. Thus it seems that Hegel had lost the value of the thought of Kant and Fichte. The individual seems almost to have disappeared in this criticism of individualism.

It appeared, however, that Schelling was pressing this criticism of his predecessors to an extreme, and erecting an absolute universalism into the only principle of thought and life. Hegel therefore perceived that the truth lay with neither or with both; for if the assertion of a unity above difference be held to mean that there is no difference, it is false or unmeaning. If, because the individual exists only in a community, we say that the individual exists only for the community, it is false. In the attempt to explain the universal side of individual life, the principle of absolute authority leads to a lion's den—towards which all footsteps go, and from which none return.

At this stage, therefore, Hegel no longer treats the result attained by the Greeks as an ideal to which we may return; for he sees

that the opposition and even antagonism between individuals is no less necessary in real and full life than the sympathy and community. Kant and Fichte were right, and so was Schelling in his original meaning. We cannot return to childhood and accept external direction: the force that moves a perfect community must be the spontaneous force of individuals. On the other hand, the individualism which promotes only the full development of an isolated self is wrong, for self-limitation no less than self-development is necessary for the realisation of the ideal self. This, however, involves a new ethics, with which we shall deal later. Here it may be noted that Hegel now reached a point of view at which he stood above the original controversy. It is at this point that we can see how Hegel embodies the experience of his time and his nation in a new systematic philosophy. The disintegrating individualism of the Enlightenment needed correction; it had already been corrected in life, now it was corrected in thought. Hegel was conscious of the process by which he had reached this philosophic

standpoint; in re-thinking his position he corrected the methods of Kant and Fichte on the one hand, and of Schelling on the other. For, first, it appeared that the method of pure analysis was misleading. It cannot, of course, be said that Kant was ignorant of the synthetic activity of thought-process, still less Fichte; but the fact remains that an analytic division of thought from its data (the "given" in experience) had been allowed to remain unexplained by Kant. In place of this Hegel asserted the essential unity of life-process, whether in its lower elements, called experience, or in its higher, called thought. Not thought, but "spirit" ("Geist") was used to express the unifying principle; and this is of course not merely a correction, but a development of the Kantian principle—"conception without perception is empty, and perception without conception is blind." Further, if the process is thus essentially synthetic, as Fichte had seen, yet by Fichte the not-self had been left analytically divided from the self. As the self grew to fulness, the not-self moved ever before it, like a ghost that would not be laid. Yet the not-self was a mere

negation, a limitation set up by the very activity which it limited. Fichte had himself shown the way to avoid this seeming absurdity; and Hegel developed the thought by showing that both the spontaneous activity and its negation were inadequate aspects of a higher reality, to be reached by synthesis.

Secondly, as against Schelling, Hegel asserted that the same process by which scientific thought arose from the immediate statements of common sense is embodied in the change from scientific to philosophic thinking. Thus Hegel forms some of his philosophic language by using the terms of ordinary life in a new sense, for he holds the sense in which he uses them (philosophically) to be the real meaning obscurely intended in their ordinary use. Philosophy is no sacred *hortus conclusus* such as even art may be imagined to be; and, however essentially connected with poetry and religion, philosophy *is* neither. Therefore it is that every man is a possible philosopher just as much as he is a possible scientist, but not a possible artist or poet; for philosophy is a systematic and logical study. On the other hand, of course, there is no

ground for supposing that conclusions of value can be reached in philosophy with any greater ease than they can be reached in the higher mathematics. The philosopher is, therefore, one who has been through a stern and difficult logical training, and at the same time he is aware that, as a man, he is not absolved from the fuller and more immediate revelation of ordinary life.[1] The history of individual and of racial thought is one of development; and, in the logical movement from experience, we proceed, correcting abstraction by abstraction, to an appreciation of that fulness which was implicit in all experience, but could only become explicit through an analytic and dialectic consideration of experience. These thoughts are worked out by Hegel with great brilliancy in the "Phenomenology of Spirit."

The most difficult as well as the most characteristic development of thought in Hegel is to be found in his assertion of the identity of the "knowing" process with such process as can be conceived to occur in

[1] Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.

"reality." The essence of the Hegelian Dialectic lies in this; for if the dialectic method be regarded merely as a rule of logical procedure, it is not distinctively Hegelian. We may reach a more adequate concept by thinking out the opposition between two seemingly contradictory thoughts. We may also from the meaning of our concept evolve a whole system of thoughts which may be called a philosophy. Opponents asserted that such was the practice of Hegel himself; so that by some the whole Hegelian system is thought to be nothing more than idle word-spinning, or at best a beautiful web produced by poetic genius, but somewhat deficient in its application to "reality." Against such a judgment it is hopeless to appeal, for it depends on a metaphysic of reality, conscious or unconscious, which has not yet been developed up to the Hegelian standpoint. If Hegel, however, is deficient, he must be shown to be so from a point of view at which his philosophy can be seen to be relatively true—that is, his own system must be used in order to pass beyond him. Historically, and from Hegel's own words, it is not possible to say

either that he was unaware of the danger of panlogism (making "reality" fit in with logical definitions), or that he thought himself to be discussing only the forms of thought *as opposed to* some reality.

There is a further idea necessary for judging the results attained by Hegel. His object was to form a system that should rest upon the critical position. For this purpose he attempted to represent all preceding philosophers in their respective positions, both as regards one another and as regards the systematic unity of thought to which all pointed.

The general idea, above stated, that philosophy is but the highest stage of the thinking process, which begins in common sense and moves through science, needs closer definition. We may take it for granted that experience does not refer merely to the data of sense-perception. Now, it is this experience that gives birth to the first efforts of thought. By the process of thinking we generally conceive ourselves to be gaining a deeper experience, or a deeper meaning for experience. It is the first effort of philosophy to discover what is the value and meaning of the process thus begun.

In discussing the value of the process we deal with the meaning of the reality discovered in the process. We begin, therefore, from an epistemology with an ontological significance, or an ontology in terms of the knowing process. This is the Hegelian logic.[1] The postulate of the whole work is that all reality is a connected system, and that it is all rational (omne ens est verum, *νοῦς ἐστί πως τὰ πάντα*). This is not really a statement requiring proof, as it is merely the assertion of the meaning in the very first efforts of thought; but, however true, its value is unknown until we have reached what Hegel calls the fourth attitude of thought. Now, the first attitude of thought is one of unreflective faith in its own power. This produced the pre-Kantian metaphysics. In it absolute and independent reality was supposed to be reached by analytic consideration of accepted concepts. Thus God, the soul, etc., are discussed but not discovered, and definition of a concept was held to fix a reality. Against this the second attitude,

[1] "Logic in our sense coincides with metaphysics, the science of things in a setting of thoughts, which thoughts, it is allowed, express the essence of things."—"Logic," § 24.

empiricism, protested—half-heartedly; and by the third attitude, the critical, a new stage was definitely reached. In this, knowledge was strictly examined, and there was left a thing-in-itself. It is against this that the postulate stated above is directed, for the thing-in-itself is a fiction. The long-popular assertion of the limitations and relativity of all human knowledge is here cruelly dissected by Hegel. Of course if these concepts merely mean that no knowledge can exhaust reality, or that much is unknown, they are reasonable, and even obviously true; but if they imply any unknowable in the sense of a residuum reality, irreducible by thought, they are nothing but unjustifiable assumptions. The faith in the unknown, embodied in all thinking, is a denial of any "unknowable."

Let us now express in the Hegelian terms the great system of German thought which attempted to explain the whole of human experience according to one all-embracing law. The language will only have meaning for those who feel the desire for such a system.

We begin from the logical starting-point of all thinking, whether that of common sense

or of philosophy. This starting-point is abstract being. Thus we presume ourselves to understand mere existence, expressed in the verb "is"; but as soon as we begin to discuss this presumption, we find that there is literally nothing to be said for it: for mere "is" without any subject is meaningless, and thus equivalent to or identical with "is not." That is to say, being and not-being are the same, and yet different. The truth which is indicated in both is called "becoming"; that is to say, determinate being (a thing or somewhat) is and is not. "There is" has become "this is." Now, reality, being found to be essentially determinate, is thought to consist of isolated reals. After saying "this is" it is natural that we should strive to conceive *what* "this" is. Therefore we have *qualification*. Here we find the concepts of the one and the many, or the one consisting of many independent ones, and a kind of atomism is reached. Out of this arises the concept of *quantities*, and last of all that of measure or proportion. We have begun from the presumption that everything was isolated and definable as separate, and, because of the

contradictions in which that would involve us, we have now reached the concept that all is relative.

Here, then, is the second stage, the philosophy of Essence ("Wesen"), or relativity. At this point the effort of thought shows us reality as a contrast and a conflict between identity and difference, appearance and reality, and, still more prominently, the three great puzzles of old philosophies—substance and qualities, cause and effect, action and reaction. At this point, too, there first appears the contrast between freedom and necessity. Now, just as we corrected the assumptions of our first thoughts as too abstract, so we may correct these efforts in so far as they also give only abstractions. This stage, however, is one that is still popularly identified with philosophic thought, for it has not yet been grasped that philosophy should be the most concrete and not the most abstract of sciences. Therefore we state that, so far from its being true that thinking must stop here, it is rather the fact that here thinking is most obviously inadequate. Substance, for instance, can only be explained by quality, and quality by sub-

stance; and no philosophy can remain within that vicious circle. In fact, we notice that the concept of substance presses us forward to the concept of cause, and that again to the concept of activity. The force of the contradictions in the sphere of relativity shows us that reality lies beyond these abstractions: not relativity but development is the truth.

This is the last and highest stage, for it is the plane upon which the grasp of thought ("Begriff") embraces the fulness of reality. Reality is now conceived to be a process: in thought we conceive the permanent and the changing to be somehow the same. The truth is, we may say, that a man, for instance, develops. Within the general process of development three stages can be marked, for the notion or thought is first subjective, then objective, and lastly absolute. That is to say, the concept of development gives us first reality developing in the form of selves. First comes a bare and colourless universality (for instance, the man is only a human being), and next comes particularity (which, for instance, distinguishes this man from that). Now the particular appears by contrast to other par-

ticulars, just as the judgment seems to divide the thoughts which it unites as well as divides. The bare notion, in Hegel's language, passes into the judgment; but even that is not final, for the reality of process (or development) does not merely mean a differentiation of an originally unanalysed medium. Rather development involves that universal and particular are inadequate aspects of that which is truly the individual. The notion and the judgment, says Hegel, are reconciled in the syllogism or reasoning. Thus the whole subjective side of reality is gradually proceeding through bare universality and particularity to individuality; and when once we have reached the clearly thought individual we have no longer the mere subject, but an apparently independent "objective" world. The general structure of this objective world of development is explained as having three aspects—the mechanical (independent "objects"), the chemical (objects with affinity), and teleological (objects as ends or means). Still the cleft between subject and object divides reality. Therefore the notion (development) reaches its final stage in the idea. The opposition

between subject and object is solved first in life, then in cognition and in Will ("omne ens est verum, omne ens est bonum"): and of all these the Absolute Idea is the solution and reconcilement, for in it is found the highest philosophy. "The ideal is the real." The structure of reality as a whole must therefore be conceived as that of a process which, since it produces only itself, must be confessed (but not understood) to stand above process.

Having thus sketched a Metaphysics or First Philosophy, Hegel proceeds to show its results in a Physics or Philosophy of Nature ("Naturphilosophie"). This is the least valuable part of his system, because Hegel's training had been more historical than scientific, and, again, the concepts of nature in our present science have largely been formed since Hegel's time; but the attitude adopted by Hegel toward an ideal unification of all the concepts of science has had great influence. Nature as a whole is regarded as the outward manifestation of thought. The outward is as such the abstract and the inadequate; but the movement even within this sphere is that of thought, for the whole can be conceived as

a system having three stages—mechanism, physics, and organism.[1]

The third and last stage of systematic philosophy deals with Spirit. This is conceived to summarise all the subject-matter of knowledge that lies beyond metaphysics and physical science: thus we are here concerned with life in the individual, with the relations involved in that life (morality), and with those highest spheres of activity in which life, now embodied as spirit, stands above the contrast of individual activity and the dead nature of science. These last are the spheres of art, religion, and philosophy. In the whole of this part of the subject-matter Hegel shows his true sympathies: here he is most plainly an Idealist, not of the older type which devoted itself to *Ideas*, but of the new whose thought is directed by *Ideals*. His own studies had fitted him for a logical dis-

[1] It is necessary continually to guard against the misunderstanding of Hegel's meaning through the peculiarity of the form of his thought. For instance, the serial order, which is intended to give a logical connection, should not be thought of as though it involved a sequence in time of the objects or thoughts dealt with. This is to be understood particularly in regard to the Philosophy of Spirit. Cf. Wallace: Hegel's "Phil. of Mind," I. iii., and Proleg. to Hegel, ch. xviii., xxvi.

cussion of the life of men, and his results in this sphere have won approval from many who reject his metaphysics.

Hegel himself did not consider his philosophy as separable into disconnected parts, but the philosophy of spirit was for him the necessary and culminating conclusion of his metaphysics as to the general nature of reality. Here we study the most "concrete" subject-matter possible, for the nature of spirit (or mind) involves a rejection of any idea of studying by "aspects" or "manifestations" essentially different from one another. Spirit is said by Hegel to be the "truth" of nature, or its "absolute prius"—that is to say, we are driven logically from the study of aspects to the study of that deeper reality of which the very word "aspect" reminds us. Now, we find that the actuality (almost the Aristotelian ἐνεργεία[1]) of life first appears as individual, almost isolated. First

[1] Hegel himself says: "The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those books of Aristotle (*i.e.* the 'de Anima')." It will be remembered that there Aristotle had defined ψυχή (life, or soul) as ἐνεργεία.

therefore we study "subjective spirit" or spirit (living-activity) in so far as it involves no direct reference beyond itself. Here spirit may be called "soul" and not yet "mind," although it is in fact the "passive mind" of Aristotle. Thus deep down we find all actual life to be one (the "natürliche Seele"): here even man is one with "nature," taken in the poetic and not the scientific sense. From this comes the waking of the individual as sensitive, first in antithesis (in interests, and in the contrast which joins *en rapport*), then by a kind of synthesis in the sense of selfhood ("Selbstgefühl"). With a short note on "habit," the last mechanism from which life rises, we end that part of the philosophy of spirit which would be called nowadays physiological psychology; but the physiological still colours the second part of "subjective spirit," in "the phenomenology of spirit." Here we study consciousness, in which form spirit first appears as self-related or reflective. In its first form we have sense-perception and then intelligence ("der Verstand"), in which the "I" is at first implicit, and then in complete self-consciousness as desire or nisus (striving).

Here at once arises the conflict of life, the first appearance of the everlasting contrast and yet communion between what is individual (and free) and what is universal (and necessary). Here we leave mere "anthropology" and begin to study psychology; for spirit now appears as mind. First, the activity is one of bare reasoning: "theoretical mind" is discussed under perception, recollection, and thinking; and next we have practical mind, or mind as will. Then, where will has arisen from thought, there first appears the "ought" or ideal of what is to be moral life. The contrast and conflict of the moral life first appears as practical feeling; it is momentary—it comes and goes, so to speak; but out of this comes the higher contrast between natural passion or impulse and the freedom of choice. When this freedom of choice has become the settled attitude of liberty of the ideal self presented in thought, we have reached the fundamental concept of individualistic ethics. Here we part with subjective mind or spirit.

Once more, however, there is no gap in the system; for we find that the individual mind of psychology and psychological ethics is not

the mind or spirit of our experience. We are Christians, and no longer Greeks and Romans. Mind or spirit, however individual, is by no means isolated. If we look into our experience we find that from the very earliest dawn of consciousness and will we have been related not only to the "lower" unities of "nature" but to the "higher" unities of society. Purposes other than our own cross or run together with ours. Freedom or liberty is never licence. In fact, in its first forms of realisation freedom appears to be absolutely opposed by law or right. The person is in contrast with others in the rights of property, for instance; or sometimes in communion. Out of this state of things comes the concept of right and wrong, as "law" and the subjective will. There we have only the dry bones of morality. This sense of the equal balancing of personal interests is indeed present in all morality, and it is perhaps the truth of pre-Kantian ethics—the ethics of natural law; but by looking again at life, we find that there is an independence, an autonomy, involved in the truly "moral" will, such that there must be a "law within" the man, as

Kant would say. Conscience, and not externally imposed law, is the true ground of morality. This is the second stage in the appreciation of the full truth of objective spirit or mind, and it is not final; for the true life of spirit is not in isolation: the contrast of conscience (between "is" and "ought-to-be") does not in fact take place in a world of selves who are mere unrelated units. The morality of the individualist must pass into social ethics ("die Sittlichkeit"). Here at last we reach the fulness of moral life. The temper of trust, the sense of the duty of benevolence, is the very core of morality: man isolated is an abstraction; for every man is bound by his past, and by his present social environment. We are not to be said to develop into a social organism units which are essentially isolated. The antithesis between law and conscience takes place within a reality which is fuller than is conceived by philosophies based upon either of these. The ethical spirit appears in three stages as the Family, the Civil Society, and the Political Society, or the State. The Family passes into Society by its own inadequacy, and in the social bond wants are

supplied and legal justice conceived. Last of all, the State arises out of the Nation (in regard to the family) and the system of wants (in regard to social strata). Here the individual finds his realisation as a citizen, and the last conflict of social morality arises, the contrast between patriotism (or loyalty) and cosmopolitanism; for the State itself points beyond itself to some vague brotherhood in a Platonic Republic. In this prophetic dream appears the last stage of philosophy, wherein we discuss Absolute Mind.

However high the realisation of spirit in the ethical community, there are higher stages in which we stand above even morality. Here the objective and the subjective mind are one, unified in three "movements"—Art, Revealed Religion, and (Absolute) Philosophy. In art the ideal appears as the beautiful; it is a revelation of the eternal, the absolute, but it is momentary. When that revelation is more than a glimpse of intuition, revealed religion takes its rise. This is not any empty creed, but a "dominant conviction of the meaning of reality"; and the final stage of all is called by Hegel "philosophy," though

it is doubtful whether the word will stand the meaning thus put upon it, for it seems that he means a rational and logical mysticism. In it what has been implicit in ordinary religion becomes explicit. We recognise ourselves in the Absolute, which is God.

Such was the great system of philosophy which Germany presented to the world. At certain points it appears to be arbitrary in its endeavour to be complete and centralised. It is an apotheosis of order such as has been loved by the German nation ; and its value for the world is in abstract form the same as the value of that particular racial expression which was developed in the concrete by the unification of Germany.

The followers of Hegel, it has been well said, expressed the greatness of their master in the very opposition which arose among them. It is generally the custom to divide the Hegelian school into Hegelians of the Right and Hegelians of the Left. The former, carrying on the language as well as what they understood to be the thought of Hegel, developed philosophy in the direction of theological and political orthodoxy. It was in the course of

speculating upon the ultimate problems of philosophy that the Hegelian Left were induced to desert the language of their master as disguising his real thought. Thus in the question of theological orthodoxy, this school of thinkers applied a rigorous criticism to the careless thinking which identified the relics of outgrown conceptions with the best results of modern thought. The most brilliant development of thought took place among the Hegelians of the Left. Feuerbach (1804–1872) and D. Strauss (1808–1874) showed the power of fearless logic. The new philosophy of religion arose out of Hegelianism. Meantime the value of Hegel's thought in historical subjects was well shown among those of his followers who stood apart from the theological controversies. Zeller and Kuno Fischer were the most remarkable.

Finally, any idea of a Hegelian school became an anachronism; and by the force that Hegel had given, thinkers passed beyond him. The influence of his thought has been strongly felt in France and England, and its force does not yet seem exhausted.

CHAPTER X

HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER

THE Hegelians of all kinds were not without opponents. As might be expected in the case of so comprehensive a system as Idealism, to many it seemed a merely arbitrary construction. Thus it was possible to treat the philosophy of Hegel as no real science, but at best a fantastic poetry. For even before the Romanticists and Hegel had attempted to work out the meaning of Kant in his doctrine of phenomena, a school, with the prejudices of physical science against metaphysics, had developed the doctrine of noumena, or things-in-themselves. In defiance of the results obtained by such thinkers as Fichte, Herbart attempted to make a philosophy of "independent reals" ("Realen"). The things-in-themselves form the shadowy founda-

tions of his thought; and, despite success in other spheres, it can hardly be denied that Herbart's metaphysics are illogical. He led the forlorn hope of common sense. "The man of average intelligence" may follow him, but by this way there is no entrance to metaphysics.

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) was born at Oldenburg and educated at Jena, under Fichte. He then became a tutor at Berne, and there met the great educationist, Pestalozzi. He was at Göttingen for some years, at first as a private lecturer and later as a professor. After being Professor of Philosophy at Königsberg (1809–33), he was recalled to Göttingen, and there died. His chief works are an "Introduction to Philosophy" (1813), a "Handbook of Psychology" (1816) and "Psychology as a Science" (1824).

The results of Herbart's thought have gained a certain persuasiveness from his starting-point. Like all logical thinkers, he conceives philosophy to arise by the thinking out of the problems with which everyday thought leaves us. Thus we begin from the

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secure ground of ordinary experience; but Herbart did not go over the whole process between common sense and metaphysics. He conceived himself to be a successor of Kant,[1] and behind Kant's thought he does not go. He accepts the results as to the nature of the subject-matter with which Kant had ended. That is to say, the outstanding problem of experience is thought to involve the dualism of phenomena and noumena or things-in-themselves. Now, we have already seen how the positive side of this dualism was developed in Fichte and Hegel. Phenomena, the only ground of knowledge, have been discussed by them; and the negative "limit of knowledge," the thing-in-itself, becomes with Fichte a shadow and with later idealism a nonentity. Nevertheless it is to this negative side of the Kantian dualism that Herbart applied his thought. For, he argued, since all knowledge is relative, the "real thing" lies beyond knowledge: in common-sense language we say that knowing "makes no difference" to "the thing" which we know. The real objects lie always

[1] Thus he called himself "a Kantian of 1828."

beyond knowledge: these absolute points, these positions (without any external implications), are things-in-themselves. They are real, unqualified, absolutely simple, and of them there are many. The concepts of substance and change, however useful, do not apply to "real" things. These arise through seeming or apparent relations between independent reals. Keeping the same meaning to the terms, the relativity of knowledge is therefore seen to involve that appearance is not reality. These independent reals are in some way connected, they "disturb" one another: and in spite of this disturbance each is really preserved intact and unchanged by the relation into which it has entered. On this basis Herbart gives a description of the "real" world in terms of time and space and motion. Contiguity and continuity explain the world as it appears to us, though the "reals" which we are thus explaining lie for ever beyond all explanation.

Even if we grant some truth to this conclusion, we must remark that absolute common sense is more arbitrary than absolute idealism: for how can we possibly say anything of that

which *ex hypothesi* never can enter into our thought? How can an unknowable thing-in-itself be the spring from which we draw our knowledge? If it were, all science would be but the emptying of an ocean with a sieve.

It is, however, in the psychological part of his studies that Herbart's method has been most valuable. The metaphysical basis may be neglected, for he conceives the soul or self as an independent real which is yet disturbed (as passive) by a stimulating and external real. Thus arise independent and atomic ideas. Eidolology is the name given to the science of these ideas or presentations, and a kind of physical science is made of them. They are treated as independent entities: we have a statics and a mechanics of them. Mathematical formulas are given by Herbart to indicate the interaction of these ideas, some of which "inhibit" others. The presentation sinks or rises in the dome of consciousness, having once entered over the threshold, and there is a fellowship of ideas which is called apperception. This picture-language of the "synthetic unity of apperception" has proved more valu-

able to educators than the deeper metaphysics of pure Kantianism. The dealing with psychological problems by means of physical concepts and mathematical formulas has led to an immense growth of "exact" psychology, and to-day we have curves and formulas of mental process. The reality to which these methods refer is not often discussed; nor is it necessary to discuss it, for psychology, fast becoming a natural science, is already quite separated from metaphysics. All this is due to Herbart. Following him a school of thinkers — the Herbartians — developed "exact" psychology. Into this we cannot enter. For we are seeking the expression of a world-view, and not the elaboration of a partial science. There was a development of psychology in the middle years of the nineteenth century, whose effects are still to be felt. As regards metaphysics the Herbartians have merely represented the recoil of the German mind from the extreme and abstract systematisation of Hegel.

A more vigorous effort of metaphysical thought is that of Schopenhauer. With him

also Kant is a starting-point, and particularly that phase of Kant's thought which connects him with empiricism. For Schopenhauer's attitude is that of a man who is blind to no part of reality, however crude and seemingly alien from philosophy.[1] With him we find a return of the philosophic mind to the living tissue of reality. What he loses in exact thinking he more than gains in his intense appreciation of real experience. On the experience of the northern world, Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon, he relies, and he expresses at once its restless complexity and its sceptical daring.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1778—1860) was born at Dantzic, of educated parents. At first he was intended for business, and with a view to this his education involved travel and an extensive study of foreign languages. He was thus of an altogether different type from that of the ordinary German philosopher. "The great book of the world" was his text-book; and, whatever the result on the

[1] Cf. Schopenhauer's own words: "From every page of Hume there is more to be learnt than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher together."—"World as Will," Eng. trans., iii, 394.

correctness of his abstract thought, such study gave more reality to his thinking than is to be found in many metaphysicians. His career in business at Hamburg was short; there, however, the violent passions, which alternated with brooding melancholy, were fully developed. At his father's death he was free to devote himself to study. He met Goethe at Weimar, and studied under Fichte at Berlin, eventually taking his degree at Jena in 1813, when he wrote the "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Into the enthusiasm of Germany at this date Schopenhauer did not enter; he was always a critic of the world rather than an actor in it, and he found it of all possible worlds the worst. An attempt at lecturing in Berlin (1820) met with no success, and the lack of the fame he hoped for made him still more critical of an unappreciative world. Travel filled the few years following, and gradually the division in the Hegelian camp and the tendency to return to Kant brought attention upon the brilliant development of Kant's thought which Schopenhauer had made. The closing years of his life were solaced by fame,

but a delicacy of taste and critical pessimism kept Schopenhauer even to the end from any share in the common life of men. From 1831 he lived in Frankfort-on-the-Main, and there he died. His chief works are "The Fourfold Root," "The World as Will and Idea," "On the Will in Nature," and Essays.

Schopenhauer himself had been inspired by his teacher Bouterwek[1] with the concept he was to make famous. From the perception of the importance of activity in willing, Schopenhauer was led to attempt the explanation of all experience in terms of the will. To him the abstract formalism of explanations based upon thought seemed to be their condemnation; for such intellectualism did not seem sufficiently at home in a world of stress and conflict such as we find in our every-day experience.

In his great work Schopenhauer first shows[2]

[1] This Professor of Göttingen, in his "Apodiktik," had stressed the practical or will aspect of life as giving fundamental certainty and a sense of reality. The purely intellectual aspect ends, according to him, in a kind of scepticism.

[2] "World as Will and Idea," bk. i.

how the world of our thought is a construction of our own. The objects of experience and science, held in order by the principle of sufficient reason, are seen to be merely appearances. That is to say, our ideas point beyond themselves. The world as idea appears in the forms of space and time; knowledge leads only into infinity of conditions in a world of manifold beings bound together by cause and effect. But philosophic insight grasps the underlying reality of which the phenomenal world is the appearance. This reality is will. "Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea, of whatever kind, all object, is phenomenal existence, but the will alone is a thing-in-itself."[1] This thing-in-itself is no mere inference, no "unknown quantity," but, although never an object, the will is "fully and immediately comprehended." It is the same throughout the whole world of our experience: the "force" in mechanical nature, the life-force—what some scientists call "irritability"—and human will are all forms of the same thing. All the connections of human will with ideas

[1] "World as Will," bk. ii., Eng. trans., p. 142.

must be omitted.[1] The will is objectivised as appearance; first as "a blind striving," an "inarticulate impulse," then in the living forms. The world of the many is a magic-lantern show by which one light, the will, manifests itself.[2] This, says Schopenhauer, is the inner meaning of Kant's thing-in-itself, and Plato's idea. The world of nature is an objectification and individualisation of will—not a product of the will, but a result of our own phenomenality. "The many" have not been explained, but explained away as unreal for philosophic insight. To this insight the æsthetic appreciation of the Platonic ideas in nature is nearly related:[3] thus we "lose ourselves in contemplation." In the discussion of the forms of art we first see that the world is as nothing, and hear the first note of pessimism in the complaint that "all is vanity." The will to live, a purposeless striving, is seen by true insight to be wrong.

[1] An interesting quotation follows from the first "voluntarist" of Western philosophy, St. Augustine ("De Civ. Dei," xi. 28).

[2] Bk. ii., Eng. trans., p. 200. "Thus," says Plato, "time is a moving picture of eternity."

[3] Bk. iii.

In the fourth book, after such knowledge, the world as will involves a philosophy of assertion and denial of the will to live. The individual form of the will is a never-satisfied want, a cry for happiness never to be attained; therefore, as want is pain, practically the whole of individual life is pain. Hence it is seen that the knowledge and appreciation of this lead to the doctrine of the denial of the will to live—"after life's fitful fever" we sleep well.[1] Pessimism leads to asceticism. The basis of all ethics is sympathy. The great wrong is the assertion of the individual will to live "so far that it becomes the denial of the will appearing in the bodies of others."[2] Right is only the denial of that will in oneself. Suicide is utterly inexcusable, because it is the assertion of will—"for the essence of negation lies in this, that the joys of life are shunned, not its sorrows."[3] Thus we seek through the Maya—the veil of illusion in this world—the bare non-existence of Nirvana.

1 Cf. Swinburne's Hymn of Man in "Atalanta," Fitzgerald's "Rubaiyat," and Ecclesiasticus.

2 Bk. iv., Eng. trans., p. 436.

3 Bk. iv., Eng. trans., p. 515.

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> And if the wine you drink, the lip you press,
> End in the Nothing all Things end in—Yes—
> Then fancy while thou art, thou art but what
> Thou shalt be—Nothing: thou shalt not be less.

Strange that philosophy should lead us here! Yet it is undeniable that expression is here given to a very real experience. The influence of Schopenhauer upon such a man as Wagner was itself a proof of how truly he had rendered an experience which has in it more than a suspicion of the brooding of Northern mythology. Perhaps it is true that the validity of Schopenhauer's philosophy is not bound up with pessimism. Certainly there is no reason to connect a philosophy of the "will" as reality with gloom and death. But the statement of this philosophy as given for the first time to the modern world was pessimistic. The effort of the German spirit seemed to be directed along lines which have not yet produced any new and comprehensive world-view.

CHAPTER XI

PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

THE production of great systems in philosophy gave place in the middle of the nineteenth century to a widespread interest in physical science. Surely and steadily increased knowledge led to new concepts of nature, and these in turn reacted upon the whole of life. Outside the region of pure science political influences were causing reactionary or at any rate traditionalist thought; and when at last scientific thinkers were induced to extend their principles that they might explain the whole of experience, for a time it seemed that pure metaphysics was replaced by a new thing. The same forces were expressed in the thought of France, England, and Germany, though the

historical antecedents of thinkers in each of these nations gave a distinctive colour to the thought of each. The full meaning of this new scientific conception and its results upon metaphysical thought cannot yet be stated, for the philosophy of to-day still bears the marks of scientific controversy.

A. In France

The history of the Enlightenment in France led us as far as the eve of the Revolution. A period of political turmoil followed which did not allow of philosophic thinking; and to this again succeeded years of warfare. Thus there is little to record of French thought during the time occupied by German Idealism. A few physiological writers continued the tradition of the scientists of the Enlightenment; but their works are of little importance to philosophy. Some did indeed touch upon pure philosophy. Pierre Laromiguière (1756–1837), and his follower, J. J. Cardaillac (1766–1845), may be mentioned; but a keener philosophic insight is to be found in Maine de Biran (1766–1824). He passed

through a development in his philosophy, for he began in sympathy with the school of physiological psychologists; and afterwards, through the perception of the spontaneity of consciousness, became somewhat mystical.

In the meantime foreign thought was being introduced once more to France. Royer-Collard (1763–1845), a statesman rather than a philosopher, and Jouffroy (1796–1842), whose chief interest was psychology, introduced the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Dugald Stewart; but the most important name is that of Victor Cousin (1792–1867), an eclectic and the founder of an eclectic school which had great vogue in France. Cousin studied under Maine de Biran and Royer-Collard. His perception of the great value of history in the understanding of philosophy led him to mistake a collection of opinions for a philosophy. Thus he supposed that philosophy could be eclectic; but though he attempted to mediate between German idealism and Scottish common sense, the result was not systematic. His own opinions shifted from a Hegelian standpoint in 1828 to a sympathy with any statement which could claim com-

mon sense as its basis.[1] His work on the history of philosophy, especially as regards the Middle Ages, was extremely valuable.

Even before pure philosophy began to be reincarnated in France, however, a school of thinkers had arisen in protest against the extreme consequences of the Enlightenment as seen in the Revolution. These are known as the Traditionalists. They are indeed rather essayists and publicists than philosophic thinkers; but they expressed a phase of the reaction against the arid intellectualism and extreme individualism of the eighteenth century. So far as they were concerned with abstract thought their protest was made from a romantic standpoint against the materialistic empiricism of the day. In practical questions they were all for the restitution of the past; and, as usual with enthusiastic reformers, it was not the past of real history, but that romantic dreamland of the Middle Ages and the *ancien régime*. The world-view of the extremists of this school was theological.

[1] Cousin had met Hegel himself, from whom his request for a *summa philosophica* is said to have met with the reply, "Monsieur, ces choses ne se disent pas succinctement, surtout en français." This tale is told of many philosophers.

Thus its two great prophets—De Bonald (1754–1840), who supposed revelation to be the source of all knowledge, and De Maistre (1753–1821), who imagined Authority to be the principle of all life—both had in view the scholastic days of the Holy Roman Empire. Despite brilliant passages, the writings of these men have but small value for logical thought; they cut themselves off for ever from philosophy by adopting a controversial purpose in their theories. The principle of Authority as opposed to eighteenth-century individualism was, however, by no means necessarily theological. De Lamennais (1782–1854), a priest, began as a theological sceptic to destroy all the possibilities of certainty in order that men might believe whatever was told them. But he eventually left the Church and attempted a synthetic philosophy of his own ("Esquisse d'une Philosophie," 1841–1846). This, however, was a kind of mystic description of the world, after the manner of Schelling, and not unlike the Neo-Platonism of such thinkers as Rosmini.

It was in Positivism, the philosophy of Comte, that French thought reached a de-

velopment of its own. In this form it had some influence upon the course of English thought.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) was born at Montpellier. He studied under Saint-Simon: this enthusiast had great influence over men, rather from the brilliancy of his intuitions than from the correctness of his thought. Especially he preached and prophesied a regeneration of society somewhat on the lines of Socialism, but by other means than those usually advocated by pure Socialists. This enthusiasm of humanity affected the young Comte; but the logical training, especially in mathematics, which he had gone through, gave him a means of criticising the arbitrary judgments of his poetic master. Eventually they quarrelled. Comte endeavoured to make a living by tutoring, and unwisely he married (1825). He then began to give some lectures upon the "positive philosophy" which he had been meditating; but poverty and sorrow and overwork made the effort too great, and he went mad. On recovery, his despair of the fame and the position for which he had hoped

caused him to attempt suicide. The lectures were resumed at last in 1828, and Comte obtained a small post. In 1842 domestic quarrels led to a separation from his wife, and he was reduced by ill fortune to great straits. At this time it was that John Stuart Mill and George Grote, with other admirers in England, subscribed for his sustenance. Comte was hurt that the subsidy was not continued. In 1845 Comte was much influenced by Clotilde de Vaux, the wife of a man who had been condemned to the galleys for life. She seems to have given to Comte's thought a more definitely emotional tinge. His income being again reduced in 1848 to vanishing point, his admirers, led by his great pupil, Littré, supplied him with money. He had published the "Cours de Philosophie Positive" in 1840–1842; and now, having become more emotional and also more dogmatic, he published his "Système de Politique Positive" (1851–1854). While this was in course of publication he issued a "Catéchisme Positiviste" (1853), and the scientific philosopher became the founder of a religion. Many of his admirers held it a weakness that Comte

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should revert, as it seemed to them, to the stage of thought which he had once called the theological; but others were attracted by the glamour, and by these Comte was revered as a prophet.

Three well-marked influences seem to be obvious in Comte's thought: the new enthusiasm for physical science which descended from the physiologists of France, the historical conceptions popularised by German thinkers and their French followers, and the traditionalist reaction against the socialistic principles of the Revolution. Perhaps from the very nature of his training the first results of Comte's thought appear as negative. Thus the extension of a thought almost identical with that of Condillac leads Comte to adopt the mechanical conceptions of science without criticism. Scientifically cogent while used in the sphere for which they were invented, these conceptions are noticeably deficient when Comte attempts to apply them to social science and ethics; but most noticeable is the entirely negative attitude which Comte is thus led to assume with respect to meta-

physics. The very possibility of pure philosophy is repudiated, and the results of physical science are said to be all that we can have of real knowledge. This attitude, copied in England and repeated if not copied in Germany, merely involved the substitution of an uncritical metaphysics for pure thought : for it is always the fate of those who repudiate metaphysics to fall victims to pseudo-metaphysics. It is clear that if you know there can be no philosophy you know something about the world. That knowledge is your philosophy.

In positive results the thought of Comte was governed by a sociological purpose of reform, an enthusiasm for which he was indebted to Saint-Simon : and again his thought was well directed by an ideal of positive knowledge. However limited his outlook, Comte has all the clearness of vision often found among the French.

The system which he embodied as the Positive Philosophy had three elements of interest. There was, in the first place, a clear historical conception known as "the three stages." Mankind, says Comte, has passed in thought through the theological stage : at

this time experience was explained on the principle of animistic interference by "supernatural beings." The action of thought upon this explanation produced the second, or metaphysical[1] stage: abstract forces take the place of personal agents. This was an intermediate stage: abstractions destroyed spirits and were themselves to be destroyed.[2] Then came the final, the positive stage. The vain search for origins and ends and absolute truth has given place at last to a sober reasoning based upon observation and experiment. Thus the sciences have arisen.

The second element of interest is the classification of the Sciences: for this must take the place of the vain aspirations of metaphysics. The hierarchy of the sciences is supposed by Comte to give a full rendering to all our knowledge of phenomena: and this is all the knowledge possible to us. The presupposition of all the sciences is the most abstract—mathematics: upon this depends

[1] It is to be noted that the very name given to this stage is in itself a repudiation of metaphysics, as a thing long dead.

[2] The essences of the Schoolmen were but the dry bones of the living creatures of poetry which the understanding had slain. (Caird, "Social Philosophy of Comte," p. 11.)

the less abstract, and so on through biology to sociology. The theory of communities is the highest of all knowledge. With the details of the system we are not concerned; but it must be noted that, despite the uncritical method, there is much valid thought embodied in the work of Comte on sociology, the subject perhaps nearest his heart. We have, in the sociology for which Comte first invented a name, the rudiments of an exact descriptive science of social wholes. A world-view was doubtless implied, but it was not clearly stated.

The third of the elements in Positivism is due to the influence of Traditionalism and perhaps to the emotional sympathies of Comte himself. It is the religion of humanity: for Comte did not merely abolish metaphysics and theology, he provided a substitute for both. When, however, Positivism became a religion many of his followers deserted Comte and kept steadily to the development of purely scientific knowledge. In the new moral and religious enthusiasm, the human race as a whole, known as the Grand-Être, took the place of the God of theologians. Religion was to be the service

of this Being. There was to be an elaborate ritual copied from that of the Catholic Church, and a philosophic priesthood modelled upon that of the Middle Ages. Obviously we are here beyond the sphere of philosophy. In spite of aberrations, Comte's thought remains valuable for its devotion to logic and to ethical aims. The limitation of his insight into real experience made it impossible for him to produce a valid philosophy. Comte seems always unaware of the individual elements in any experience—those elements which colour his own system as obviously as they do that of any idealist philosopher.

B. In Britain

Contemporaneously with the French philosophy after the Revolution and with the great systems of Germany, British thought was passing through new phases. In protest against the criticisms of Hume, the Scottish School of Common Sense had arisen. Its development, after the publication of Reid's "Inquiry" (1763), took the direction of psychological interests. Dugald Stewart (1753–1828),

a didactic orator of great influence, gave to this school of thought a wider learning, though, perhaps, not a deeper insight than it had at first possessed. Through him French thinkers were for a time turned away from the cold abstractions of science. With Thomas Browne (1778–1820) there appeared a noticeable return to the attitude of analytic psychology which had been that of Hume.

From this point the English Empirical School gathers new force ; and the movement, once joined with the Positivism of Comte, had a vigorous and valuable life in the early part of the nineteenth century. James Mill (1773–1836) first gave impetus in the new direction. In pure thought he was a follower of the sensationalism of Hartley and Hume ; and, on the other hand, he was very keenly alive to the political problems of his day. These two elements may be observed in the development that now occurs. John Stuart Mill, the son of James Mill, was the vigorous leader of the new thought.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was born in London ; he was educated at home by his

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father in a stern intellectualism. In 1823 he became a clerk at the India House, and in 1824 was already an exponent (in the new *Westminster Review*) of the new political Liberalism. He published his "Logic" in 1843, and the "Principles of Political Economy" in 1848. In 1851 he married Mrs. Taylor, to whose sympathy and intelligence he ascribed much. After her death he published works on Utilitarianism and a critical effort in "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy." In 1865 he was M.P. for Westminster. From 1868 till the end of his life he lived quietly at Avignon. He has been called the saint of Rationalism: in philosophy his clear thinking and fearless logic give him a place far above his deserts as a metaphysician.

Although there is much individuality in Mill's thought, in pure philosophy he may be regarded as one of a school. Of this school Alexander Bain, of the University of Aberdeen, represents the psychological side. With him the modern physiological theories form the most noticeable feature of psychology; and he did much to elaborate

the so-called Law of the Association of Ideas. A more thorough Positivist was George Henry Lewes (1817–1878): but his negative attitude towards metaphysics, and his criticism of all historical theories from the point of view of Comte, did not materially aid Empiricism.

It was at this time that a change took place in the world of scientific theories paralleled by only that introduced by Newton. Charles Darwin published his "Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection" (1859), and this precipitated the thoughts that had been steadily maturing for years. A new life was given to the enthusiasm for scientific knowledge, and a new method was discovered the immense value of which we can hardly yet estimate. The meaning of the new concept of the unity of nature dawned but slowly even upon trained minds; but it is now clear that what had happened was that an historical principle, that of development, was made capable of being used to explain physical nature. The unity of subject-matter of the physical sciences was now no longer to be conceived as a mechanical addition of parts, but as an organic development. Again, organism

itself was to be conceived in view of a purpose to be historically attained. "Natural selection" and the "Survival of the Fittest" became the new charms by which to still all questioning; and irrationalism rebuked the new witchcraft with all its old anathemas. To the spread of clearer concepts the writings of Huxley (1825–1895) contributed much, and success in the work of science gave the new heresy all the prestige necessary for changing the general opinions. Thus the time seemed to have come for a new reading of the nature of experience, as it appeared from the Evolutionary standpoint. To this work Herbert Spencer applied himself; but he was not aware of the historical antecedents of Scientific Evolution in the Dialectic Method and the theory of Development. He therefore approached the problem with a limited, and almost exclusively English, preparation.

Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) first appears as an essayist. His interests were in the direction of sociology and psychology, both of which he understood in a Positivist way. He was, in fact, much influenced by the

work of Comte; and when, at a later period of his life, the Evolutionary hypothesis had already gained success in some fields of science, Spencer conceived the idea of a "System of Philosophy" which should supply the much-needed unification of scientific thought. The "First Principles" appeared (in part) in 1860; later editions were much modified, but on the whole the scientific concepts remained consistent. Following this came works on biology and psychology. While philosophically inadequate, these works attained popularity through clear and limited insight. In fact the subject-matter was hardly prepared for so ambitious an attempt, and Spencer's lack of philosophic training rendered it still more impossible for him to succeed. The result, nevertheless, was rather inadequate than untrue.

The orthodox philosophic thought in England during the earlier part of the nineteenth century was strictly scientific; and by science, at this time, was understood a positivist theory of nature: this was readily combined with a positivist disdain of metaphysics. Yet the

school is not without value in the history of pure thought, for its chief object was the introduction of scientific exactness of thought, and this is so much gained in the direction of pure philosophy, in however limited a way the method may be applied. As against the airy platitudes to which the anti-sceptical Scottish school not seldom yielded, severity of reasoning was much superior. A rigid limitation of inquiry to the data of physical science made the method seem all the more cogent: and much was done towards organising a new scientific (almost wholly biological) world-view. The very limitation of the subject-matter, however, rendered it impossible that a real philosophy should arise: the non-physical aspects of experience were only too obviously neglected. A second merit may, however, be allowed to this empirical school. The exponents of its principles were keenly alive to the need and the use of logical thought in the social sphere. A pure Utilitarianism [1] therefore arose which had valuable influence in the reform of social abuses: a calculus of politics, and even of ethics, easily applied and

[1] Cf. Leslie Stephen, "The English Utilitarians."

seldom misleading, was given in the utilitarian idea of "good" as "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." And, whatever difficulties this conception may have for metaphysicians, the Empiricists here once again substituted a clear if limited conception for the airy nothings of the traditional ethics.

However much may be conceded to the Empirical School, in their theory of the nature of reality, when they condescend to have one, they are lamentably weak. The denial of the possibility of metaphysics is no security against the use of metaphysical thought, though it renders an adequate metaphysics impossible. So we find that, in its later stages, the metaphysical problems begin to press upon Empiricism, and Spencer yielded to the temptation of expressing his ideas on these points. The result, for popular thought, was an attitude known as Agnosticism, which at this time meant a denial of the knowledge of any but physical truths.[1] A purely scientific dogmatism took the place of the relics of the

[1] The word "agnosticism" (invented in 1869 by Huxley) has already changed its meaning several times. It is now not definitely connected with any scientific dogma, and in one

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old dogmatism of theology or mediæval metaphysics.

The philosophic meaning of the new concepts was partially expressed by Spencer and essayists of the same school. It amounted to the postulate of an Unknowable, the Absolute, which was said to be implied in all scientific knowledge. Of this negative surd nothing could, by hypothesis, be said; but the Empiricists were, in fact, by no means consistent, for they used this unknowable, now become "the force behind phenomena," as an explanation. That is to say, the unknowable was used as a logical ground in the explanation of the true nature of known reality. No dogmatic assertions could save such a contradiction.

For many years an opposite movement had been in progress. This may be roughly classed as Idealistic. It was contemporaneous with the empirical thought of Mill and Spencer, and when eventually its form had been changed, it outlived Empiricism.

sense is identical with scepticism. In another sense it expresses the empty platitude that no man knows all that is to be known.

The force of the movement, in so far as it was not directed by German thought, was best expressed by Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856).

In this form Idealism meant rather an interest in metaphysical studies than any definite metaphysical conclusions. A knowledge of the past history of thought is a welcome contrast to the neglect of history by the empirical school; but, although this led to admirable commentary, no original thought of great brilliance is to be found in writers of this school. It was through connection with foreign, and especially German, thought that the opposition to the traditional English Empiricism became triumphant. The long ignorance of the value of German metaphysics was a remarkable feature in the English thinkers of this date. The Scottish school was indeed aware of the existence of the Critical Philosophy, but for many years failed to understand its significance; and when at last German thought was introduced it was done by *littérateurs* rather than philosophers. It was S. T. Coleridge (1772–1834) who first made German thought intelligible to Englishmen,

and the Idealism which he appreciated had a mystic and romantic tone which obstructed logical thinking. In the same way Carlyle confused the "truth" of poetic enthusiasm with the truth of scientific thought: yet he too did much to popularise a non-empirical philosophy. A name which stands apart from pure literature is that of J. F. Ferrier[1]: a name not yet sufficiently honoured. A stern critic of the Scottish School, he was a clear thinker on metaphysical problems; but even in his writings it is noticeable that the German thought had so far been only partly assimilated.

A new and more vigorous development was marked by the work of T. H. Green. Positive thought of an English type began to assert itself, and there was in Green a steady attempt at truth for truth's sake. Yet his ethical and almost traditionalist interests prevented him from reaching any position

[1] J. F. Ferrier (1806–1864) was born at Edinburgh, and educated at Edinburgh and Oxford. He was eventually Professor at St. Andrews. His most remarkable work, "The Institutes of Metaphysic," stands apart from all the philosophic writing of his day for brilliancy and force. It is almost a Fichtean rendering of the Critical Philosophy.

above polemics. His great work is the "Prolegomena to Ethics," published posthumously (1877). Already, however, there had appeared "The Secret of Hegel" (1865), by J. H. Stirling. This marked the introduction of Hegelian thought into the course of English speculation: and the influence has been decisive. "The Dialogues of Plato," translated by Benjamin Jowett, expressed in a non-technical way the new attitude of thinkers. English thought, at any rate within the educated classes, was now deeply impressed with Hegelianism, and the effects can be read in the situation of philosophy in England to-day. Such was the external course of history by which thought left the empirical school, and turned once more definitely to metaphysics. The meaning in the whole movement may be now considered.

At first assimilative and critical, the new Idealism was for a long time vague and weak as compared with the still vigorous Empiricism; but no prejudice could keep even Empiricists from metaphysics, and as soon as it became clear that philosophy must discuss the meaning of the whole of reality, scientific detail was

seen to be inadequate. The sympathy of deeper thinkers was thus attracted towards anti-Empiricism; but as a philosophy the new thought still left much to seek. It was hampered by interests wholly irrelevant to philosophy—those of conservatism and theological controversy. The new Idealism suffered much from its friends, for they greeted it as a ready weapon against scientific thought. Later, however, when a truer insight into the meaning of German thought was possible, it became evident that no true philosophy could have any method but that of logic or any end but truth. It was still possible, indeed, to use words consecrated by popular usage to indicate meanings which they had never intended: not hypocrisy, but a fear of an unreal terminology, had caused this. In fact, Hegel himself had found it possible to use "Revelation" and "God" in metaphysics. Eventually, however, English Idealism passed beyond a merely controversial attitude towards Empiricism, and all connection with theological polemics.

Thus it was seen that philosophy must acknowledge as fundamental "the synthetic

unity of consciousness." Experience as a whole was to be accounted the basis for thought. Of this experience the prominent note was activity. Not the stimulation of a hypothetically inert "self" was to be the basis, but an energy which alone could explain the very possibility of stimulation. Finally, in ethics, it had become apparent that the Individualist and Utilitarian Ethics, though providing an admirable calculus, required a deeper metaphysical concept on which it could be founded. Such were the lines upon which English philosophy was travelling after the decay of Empiricism. The full result can be seen in the state of philosophy as it is to-day.

C. In Germany

In Germany the age of the great systems left two clearly defined schools of thought, the Hegelian and the Herbartian. It has already been shown how, within the Hegelian school, there was conflict which centred round the question of the relations of philosophy and religion. There were, however, some

Hegelians who stood apart from the controversy and devoted their attention to an historical study of metaphysics, and as a whole the school may be regarded as a metaphysical one; but, on the other hand, the Herbartians had turned away from fundamental problems and were thinking out the details of science: the subject which had reached its highest development with them was physiological psychology. To this the readers of Schopenhauer tended.

Now such a division of tendencies must of necessity be inexact. It is not to be supposed to be accurate if applied to the list of philosophic writers, for often one man shows in his thought both tendencies. In fact, the greatest thinker of the period, Lotze, has been often connected with the Herbartians, in spite of his protests, and but seldom with the more abstract thinkers. We shall, however, divide the representatives of these two tendencies in accordance with what seem to be the most noticeable elements in their work. Another criterion for division, the contrast between optimism and pessimism, gives somewhat the same

results. And, apart from all division, it is clear that, to all the thinkers of this period in Germany, the crucial question was the relation between physical science and philosophy, in method and in results.

On the side of a philosophic rendering of experience was Lotze. To him physical science seemed a stage through which, and beyond which, the philosopher passes. The emotional results he attained may fairly be classed as optimistic.

Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) was the son of a physician in Saxony. His studies were in physical science and in philosophy, and at one time he proposed to follow his father's profession. At Leipzig, under S. T. Fechner, he learnt the value of exact scientific knowledge, and under the Hegelian C. H. Weisse he learnt to appreciate the æsthetic and romantic elements of life. He published a "Metaphysics" in 1841, and a "Logic" in 1842. At that time the main lines of his thought were fixed, but his later lectures and writings on physiological subjects led critics to suppose that he was an opponent of metaphysical

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thought. He had succeeded Herbart at Göttingen in 1844; and he found it necessary to state definitely that he was not a Herbartian. In 1856 he began to publish his great work, the "Microcosmus."

The two interests, of physical science and pure philosophy, meet in Lotze. In his concept of the data and the starting-point of philosophy he is in agreement with Herbart. He had a wide knowledge of physical science, and an appreciation of its methods such as was then seldom found in German philosophers; but not only did he use science, he also furthered its researches in his extension of the mechanical conceptions to all phenomena: even the hitherto closed regions of life and organism were explained by him on mechanical principles. In this he was opposed to the romantic tendencies to be found in Schelling, and even, in a modified form, in Hegel. So also, in agreement with Herbart, he conceived philosophy to be a remodelling of the concepts of common sense, with a view to consistency of thought. The conclusion with which he ends, in so far as it involves a plurality of conscious beings, looks back with

Herbart's "Reals" to the monads of Leibnitz. With Leibnitz also the optimism of Lotze is connected.

On the other hand the philosophy of Lotze, regarded as a whole, may be conceived as teleological idealism. Not scientific law, but ethical value, is for him the highest truth. Thus he is connected with the main current of idealistic thought. Although he rejects the formalism and the dialectic method of Hegel, Lotze is at one with the idealists in his conception of the fulness of human life, and in his interest in those experiences with which physical science is not concerned. Thus the conclusion of his metaphysics is in an Absolutism almost like that of Spinoza; but remnants of dogmatism prevent clearness in his concept of how the Absolute of philosophy is related to the personal God of religion.

There are three regions of experience, says Lotze—of facts, of laws, and of values. Thus when thought arises we have to purify it by eliminating those concepts which prevent "a consistent and harmonious view" of reality. From the first effort of thought we should conceive the world as a collection

of independent "things"; but further thinking leads us to see that these "things" are bound together by laws; it is at this stage that we have science and the plural world of monads. Once again, however, if the connection of "things" is real, obviously we have reached the idea of one all-pervading substance, and we can only conceive this deep reality in a consistent way if we think of it as essentially of the type of the active self. For in the self we have at once the concept of unity and a plurality of states. Other interests of life may now lead us to regard this substance as a person, as God, whose thoughts are all things. The world is then the expression of His will.[1]

The philosophic value of such conclusions it lies with the future to determine. For us the results do not appear much different from those attained by Leibnitz: on the other hand, there is a touch of reality about the philosophy of Lotze which gives him a high place among thinkers.

1 Cf. the whole of the "Microcosmus" from vol. ii. p. 646, Eng. trans. The theological comfort to be got from this conclusion must be distinguished from its logical validity.

An opposite, and, like Schopenhauer's, a non-professional development of philosophic thought, was made by Hartmann. In him, too, the scientific interest is very strong. His own purpose was to use the new knowledge in order to reconcile the conflicting metaphysics of Hegel and Schopenhauer; but the result in his work appears to be merely a re-reading of Schopenhauer. With that philosopher, Hartmann is a pessimist.

Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) was the son of an artillery officer stationed at Berlin. He entered the artillery, but at twenty-three he was obliged to retire owing to chronic ill-health. After this he lived in retirement with his wife. He had first hoped for success in literary and dramatic work; but, this failing, he turned his attention to philosophy. His famous "Philosophy of the Unconscious" (1869)[1] was composed before

[1] The immediate success of this work (it had seven editions in the seven years following its publication) can be put down rather to the brilliancy of treatment and the display of scientific knowledge than to its value in philosophy. In fact, Windelband goes so far as to say that it "could have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period."

he had made any deep study of metaphysics. He was, however, saturated with the physical science of his day, and was then aware of (and, later, appreciative of) the work of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and, above all, Schelling. Other works developed his fundamental pessimistic thought.

Hartmann's attempt to mediate between optimism and pessimism led him to conceive Schelling's Absolute as the solution of the apparent opposition between the Will of Schopenhauer and the Idea of Hegel.[1] The method adopted by Hartmann is that of scientific induction: thus, in examining experience, we find the ultimate ground to be not merely the non-intelligent force, apparent in the change of things (Schopenhauer's Will), nor the motionless intelligence apparent in the order of things (Hegel's Idea), but an unconscious ("unbewussten") Absolute which appears both as action and as thought. The evolution of the world takes place by a non-individual and yet teleological striving, which results in "Natural Selection."

[1] Cf. "Philosophy of the Unconscious," Eng. trans., vol. iii. p. 147.

From this dark night came the organisms of physiology and then consciousness; but this consciousness is produced so as to overcome, first, the whole sphere of blind striving, and after the victory to lead all back into the nothing from which it came. The illusion of happiness is the joke of the Unconscious, luring on a restless intelligence: the world is bad, but already the corruption is here that makes an end even of itself. In practical life the principle should be, by the absolute resignation of all hope for ourselves or the world, "to make the ends of the Unconscious ends of our own consciousness."[1] Thus pessimism is to go further than Schopenhauer's philosophic calm.

One of the most remarkable phases of thought in Germany was represented by Nietzsche. Although there is a world-view implied in his work, he was rather a poet or prophet than a philosopher. Nevertheless, the place which he will take in future histories of thought may be great, for his influence goes beyond the purely literary and poetic classes. The chief elements in his rendering of ex-

[1] Eng. trans., vol. iii. p. 133.

perience are connected with a new individualism. His followers have not yet explained satisfactorily the meaning implied in the idea of Super-man; but it seems that the ideal individual of Nietzsche is not the barren opponent of society but the highest embodiment of the whole of human achievement. In certain moods Nietzsche seems to imagine the super-man rising out of the ruins of the past; but in other, and saner, moods, the ideal is seen to be the complete inheritance of the past. The rendering given by Nietzsche of the experience of his day is not sufficiently consistent to be treated as purely philosophical. The salient idea as regards the world seems to be that of rending, or tearing, and conflict. Doubtless this is a reflection of the iron years in which Nietzsche lived. Its permanent value remains still to be discussed. But here we leave the domain of history.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

THE philosophy of the present is almost cosmopolitan; and it seems that we have at last reached the possibility of a Western Philosophy such as will explain the whole of experience as we know it. But even the Western world is not yet so completely one in its experience as to have a philosophy which can be called international. Among the generally acknowledged schools of philosophy, however, there are still oppositions. These are to be found among the philosophers of all Western nations; and, generally speaking, essential differences seem to divide the philosophic world into two camps. They are those of the Idealists and of the Empiricists; but, of course, under these names we include much more than the historical oppositions of the

past. The present situation in philosophy is largely due to the vigorous growth of physical science in the last generation. Out of that state of things and the controversies to which it gave rise, the present opposition has appeared. Again, another interest of modern life, that of historical study, has introduced still more complexity into philosophic thought.

The period of thinking immediately preceding our own contains names to which, as yet, no certain place can be given in the history of philosophy. The development of thought still continues to reflect the features of national experience. If we follow our former divisions and discuss the nations separately, we shall find that in Germany philosophic thought is divided between scientific and historical interests. On the side of science there has taken place a great development of physiology, and new concepts of psychology have arisen. Some thinkers have even revived an extreme materialism. On the other hand, historical interest and commentary upon past metaphysics has led to a vigorous development of thought in an idealist direction.

The outstanding names are those of Lange (1825–1875), whose "History of Materialism" is a most brilliant essay upon the value of purely scientific thought; and E. Dühring, who expressed an extreme materialism. Of physiological psychologists the most brilliant is Wundt. He has also done a very great deal in bringing out the will-element in experience. Somewhat apart from these was Richard Avenarius, of Zurich (1843–1896), whose philosophy is a brilliant outcome of the new movement. His work will doubtless be assigned a great place in future histories. The most prominent names of strictly modern times are those of Paulsen, the professor at Berlin, who wrote a "System of Ethics" in which "teleological energism" seemed to be fundamental, and a small "Introduction to Philosophy"; and of Rudolf Eucken, who stands for a certain mystical interest in thought.

In France the division of schools is the same. The more metaphysical thinkers owe much to the thought of Hegel. P. Janet and H. Taine were vigorous and independent thinkers. Henri Bergson, whose "L'Evolu-

tion Créatrice" seems to re-embody the will-concepts of Schopenhauer, may be yet valued highly; but his name does not properly belong to history.

It is not yet clear to what constructive ideas the social and individual experience of Frenchmen is giving birth. On the one hand, an extreme exactness and clearness of thought seems to be producing blindness in the more subtle problems of experience, and yet there are indications that Frenchmen may prove themselves competent to express the philosophic implications of physical science.

Since the days of the Renaissance Italy has not been the home of philosophic thought. Political troubles and economic distress made abstract thinking impossible. Then followed a period of gradual pacification, and Italians were influenced by the already mature French thought, and, in a less degree, by German Idealism. Theorising, however, passed into a kind of theosophical Neo-Platonism in its clerical exponents. Official orthodoxy suppressed the effort; and Italian thought, among the educated, suffered from the opposition

between physical science and metaphysics which now exists in Europe generally. During the revolutionary period preceding the formation of the Italian nation, thought seemed to concern itself chiefly with emotional problems. The revived metaphysical interests were expressed by Pasquale Galuppi (1771–1845), and in a stronger form by Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797–1855). The results appeared to be a mystic absolutism. A like effect was produced by the work of Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1832). Free speculation at present in Italy has produced valuable scientific theory. A strong scientific school has been arising, and in so far as it expresses the world-view of the new Italian national experience, it seems to be very closely related to the French schools of thought.

In England and in the United States the purely scientific thinkers of the last generation, such as Herbert Spencer, have had no philosophic successors. In place of these we have now a strong psychological school; but within this school there are indications of very varying metaphysical conceptions. The more

physiological psychologists may be held to express the scientific attitude as opposed to the metaphysical. Of the physiological psychologists may be mentioned William James (Harvard University), and E. B. Titchener (Cornell University), who is more extreme. The expression of the philosophy implied in their psychology has been, so far, left to other writers.

Psychologists with a defined attitude to metaphysical problems, generally almost idealist, are G. F. Stout (St. Andrews) and Hugo Münsterberg (Harvard).

On the other hand, the Idealist school, which began in a kind of intellectualism, and depended at first almost wholly upon German thought, has had a most brilliant development. Intellectual formalism and commentary have given place to vigorous and independent thinking, and even those who may be classed as adherents of Hegel or Lotze have learnt the truth of Nietzsche's saying—"One ill requiteth one's teacher by remaining always a scholar."

Among Idealists who are specially connected with Hegelian thought the chief names are W. Wallace, the populariser of Hegelian concepts; E. Caird (late Master of Balliol), who may be called an Hegelian of the right wing; and J. E. McTaggart, perhaps an Hegelian of the left. To somewhat the same school belongs F. H. Bradley, whose "Appearance and Reality" marks a valuable advance in metaphysical thought: with Bradley's name is connected the development of thought made by B. Bosanquet and A. E. Taylor.

Idealists, sometimes connected with the principles of Lotze, are James Ward (Professor at Cambridge) and Ladd in America. With these may be classed Josiah Royce (Harvard).

The details of present thought and controversy do not belong to history. There is, however, one further division which may have important results in the future. For to many the Idealist attitude, even in its present form, seems to savour too much of an intellectual formalism. A small body of thinkers have therefore attempted, under the

name of Pragmatism, or Humanism, to stress the will-element as the most important aspect for a philosophy of experience.

With this the names of William James and F. C. S. Schiller are connected; although many others, who would by no means call themselves Pragmatists, express the same interest in will as opposed to intellect.

Thus the present state of philosophic opinion seems to be unsettled. And yet there is no doubt that the disagreement of writers on philosophy is a sign of life. We no longer desire a general consensus as a criterion of truth. In fact, disagreement is natural upon so complex a problem as the nature of experience. The world in which we live and we ourselves are not facts of such simplicity that everyone can see them in the same light. But even allowing for differences in the statement of what we now believe to be the nature of the world and humanity, there is undoubtedly agreement among all competent thinkers as to certain methods and certain limited results. The state of philosophic thought at present seems to point to the formation of some general

view of the world which may become as commonly acknowledged in the West as was the scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages. We are not likely, however, to reach common beliefs until we have common sympathies and a common experience of life; and cosmopolitanism, even if we exclude the East, is still an unrealised ideal.

Here the history of philosophic thought ends. We have indeed discussed only the thought which has appeared in one small corner of the world. But there is good reason to suppose, now that we are at least aware of Eastern thinkers, that Western thought has more than a provincial interest for humanity as a whole. Perhaps once again among modern Idealists the traces of Eastern thought may be found by future historians; but above all division of East from West must stand the common experience of humanity as a whole. It is impossible for us to distinguish in our own experience and thought those elements which are human and those which are only English. But we may be assured that no real thought will ever arise through the denial of the obvious distinction between nations

and races. The mistake of the Middle Ages was a too hurried unification. Cosmopolitanism which denies nationality is doomed to failure. Only through the infinite complexity of real life and thought is it possible to find that harmony which secures unity as well as variety.

Now if, beyond the mists that still cover the foot of the slope up which we may be imagined to have come, we look back again over the road by which we have travelled, we may find, perhaps, in history something of that calm which the earliest thinkers held to be the chief reward of philosophers. We may see, indeed, that there has been no untroubled progress, no easy and open path in philosophy; but each pioneer has cut his way. And if we are not yet at the mountain-top—nor can ever hope to be, for the metaphor fails—yet our climbing has not been in vain. For we are above the lower clouds at least, and for the future there is hope—*κάλον τὸ ἆθλος καὶ ἡ ἔλπις μεγάλη*.

It remains only to glance over the past. Philosophy in the West began in Ionia: to the first thinkers, as to children, the "solid"

world was the only real one. They thought physics. Next came the brilliant period of conscious criticism in Greece, the age of Plato and Aristotle: and with the problems of thought, the problems of conduct were then first discussed. There is still a living freshness about the thought of this period that belongs to no other. But with the decay of the old-world politics there came the need for a new rendering of experience. Practical doctrine took the place of scientific knowledge. The Stoics and Epicureans stood for the independence of the thinking man in the midst of a falling world. To them succeeded the mystic Neo-Platonists: for one short moment Plotinus thought, and then the last relics of ancient knowledge were swept away in a tide of emotion.

A change came over the Western world, as when the form of life is changed by death. But after the dark ages of thought there came again an Athena-birth. The Romans had left their order and their burden of Greek thought impressed upon the North, and on their part the Northern invaders brought new vigour. After vague travailing, the great

scholastics, Abelard and St. Thomas, thought clearly, and the world went after them; until at last the way that Greece had opened—for the scholastics learnt from the Greeks—led to the Nature the Greeks had known: and commentary once more died.

The Renaissance was almost another age of darkness for pure philosophy. But the new and vigorous outward life developed in time the first modern thought. Descartes and Spinoza showed the tendencies: the one is all for the individual experience as basis, the other for the Absolute as conclusion. Leibnitz gathered up the many threads. But doubt was already at work on dogmatism; Hume's logic and French wit destroyed it. Then, almost in our own day, Kant vaguely understood the new world into which Western thought had entered. To him all truth was relative, and—that was nothing against it. A brilliant development in Germany followed the Critical Philosophy, in some ways like the short-lived insight at Athens long before. The great systems of Idealism in the generation preceding our own have cast the data of experience in a new mould.

The history of philosophy is one in so far as the experience of which it is the reflection is one. But at one time the philosophic insight pierces one part of appearances, at another time it reaches even an opposite truth. As Thoreau has put it, "No truth was ever expressed but with this sort of emphasis, that for the time there seemed to be no other." Therefore the history of thought is, in a way, a record of great thinkers and not that of a mass—"collective mediocrity." Thus "every important individuality is a point of view for the human race from which men catch sight of possibilities and aspects of existence which would otherwise have escaped them."[1]

We, too, belong to the stream: and we have no hope, as Hegel had, that we have even reached the outline of a final synthesis. Such a hope is a delusion. Our standpoint is not less valid for us because it cannot be that of the twenty-first century. And if history is not merely archæology it must end on no uncertain note. "There is a dead and a living past in the history of philosophy, and

1 Höffding, "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 237.

life is not only to be found in the present. It is not merely strength for which the living ring (of the tree) is debtor to its forefathers, but, by holding them in its embrace, expansion likewise: wherefore for the newly sprouting ring, as for the tree, the first law is really to embrace and enfold all its predecessors; the second, to grow from the root upwards self-independently. The problem how to fulfil these two conditions in philosophy verges on the paradoxical, for they who overlook the situation have usually lost the ingenuousness necessary for making a true beginning, and he who attempts a new departure, generally presents some crude dilettante product from having insufficiently appreciated the previous historic evolution."[1] The past, however, holds lessons, not models. We learn by thinking, not by copying. And, while we follow the long lessons of history, the conclusions may indeed lie only obscurely before us, but in the past we find the hope of the future which is our only ground for movement. Indeed, without such an ideal before us it is impossible

[1] Von Hartmann, "Philosophy of the Unconscious," vol. i. p. 5.

even to judge fairly of the past: for the past is not all ready for burial. "It is impossible to march with enthusiasm to the attack upon the institutions of the past without the conviction that there is something more to be gained than the destruction of those institutions."[1] And so in philosophic history we criticise in order to construct.

Experience remains the only ground for real thought, and experience is necessarily individual and social at once. The inheritance of the past is handed on to us even when we are not aware of it. But when we recognise our heritage we have greater power in arriving at a view of the world in which we live. The object of studying the philosophers of the past is not that we may take their thoughts, but that we may think for ourselves. Reasoning is, and always will be, the only road to truth. There are other interests in life besides truth: there are other and perhaps more splendid tasks than that of philosophy. But some men will always be driven by the passion for truth. Reasoning is, indeed, no mechanical or formal logic, but an enthusiasm; and he

[1] Caird, "Comte," p. 12.

little understands the philosopher who believes him to be passionless. The flare of personal passion is but a poor thing compared to that clear flame which burns at the heart of him who desires, at all costs, the truth.

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